er qualifications, than what ordinarily belonged to the executive department. His political opinions might be in marked contrast with those of a majority of the nation; and while he might possess a just influence in the senate, as a presiding officer, he might be deemed wholly unfit for the various duties of the chief executive magistrate. In addition to these considerations, there was no novelty in the appointment of such an officer for similar purposes in some of the state governments; and it therefore came recommended by experience, as a safe and useful arrangement, to guard the people against the inconveniences of an interregnum in the government, or a devolution of power upon an officer, who was not their choice, and might not possess their confidence.

§ 743. The next clause embraces the mode of election of the President and Vice-President; and although it has been repealed by an amendment of the constitution, (as will be hereafter shown,) yet it still deserves consideration, as a part of the original scheme, and more especially, as very grave doubts have been entertained, whether the substitute is not inferior to it in wisdom and convenience.

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§744. The clause is as follows: "Each state shall "appoint in such manner, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole num"ber of senators and representatives, to which the "state may be entitled in the congress. But no sena "tor, or representative, or person holding an office of "trust or profit under the United States, shall be ap pointed an elector.

"The electors shall meet in their respective states, "and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at "least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with

"themselves.

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And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; "which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit, "sealed, to the seat of the government of the United "States, directed to the president of the senate. The "president of the senate shall, in the presence of the "senate and house of representatives, open all the cer"tificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be "the president, if such number be a majority of the "whole number of electors appointed; and if there be "more than one, who have such majority, and have an "equal number of votes, then the house of representa"tives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them "for president; and if no person have a majority, then "from the five highest on the list the said house shall "in like manner choose the president. But in choos"ing the president, the votes shall be taken by states, "the representation from each state having one vote; "a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member "or members from two-thirds of the states, and a ma"jority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. "In every case, after the choice of the president, the "person having the greatest number of votes of the "electors shall be the vice-president. But if there "should remain two or more, who have equal votes, "the senate shall choose from them by ballot the vice"president."

§ 745. Assuming that the choice ought not to be confided to the national legislature, (which was at one time proposed, and after deliberation rejected,) there remained various other modes, by which it might be effected; by the people directly; by the state legislatures; or by electors, chosen by the one, or the other. The latter

mode was deemed most advisable; and the reasoning, by which it was supported, was to the following effect. The immediate election should be made by men, the most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the inducements, which ought to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from the general mass for this special object, would be most likely to possess the information, and discernment, and independence, essential for the proper discharge of the duty. It is also highly important to afford as little opportunity, as possible, to tumult and disorder. These evils are not unlikely to occur in the election of a chief magistrate directly by the people, considering the strong excitements and interests, which such an occasion may naturally be presumed to produce. The choice of a number of persons, to form an intermediate body of electors, would be far less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one, who was himself the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors chosen in each state are to assemble, and vote in the state, in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation would expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all convened at one time in one place. The same circumstances would naturally lessen the dangers of cabal, intrigue, and corruption, especially, if congress should, as they undoubtedly would, prescribe the same day for the choice of the electors, and for giving their votes, throughout the United States. The scheme, indeed, presents every reasonable guard against these fatal evils to republican governments.

The appointment of the president is not made to depend upon any pre-existing body of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but is delegated to persons chosen by the immediate act of the people, for that sole and temporary purpose. All those persons, who, from their situation, might be suspected of too great a devotion to the president in office, such as senators, and representatives, and other persons holding offices of trust or profit under the United States, are excluded from eligibility to the trust. Thus, without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election may fairly be presumed to enter upon their duty free from any sinister bias. Their transitory existence and dispersed situation would present formidable obstacles to any corrupt combinations; and time, as well as means, would be wanting to accomplish, by bribery or intrigue of any considerable number, a betrayal of their duty. The president, too, who should be thus appointed, would be far more independent, than if chosen by a legislative body, to whom he might be expected to make correspondent sacrifices, to gratify their wishes, or reward their services. And on the other hand, being chosen by the voice of the people, his gratitude would take the natural direction, and sedulously guard their rights.

§ 746. The other parts of the scheme are no less entitled to commendation. The number of electors is equal to the number of senators and representatives of each state; thus giving to each state as virtual a representation in the electoral colleges, as that, which it en

joys in congress. The votes, when given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and there opened and counted in the presence of both houses. The person, having a majority of the whole

number of votes, is to be president. But, if no one of the candidates has such a majority, then the house of representatives, the popular branch of the government, is to elect, from the five highest on the list, the person, whom they may deem best qualified for the office, each state having one vote in the choice. The person, who has the next highest number of votes after the choice of president, is to be vice-president. But, if two or more shall have equal votes, the senate are to choose the vice-president. Thus, the ultimate functions are to be shared alternately by the senate and representatives in the organization of the executive department.

§747. The principal difficulty, which has been felt in the mode of election, is the constant tendency, from the number of candidates, to bring the choice into the house of representatives. This has already occurred twice in the progress of the government; and in the future there is every probability of a far more frequent occurrence. This was early foreseen; and, even in one of the state conventions, a most distinguished statesman, and one of the framers of the constitution, admitted, that it would probably be found impracticable to elect a president by the immediate suffrages of the people; and that in so large a country many persons would probably be voted for, and that the lowest of the five highest on the list might not have an inconsiderable number of votes. It cannot escape the discernment of any attentive observer, that if the house of representatives is often to choose a president, the choice will, or at least may, be influenced by many motives, independent of his merits and qualifications. There is danger, that intrigue and cabal may mix in the rivalries and strife. And the discords, if not the corruptions, generated by the occasion, will proba