Williams v. Bank of United v. Bank, v. Benton, v. Brobst, SECTION. Willard v. Buckingham, 675, 690 Woodcock v. Houldsworth, States, 736, 786, 831, 844 Woodman v. Thurston, Woodliffe v. Connor, 118 Woods v. Boots, SECTION. 821 1368 936 659 7, 273, 298, 300 v. Monroe, v. Neeld, v. Sherman. 1128 919 417, 422 v. Jones, v. Matthews, 740, 1397 Woodson v. Eastman, 956 v. Miller, 1186 Woodthorpe v. Lawes, 697, 720 v. Peyton, 1106 Woolfolk v. Bank of America, 8), 86 Williamson v. Brown, 8, 11, 246, 249 Worden v. Nourse, 1150 Woodworth v. Paige, 758, 761 Worsley v. Earl of Scarborough 714 29 694 263, 348 980 Wright v. Marsh, 1160 Wilson. Anderton, v. Basket, 471 v. Johnson, 1137 Wrights' Mortgage Trust, 111 v. Ladd, 1031 Wyatt v. Barwell, 108, 161 v. McCullough, Wyld . Pickford, 542, 558 Y. 703 745 Yeager v. Farwell, 938 Yeatman v. Erwin, 899 York v. Crawford, 1374 Winston v. Taylor, 978, 1397 York Co. v. Central R. R., 553 1084 v. Westfeldt, Winter v. Landphere. 369, 372 177 6891 Winthrop v. Farrar, Wirtz v. Henry, Wiseman . Westland, v. Tibbitts, 499, 507 1297 v. Wilson, 180 1355 Wolfe v. Horton, Witczinski v. Everman, Withington. Herring, Wollenweber v. Ketterlinus, Wood v. Blanchard, v. Crocker, 272 Younghaus v. Fingar, 105! Youngblood v. Vastine, 217, 222 1213 656 v. Wood, 759 Zollar v. Janvrin, 483 v. Yeatman, 462 Zouch v. Willingale, 648 THE LAW OF NOTICE. CHAPTER I. THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF NOTICE. I. ACTUAL NOTICE. II. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. I. ACTUAL NOTICE. §1. Conflict of Authority as to what is Actual Notice. 2. Causes of the Apparent Conflict. 3. Distinction between Knowledge and Notice. 4. Same, with Illustration. 5. Different Kinds of Actual Notice. 6. Express Notice. 7. Direct Information. 8. Notice by Implication. 9. Disregard of Notice Amounting to Fraud. 10. Circumstances Sufficient to put upon Inquiry. 11. Knowledge Imputed to One who has the Means of Knowing. 12. Notice to Purchasers-When Actual. 13. Facts sufficient to Excite Inquiry. 14. Possession Insufficient. 15. Title-Papers. 16. Possession held Sufficient. 17 Purchaser to use Diligence. 18. Purchaser of Equitable Interest. 19. Vendor's Lien. 20. Purchaser from Mortgagor. 21. Notice of Trust. 22. Purchaser from Insolvent Trustee. 23. Suspicious Circumstances. 24. Inadequacy of Price. 25. Relationship between the Parties. 26. Notice of Partnership Interest. 27. Information Sufficient to put upon Inquiry. 28. Different Sources of Information. 29. Vague Statements Disregarded. 30. Degree of Certainty Required. 31. Notice to an Agent. 32. Principal not Benefited by Agent's Fraud. 33. How Principal Affected by Notice to Agent. 34. Purchase after Fruitless Inquiry. 35. Information Allaying Suspicion. 36. The Effect of Reliance on Information from Doubtful Sources. 81. Conflict of Authority as to what is Actual Notice. - The term here used to designate that branch of the law of notice which does not rest upon mere legal inference or presumption, and to distinguish it from what is properly called constructive notice, would seem to be sufficiently definitive of its own meaning to pass without further gloss or comment. On its face, it would appear to import its character so clearly and unmistakably, as not to depend for elucidation upon judicial construction. And yet the decisions upon this question are far from harmonious, even in this country, and the contrariety of view between the courts of Great Britain and the United States, is equally perplexing and unsatisfactory. $2. Causes of the Apparent Conflict. The conflict of author. ity is more apparent, however, than real. A careful examination of some of the cases, in which the most contradictory methods of classifying the kinds of notice there considered, discloses the fact that much of the confusion arises from attempts to give general definitions which shall embrace just sufficient. to be applicable to the cases decided, in the same manner as they are applied to precedent cases where the same principles are involved. A term incapable of being disposed of in a brief definition, may be thus loosely explained and convey a meaning sufficiently clear and distinct for the purposes of the case; but when there is an attempt to apply the definition thus hastily constructed, to other cases, it may express too much, or too little. §3. Distinction between Knowledge and Notice. Actual notice has been defined by declaring that it exists "when knowledge is actually brought home to the party to be affected by it." This excludes all notice which does not amount in fact, as well as theory, to actual knowledge. There can be no doubt that this definition is too narrow. If we are to be confined strictly to what would be considered in metaphysics as actual knowledge, it will be necessary to banish the term from our statutes, and the courts will be compelled to abandon it as unfit for judicial use. Scarcely any fact can be communicated in a manner so direct as to exclude every possibility of doubt as to its authenticity. Absolute knowledge in the strict sense of the term, imports so high a degree of certainty as to the matter to be established, that to require it in every instance would render the adjustment of differences between man and man, on any just basis, practically impossible. Courts must at best be content with such an approximation to perfect knowledge as the natural imperfections of human recollection will afford. And if this term, like all others employed to express the intention of legislative bodies, is to be subjected to judicial construction, there seems no good reason why it should not be construed in harmony with the whole body of the law, and so as to effectuate the purposes for which laws are intended. §4. Same with Illustration. The courts have accordingly refused to confine actual notice within the narrow limits of the definition quoted above. Their departure from the rule 'Bouv. Law Dict., 236; Story Eq. Jur., § 399. |