210 U. S. Argument for Petitioner. Fisher, 333; Hoe v. Knap, 27 Fed. Rep. 212; Germain v. Wilgus, 67 Fed. Rep. 600; Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Duplex Printing Press Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 331; 1 Robinson on Patents, § 43, pp. 65, 66; Curtis on Patents, 1st ed. and 2d ed., § 320; and 3d ed. and 4th ed., § 406. Upon the question of 'nfringement it is contended that: First. The Liddell patent is the twentieth, in the particular department of the general art to which it belongs; nineteen prior patents showed and described nineteen combinations of machinery, for doing exactly the same work as that which the Liddell patent shows a twentieth combination of machinery for doing. Second. That combination of machinery which is specified in claims 1, 2 and 7 of the Liddell patent, is both analytically and synthetically very different from that combination of machinery, in the defendant's machines, which was held by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, to infringe those claims. Third. That decision cannot be affirmed by the Supreme Court, without reversing all of those twelve prior decisions in which, during fifty years, the Supreme Court has established, enforced and formulated, as one of the patent laws of the United States, the rule that: "Where the patent does not embody a primary invention, but only an improvement on the prior art, and the defendant's machines can be differentiated, the charge of infringement is not sustained." McCormick v. Talcott, 20 How. 405 (1857); Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 556 (1878); Morley Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U. S. 273 (1889); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully Mfg. Co., 144 U. S. 242 (1892); Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 45 (1892); Knapp v. Morss, 150 U. S. 230. (1893); Miller v. Eagle Co., 151 U. S. 204 (1894); Duff v. Pump Co., 107 U. S. 639 (1882): Boyd v. Janesville Hay Tool Co., 158 U. S. 267 (1895); Dashiell v. Grosvenor, 162 U. S. 432 (1896); Kokomo Fence Machine Co. v. Kitselman, 189 U. S. 8 (1903); Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Refining Co., 198 U. S. 399 (1905). Argument for Respondent. 210 U. S. Mr. Samuel R. Betts and Mr. Francis T. Chambers, with whom Mr. James J. Cosgrove was on the brief, for respondent: Under the principles of law and equity which must govern the right to injunctions restraining the infringement of patents for inventions, the court committed no crror in entertaining jurisdiction, even though there had been no commercial use of the invention. After the inventor has made a full and complete disclosure of his invention, he is under no moral or legal obligation to any portion of the public. He is not required by the patent statute to directly or indirectly put it into commercial use, nor is he obliged to permit others to do so, directly or indirectly, except upon his own lawful terms. Having disclosed his invention, he is legally and equitably entitled to all the benefits of the laws, whether administered by a court of law or equity. He has an absolute legal and equitable right to avail himself of all means which the law provides and the machinery of its courts, for preventing others from taking advantage of his invention before his patent expires. The public, acting through the Government, induced him to disclose to it his invention, and has granted him these rights and has agreed and promised to enforce and protect them. The inventor, having fully complied with all of his obligations, the Government cannot indirectly, by withholding an injunction, permit any portion of the public to take advantage of his invention (unless there is a special equity in favor of some portion of the public against the inventor), and thus force him to make use thereof or permit infringers to do so, perhaps on their terms, without failing in its duty and violating its moral and legal obligation as well as its solemn statutory promise, by which it persuaded the inventor to part with his secret property and to disclose the invention, so that the public might obtain immediate knowledge of it and share in and have the full benefit of it after the expiration of the patent. Therefore, considerations of any alleged immediate public benéfit resulting from the inventor putting the invention into 210 U.S. Argument for Respondent. commercial use, should not induce the courts to deprive the inventor of any of his rights, either directly or indirectly, by withholding its most effective process for the preservation of these rights, viz: that of injunction. Grant v. Raymond, 6 Peters, 218, 243 (opinion by Chief Justice Marshall); Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646-674; Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 533; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U. S. 226; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U. S. 375; United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 249; Connolly v. Union Sewer Co., 184 U. S. 540, 546; Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 90; Edison v. Mt. Morris Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 542, 644 (2d Cir.); Heaton Peninsular Co. v. Eureka Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 294 (6th Cir.); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. Rep. 845, 868 (4th Cir.); Fuller v. Berger, 120 Fed. Rep. 274, 277 (7th Cir.); Lamson Consolidated Service Co. v. Hillman, 123 Fed. Rep. 416, 422 (7th Cir.); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Fair, 123 Fed. Rep. 425 (7th Cir.); U. S. