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the Italian law of May 13, 1871, called 'the law of guarantees,' against which Pius IX and Leo XIII have not ceased to protest." 1 Moore's Dig. 39.

After the cession of Louisiana by France to the United States certain questions came up as to the title to lands granted by the King of Spain to the Roman Catholic Church. The opinion of Attorney General Wirt, having been asked thereon, he wrote as follows, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 563.

"There can be no doubt of the power of the King of Spain to grant lands in Florida while the province was his, nor of the capacity of the Roman Catholic Church to take by grant. Our treaty with Spain recognizes and ratifies all such grants made prior to a certain day."

The proposition, therefore, that the church had no corporate or jural personality seems to be completely answered by an examination of the law and history of the Roman Empire, of Spain and of Porto Rico down to the time of the cession, and by the recognition accorded to it as an ecclesiastical body by the Treaty of Paris and by the law of nations.

Appellant claims that there were some laws of Porto Rico which should have been complied with before the Roman Catholic Church could have any corporate existence or right to sue. It may be assumed that he refers to the various laws of Porto Rico relating to the formation and regulation of business corporations. But it is plain that none of these laws have any application to the church and never were so intended.

If the people of Porto Rico had passed some law, by which the manner of holding properties by ecclesiastical bodies through trustees or otherwise, or the method in which such body should be represented before the courts were prescribed, a different question would arise. But there was no such law, and by the Spanish law, from the earliest moment of the settlement of the island to the present time, the corporate existence of the Catholic Church has been recognized. As counsel for the appellee says: "At the very least, and even assuming that for centuries the church had not been recognized as a body of equal

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importance with the State in Porto Rico, but that it was a merely de facto organization or association holding property it would nevertheless have sufficient standing to maintain this suit."

There is no pretense in the corporation law of regulating the manner in which the Roman Catholic Church or any other religious corporation or body shall hold its property. No question of conformity to any law of "Sociétés Cultuelles" or of "Associations" or religious societies can here arise, since there are no statutes relating to any such genus of legal or artificial persons.

The general law as to corporations is found in Titles I and II of the Civil Code now in force. We give in the margin sections 27-30 and part of section 65.1

1 SEC. 27. The following are artificial persons:

(1) Corporations, associations and institutions of public interest, having artificial personality recognized by law.

The personality of such bodies shall commence from the moment of their establishment in accordance with law.

(2) Private associations, whether civil, commercial or industrial, to which the law grants legal personality.

SEC. 29. The civil status of corporations shall be governed by the laws which create or recognize them; that of associations by their by-laws; and that of institutions by the rules of their establishment duly approved by administrative action when such requisite be necessary.

SEC. 30. Artificial persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds and also contract obligations and institute civil and criminal actions in accordance with the laws and regulation of their establishment.

SEC. 65. All corporations or joint stock companies, organized under the laws of any State, or of the United States, or of any foreign government, shall, before doing business within this island, file in the office of the secretary a duly authenticated copy of their charters or articles of incorporation, and also a statement verified by the oath of the president and secretary of said corporation, and attested by the majority of its board of directors, showing

(1) The name of such corporation and the location of its principal office or place of business, without this island; and if it is to have any place of business or principal office within this island, the location thereof.

etc.

(2) The amount of its capital stock.

(3) The amount of its capital stock actually paid in, in money.

(4) The amount of its capital stock paid in, in any other way, and in what,

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Domestic corporation law is equally inapplicable. Its terms are found in the Civil Code, Title II, chap. I, and have reference solely to business or commercial corporations. No religious, eleemosynary or charitable corporation can fall within its purview. Stock, stockholders, capital, surplus, officers, directors, the doing of business are the basic elements of this statute.

