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§ 344. The propriety of adopting this clause does not seem to have furnished any matter of discussion, either in, or out of the convention. It was obvious, that the power ought to reside somewhere; and must be exercised, either by the state or national government, or by some department thereof. The friends of state powers would naturally rest satisfied with leaving it with the state executive; and the friends of the national government would acquiesce in that arrangement, if other constitutional provisions existed sufficient to preserve its due execution. The provision, as it stands, has the strong recommendation of public convenience, and facile adaptation to the particular local circumstances of each state. Any general regulation would have worked with some inequality.

§ 345. The next clause is, that "the house of repre"sentatives shall choose their speaker, and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeach"ment."

§ 346. Each of these privileges is of great practical value and importance. In Great Britain the house of commons elect their own speaker; but he must be approved by the king. This approval is now altogether a matter of course; but anciently, it seems, the king intimated his wish previously, in order to avoid the necessity of a refusal; and it was acceded to. The very language used by the speakers in former times, in order to procure the approval of the crown, was such as would not now be tolerated; and indicated, at least, a disposition to undue subserviency. A similar power of approval existed in the royal governors in many of the colonies before the revolution. The exclusive right of choosing a speaker, without any appeal to, or approval by any other department of the government,

is an improvement upon the British system. It secures a more independent and unlimited choice on the part of the house, according to the merits of the individual, and their own sense of duty. It avoids those inconveniences and collisions, which might arise from the interposition of a negative in times of high party excitement. It extinguishes a constant source of jealousy and heart-burning; and a disposition on one side to exert an undue influence, and on the other to assume a hostile opposition. It relieves the executive department from all the embarrassments of opposing the popular will; and the house from all the irritation of not consulting the cabinet wishes.

$347. The other power, the sole power of impeachment, has a far wider scope and operation. An impeachment, as described in the common law of England, is a presentment by the house of commons, the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom, to the house of lords, the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdiction of the kingdom. The articles of impeachment are a kind of bill of indictment found by the commons, and tried by the lords, who are, in cases of misdemeanors, considered, not only as their own peers, but as the peers of the whole nation. The origin and history of the jurisdiction of parliament, in cases of impeachment, are summarily given by Mr. Woodeson; but little can be gathered from it, which is now of much interest, and, like most other legal antiquities, it is involved in great obscurity. To what classes of offenders it applies, will be more properly an inquiry hereafter. In the constitution of the United States, the house of representatives exercises the functions of the house of commons in regard to impeachmen ; and the senate (as we shall hereafter see) the

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functions of the house of lords in relation to the trial of the party accused. The principles of the common law, so far as the jurisdiction is to be exercised, are deemed of primary obligation and government. The object of prosecutions of this sort in both countries is to reach high and potent offenders, such as might be presumed to escape punishment in the ordinary tribunals, either from their own extraordinary influence, or from the imperfect organization and powers of those tribunals. These prosecutions are, therefore, conducted by the representatives of the nation, in their public capacity, in the face of the nation, and upon a responsibility, which is at once felt, and reverenced by the whole community. The notoriety of the proceedings; the solemn manner, in which they are conducted; the deep extent, to which they affect the reputation of the accused; the ignominy of a conviction, which is to be known through all time; and the glory of an acquittal, which ascertains and confirms innocence; these are all calculated to produce a vivid and lasting interest in the public mind; and to give to such prosecutions, when necessary, a vast importance, both as a check to crime, and an incitement to virtue.

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§ 348. This subject will be resumed hereafter, when the other provisions of the constitution, in regard to impeachments, come under review. It does not apthat the vesting of the power of impeachment in the house of representatives was deemed a matter of serious doubt or question, either in the convention, or with the people. If the true spirit of the constitution is consulted, it would seem difficult to arrive at any other conclusion, than of its fitness. It is designed, as a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men. If such is the design, who can so properly In the

inquisitors for the nation, as the representatives of the people themselves? They must be presumed to be watchful of the interests, alive to the sympathies, and ready to redress the grievances, of the people. If it is made their duty to bring official delinquents to justice, they can scarcely fail of performing it without public denunciation, and political desertion, on the part of their constituents.

CHAPTER X.

THE SENATE.

§ 349. THE third section of the first article relates to the organization and powers of the senate.

§ 350. In considering the organization of the senate, our inquiries naturally lead us to ascertain; first, the nature of the representation and vote of the states therein; secondly, the mode of appointment; thirdly, the number of the senators; fourthly, their term of service; and fifthly, their qualifications.

§ 351. The first clause of the third section is in the following words: "The senate of the United States "shall be composed of two senators from each state, "chosen by the legislature thereof for six years; and "each senator shall have one vote."

§ 352. In the first place, the nature of the representation and vote in the senate. Each state is entitled to two senators; and each senator is entitled to one vote. This, of course, involves in the very constitution of this branch of the legislature a perfect equality among all the states, without any reference to their respective

size, population, wealth, or power. In this respect

there is a marked contrast between the senate and the house of representatives. In the latter, there is a representation of the people according to the relative population of each state upon a given basis; in the former, each state in its political capacity is represented upon a footing of perfect equality, like a congress of sovereigns, or ambassadors, or like an assembly of peers. The only difference between it and the continental congress under the old confederation is, that in this

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