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moment, we cannot but be struck with the reflection, how admirably this division and distribution of legislative powers between the state and national governments is adapted to preserve the liberty, and promote the happiness of the people of the United States. To the general government are assigned all those powers, which relate to the common interests of all the states, as comprising one confederated nation. While to each state is reserved all those powers, which may affect, or promote its own domestic interests, its peace, its prosperity, its policy, and its local institutions. At the

same time, such limitations and restraints are imposed upon each government, as experience has demonstrated to be wise in order to control the public functionaries, or indispensable to secure the harmonious operations of the Union.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

ORGANIZATION OF.

§ 719. In the progress of our examination of the constitution, we are now arrived at the second article, which contains an enumeration of the organization and powers of the executive department. What is the best constitution for the executive department, and what are the powers, with which it should be entrusted, are problems among the most important, and probably the most difficult to be satisfactorily solved, of all, which are involved in the theory of free governments. No man, who has ever studied the subject with profound attention, has risen from the labour without an increased and almost overwhelming sense of its intricate relations, and perplexing doubts. No man, who has thoroughly read the human history, and especially the history of republics, but has been struck with the consciousness, how little has been hitherto done to establish a safe depositary of power in any hands; and how often in the hands of one, or a few, or many, of an hereditary monarch, or of an elective chief, the executive power has brought ruin upon the state, or sunk under the oppressive burthen of its own imbecility. Perhaps our own history, hitherto, does not establish, that we have wholly escaped all the dangers; and that here is not to be found, as has been the case in other nations, the vulnerable part of the republic.

§ 720. The first clause of the first section of the second article is as follows: "The executive power "shall be vested in a President of the United States

"of America. He shall hold his office during the term "of four years; and together with the Vice-President, "chosen for the same term, be chosen as follows."

§ 721. In considering this clause, three practical questions are naturally suggested: First, whether there should be a distinct executive department; secondly, whether it should be composed of more than one person; and, thirdly, what should be the duration of office.

§ 722. Upon the first question, little need be said. All America have at length concurred in the propriety of establishing a distinct executive department. The principle is embraced in every state constitution; and it seems now to be assumed among us, as a fundamental maxim of government, that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments ought to be separate, and the powers of one ought not to be exercised by either of the others. The same maxim is found recognised in express terms in many of our state constitutions. It is hardly necessary to repeat, that where all these powers are united in the same hands, there is a real despotism, to the extent of their coercive exercise. Where, on the other hand, they exist together, and yet depend for their exercise upon the mere authority of recommendation, (as they did under the confederation,) they become at once imbecile and arbitrary, subservient to popular clamour, and incapable of steady action.

723. Taking it, then, for granted, that there ought to be an executive department, the next consideration is, how it ought to be organized. It may be stated in general terms, that that organization is best, which will at once secure energy in the executive, and safety to the people. The notion, however, is not uncommon, and

occasionally finds ingenious advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of a republican government. It is difficult to find any sufficient grounds, on which to rest this notion; and those, which are usually stated, belong principally to that class of minds, which readily indulge in the belief of the general perfection, as well as perfectibility, of human nature, and deem the least possible quantity of power, with which government can subsist, to be the best. To those, who look abroad into the world, and attentively read the history of other nations, ancient and modern, far different lessons are taught with a severe truth and force. Those lessons instruct them, that energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of a good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks. It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, and to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant with Roman history knows, how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable name of a dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, aspiring to tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community, threatening the existence of the government, as against foreign enemies, menacing the destruction and conquest of the state. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever may be its theory, must, in practice, be a bad government.

§ 724. The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are unity, duration, an adequate provision for its support, and competent powers. The ingredients, which constitute safety in a republican form of government, are a due dependence on the people, and a due responsibility to the people.

§ 725. That unity is conducive to energy will scarcely be disputed. Decision, activity, secresy, and despatch will generally characterise the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of a greater number; and in proportion, as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

§ 726. This unity may be destroyed in two ways; first, by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity; secondly, by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, however, in whole or in part, to the control and advice of a council. Of the first, the two consuls of Rome may serve, as an example in ancient times; and in modern times, the brief and hasty history of the three consuls of France, during its shortlived republic. Of the latter, several states in the Union furnish examples, as some of the colonies did before the revolution. Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have had their advocates. They are both liable to similar, if not to equal objections.

§ 727. But independent of any of the lights derived from history, it is obvious, that a division of the executive power between two or more persons must always tend to produce dissensions, and fluctuating councils. Whenever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise, or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust, or office,

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