The properties of the church in Cuba and the Philippines at the time of the ratification of the treaty were far more considerable than those in Porto Rico. And the controversies or questions arising as to those properties have been quite generally adjusted in both Cuba and the Philippines partly with and partly without recourse to the courts. In Cuba a commission was appointed to consider the whole question and its report contains much interesting and pertinent information. It begins with the fundamental proposition that: "The church, as a juridical person, has held and holds the right to acquire, possess, or transfer all kinds of properties. The church has never been denied this right in Spain; rather, on the contrary, in all the provisions covering these matters this right has been recognized in the church," Sen. Rep. 2977, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 12.

On this admitted basis was concluded a satisfactory adjustment of the difficult problem incident to the transfer of sovereignty from a regime of union of church and state to the American system of complete separation.

Even greater difficulties were settled in the Philippines, and the American Government never suggested that the church was without juristic capacity to possess or protect property rights. The suggestion that it did not possess a license from the local authorities "to do business" was never put forward.

Whether these ecclesiastical properties originally came from the State or any subdivision thereof, they were donated to, at once became and have ever since remained the property and in the peaceful possession of the Roman Catholic Church.

In the Philippines, the Supreme Court of the islands has recently treated these questions in an interesting and satisfactory opinion. Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Philippines, 41. The sugVOL. CCX-21

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gestion, made there as here, that the church was not a legal person entitled to maintain its property rights in the courts, the Supreme Court answered by saying that it did not require serious consideration when "made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe."

It is urged that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action, and that it admits that the property in question was constructed out of funds of the municipality of Ponce, Porto Rico. This contention has been sufficiently answered. Counsel for appellee rightly says that—

"Whether the property originally came from the crown or the local government is immaterial, since it had been for centuries recognized as the property of the church. Because the Spanish crown or one of its municipal agencies chose to donate churches some years or centuries ago, it scarcely follows that it can now be claimed that the gift is revocable, and that the municipality may now expropriate the church and convert the property to any purpose it may desire."

In his statement to His Holiness, the Pope, when on special mission, Mr. Taft, the then Governor General of the Philippines, said, in referring to those islands:

"The transfer of sovereignty and all governmental property rights and interests from the crown of Spain to the United States in the Philippine Islands contained in the Treaty of Paris was a transfer from a government between which and the Church of Rome there had been in those islands the closest association in property, religion, and politics, to a government which by the law of its being is absolutely prevented from having such associations with any church. To make the transfer effectual, and, at the same time just, it is obvious that the proper line of division must be drawn between what were really civil property interests of the crown of Spain and what were religious, trusts of the Catholic Church, and that all union of civil and clerical agencies for performance of political functions must end." Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, p. 237.

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In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 53, Mr.. Justice Bradley said:

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"By the Spanish law, whatever was given to the service of God, became incapable of private ownership, being held by the clergy as guardians or trustees; when property was given for a particular object, as a church, a hospital, a convent or a community, etc., and the object failed, the property did not revert to the donor, or his heirs, but devolved to the crown, the church or other commune or community," etc.

All the public funds employed in church buildings and other property were appropriated for that purpose without any reservation or restriction whateve, being approved according to law by the representatives of the nation in the Cortes, or by those of the towns in the common councils. Therefore the application of funds thus appropriated and voted by the legitimate mandataries of the nation or of the municipalities constituted, from the standpoint of law and justice, a perfect, irrevocable gift.

Certain objections in the nature of matters of procedure made by appellant we do not think we need consider. They may be classified as follows:

(1) Misjoinder of causes of action; (2) Insufficiency and irregularity of form; (3) Bar of statute of limitations; and (4) Lack of authority to bring suit in name of the church.

We do not regard either of these as possessing sufficient merit to require discussion.

We accept the conclusions of appellee's counsel as thus summarized:

"First. The legislative assembly of Porto Rico had the power to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the island of this special class of controversies. Such legislation was not contrary to the constitution and was in conformity with the power conferred by Congress upon the legislative assembly to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts.

"Second. The Roman Catholic Church has been recognized as possessing legal personality by the treaty of Paris and its

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