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Griffin, 126 Fed. Rep. 364, 368 (9th Cir.); Rupp v. Elliott, 131 Fed. Rep. 730 (6th Cir.); Munroe v. Railway Ap pliance Co., 145 Fed. Rep. 646, 648 (7th Cir.); Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed. Rep. 340, 343 (8th Cir.); U. S. Fastener Co. v. Bradley, 149 Fed. Rep. 222 (2d Cir.); Rubber Tire Co. v. Milwaukee, 154 Fed. Rep. 358, 361 (7th Cir.); Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case Co., 154 Fed. Rep. 365 (7th Cir.); Carr v. Rice, 1 Fish. 198, 200 (N. Y.); Wintermute v. Redington, 1 Fish. 243 (Ohio); Ransom v. Mayor, 1 Fish. 255 (N. Y.); Pitts v. Wemple, 2 Fish. 15 (Ill.); Whitney v. Emmett, 1 Bald. 304; Broadnax v. Central Stock Yard, 4 Fed. Rep. 214, 216 (N. J.); In re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62 (Justice Miller) (Mo.); Consolidated v. Coombs, 39 Fed. Rep. 803 (Mich.); Wirt v. Hicks, 46 Fed. Rep. 71 (N. Y.); Campbell v. Manhattan Railway, 49 Fed. Rep. 930 (N. Y.); Edison v. Mt. Morris, 57 Fed. Rep. 642, 644 (N. Y.); Masseth v. Reiber, 59 Fed. Rep. 612 (Pa.); Bonsak v. Smith, 70 Fed. Rep. 383 (N. C.); Columbia v. Freeman, 71 Fed. Rep. 302, 306 (Mo.); Wyckoff v. Argument for Respondent. 210 U. S. Wagner, 88 Fed. Rep. 515 (N. Y.); White v. Peerless, 111 Fed. Rep. 190 (Pa.); Brodrick v. Mayhew, 131 Fed. Rep. 92 (Wis.); National Co. v. Daab, 135 Fed. Rep. 891, 895 (N. J.); Hoe v. Miehle, 141 Fed. Rep. 115 (N. Y.); Hartmann v. Park & Son, 145 Fed. Rep. 358 (Ky.). Withholding the injunction restraining the petitioner's infringement of the valid Liddell patent, on the ground of non-use of the invention thereof, would be a violation of respondent's constitutional and statutory rights, and contrary to the "course and principles of equity." The court below was not in error in holding that the invention of claims 1, 2 and 7 of the Liddell patent was of sufficient breadth to cover the defendant's machine. The courts below having found as matters of fact that the petitioner's evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of priority of invention of the patent in suit, and that the patent was a broad one and that the evidence disclosed no material difference in structure and mode of operation and results between the petitioner's machine and the machine of the patent, the decisions on these matters of fact will not be reëxamined by this court. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70. No one of the claims in suit is limited to the use of the specific form of mechanism illustrated in the drawings for giving the described movements to the characteristic parts of the combination. It is also evident from a consideration of the detailed mechanisms pointed out in the drawing, as illustrative, or efficient, or operative mechanisms, for carrying out the invention, and referable as detailed mechanisms to the broad elements of the claims, that if said claims are to be construed as limited to the details of such mechanisms as shown in the patent, they become of no protective value or force. It is undoubtedly within the skill of mechanics skilled in the art to construct machines embodying the essence of Liddell's invention and construction, and yet to actuate the moving parts by well-known mechanical devices, widely different in detail from those shown in his drawings and described in his specification, but clearly mechanical equivalents thereof. A patent can certainly be very broad in scope, and broad enough to cover very broad differences of details in mechanism, under the doctrine of equivalency, without requiring that it shall occupy the position held by so few patents, of being of a strictly "primary" or "pioneer" character. It is enough in this particular case, if it be given a fair application of the doctrine of equivalents, as the first machine for making the diamond fold for S. O. S. [self opening, square] bags, involving the combination of a continuously-rotating cylinder with a forming plate, not sharing the rotative motion of the cylinder, but oscillating about its rear edge on said cylinder, in regular and properly related and timed succession, to make the diamond fold on the bag blanks. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The defense of want of invention in the Liddell machine is not urged here, because it is said that the decision of that question depends upon mechanical comparisons, too numerous and complicated to be conveniently made by a bench of judges, and because, though the Liddell patent approaches closely the prior art, it "perhaps covers a margin of differentiation sufficient, though barely sufficient, to constitute invention." The two questions, therefore, which remain for decision are the jurisdiction of the court and the question of infringement. We will consider the latter question first. It does not depend, counsel for the Continental Company says, "upon any issue of fact, but does depend, as questions of infringement" sometimes do, upon a "point of law." This point of law, it is further said, has been formulated in a decision of this court as follows: "Where the patent does not embody a primary invention, but only an improvement on the prior art, and defendant's machines can be differentiated, the charge of infringement is |