cherish; and if these are hurtful or dangerous to society, then is Phrenology likely to be so.

Before parting with Dr Elliotson, we must remind the reader, that the value of that gentleman's defence of Phrenology is not to be estimated by what it would have cost, so to speak, at the present day; we must take into account the troublous times in which it was sent forth, and the influence which it was calculated to produce, and which it did produce, on the unprejudiced minds of the numerous class of readers for whose hands it was destined. At that time it was almost the only modern physiological work to which the English medical student had access, and that its influence was extended over a wide surface is evident, from the simple fact of four large editions having been sold off in a very few years. At the present day a man may sit quietly down and defend Phrenology, certain that his efforts will neither procure for him insupportable ridicule, nor loss of reputation; but it was quite the reverse six years ago; it then required no small degree of moral courage to face the storm with which the Phrenologist was sure to be assailed, even in private society, if he ventured a word in support of his views. Keeping these circumstances in mind, the Phrenologist will not hesitate to rank Dr Elliotson high among the earliest, boldest, and ablest advocates of his science, For our parts, we should be delighted if the present notice were to stimulate him to extend his usefulness still farther, by publishing more in detail the results of his experience in the science.

There is one other very early, able, and zealous defender of the science, to whom also we have hitherto omitted to do justice, Sir George S. Mackenzie, Bart. We have prepared, and intended to publish in this Number a review of his works on Phrenology, and an exposition of his meritorious services in the cause, but the length to which our reviews of Dr Poole's and Dr Spurzheim's works, both recent publications, demanding immediate notice, have extended, precludes us from discharging this duty on the present occasion; we pledge ourselves, however, not to fail in doing so in our next.

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ARTICLE XV.

SCOLDING OF JURIES.

In the Scots criminal courts, after the witnesses have been examined, and the counsel for the crown and the prisoner have each addressed the jury, the presiding judge recapitulates the statements of the different witnesses, makes comments upon them, explains such matters of law as require to be dealt with, and finally directs the jury what verdict, according to his views of the case, they ought to return. It sometimes happens, however, that they differ from him in opinion, and give a decision opposite to that which he has recommended. The verdict decides the fate of the prisoner; but if he has escaped when the court thought he should have been found guilty, it is not uncommon for the judge to address the jury in a strain of rather strong and vehement vituperation. We have heard jurymen complain of this treatment, and regard it plainly as a scold for having decided according to their own conviction, and not according to that of the bench.

We shall endeavour to analyze phrenologically the rationale of this proceeding.

First, then, the human mind has received a definite constitution, and its operations are governed by determinate laws. A man believes that three times three are nine, in consequence of his faculty of number perceiving the relations of these quantities; but if in him the organ be very small, and the faculty in consequence weak, he may have great difficulty in finding out how many 14 times 19 are. 14 times 19 are. Suppose we wish to convince him that the amount is 266, we must lay before him the simplest elements of the calculation, and advance step by step till he see it as we do. If he fail in attaining the right result after all our pains, the proper inference is, either that we have not been sufficiently explicit in

our demonstration, or that his faculty of number is so weak as not to be able to comprehend the computation. If the first has been the cause, we must bear the blame ourselves; if the second, we ought to avoid in future placing that individual in a situation where the power of calculation is necessary to the discharge of his duties; but in neither view is it proper to scold him for the disappointment that we meet with.

In judging of moral guilt or innocence the laws that regulate the mind are analogous. If the case is simple and the evidence clear and strong, the conclusion will be as intuitively reached as in the calculation of 3 times 3; but if the circumstances are numerous and complicated, stronger natural moral sentiments and intellectual faculties will be required to arrive at a sound judgment. If the major part of a jury happen to be deficient in Conscientiousness and reflection, they may, in such cases, experience a real difficulty in detecting justice. After the witnesses, counsel, and judge, have done their best to enlighten them, they may still involuntarily wander in error from sheer incapacity to feel justly ;-we say to feel justly, because Conscientiousness is a sentiment, and justice must be felt, and cannot be imparted by intellect alone, like a logical or mathematical demonstration. If, on the other hand, the jurymen possess an average endowment of the moral and intellectual powers,-then, as evidence produces conviction according to regular laws, the cause of the verdict being erroneous must be sought for in the imperfection of the manner in which the faculties have been addressed. Even prejudice itself, if it has been the occasion of the error, must owe its existence, after the trial, to one or other of these causes. Prejudice is a preconceived opinion of the guilt or innocence of the party accused, taken up before entering the jury-box; but every opinion, however formed, must necessarily yield to the force of evidence, unless the natural capacity for recognising truth be too feeble, or the evidence itself be deficient in strength and precision.

Whether, therefore, the disappointment of the judge arises from natural incapacity in the jury, or from imperfection in the steps necessary to produce conviction, it is unphilosophical to blame them for their verdict. They are not entitled by law, even although inclined, to recall their opinion, and adopt that of the bench; so that, in the case in which they are found fault with, it is impossible for them to remedy the evil. The only effect of scolding them, therefore, must be to make them slavishly follow the direction of the judge in future trials, and not trust to the impressions made on their own minds,— a result to be deprecated above every thing, as defeating the very end of their institution.

But farther, it is a possible case, that a judge himself might be deficient in the organ and faculty of Conscientiousness; and then the impressions made on his mind by the evidence and speeches of the counsel, would not be a correct reflection of that which would arise in the minds of individuals in whom Conscientiousness was strong. Every faculty has a natural language of its own, which is recognised only by the same faculty in others. An unconscientious witness may give evidence so feasible to the intellect, that a person with a deficient Conscientiousness may not detect imperfec tion in it; while an individual with a strong Conscientiousness might feel that the substance of truth was wanting. Suppose such evidence contradicted by the testimony of another witness, in whose tones and manner truth spoke out in her native language, a person, with Conscien tiousness strong, would instinctively believe the latter; while another, in whom that faculty was weak, would not, impro bably, be led by sympathy to believe the former. According ly, if a jury possess average intellect and moral sentiments, and a judge find them return an unanimous verdict in opposition to his charge, we think the philosophical inference is, either that some obstacle, in the way of arriving at a sound judgment, has existed, which has not been removed, or that his own impression is erroneous; and, again, we arrive at the

conclusion, that it is not proper to blame a jury for expressing in their verdict the opinion which they have actually formed, whatever its merits may appear to the mind of another individual to be.

ARTICLE XVI.

COMMERCIAL DISTRESS.

(From a Correspondent.)

It is a fundamental doctrine of ours, that the faculties common to man with the lower animals are inferior to those proper to man; and that the Creator has so arranged the world, that misery is the natural result of the predominance of the former, and happiness of the latter. We shall endeavour to apply these principles in accounting for the commercial distress which has of late so painfully engaged public

attention.

In a period of profound peace, and immediately after one of the finest summers and most abundant harvests ever showered by a bountiful Providence on Britain, this country has been a theatre of almost universal misery. In October and November, 1825, stocks began to fall with alarming rapidity; in November, numerous bankers in London failed; in December the evil spread to the country bankers; in January and February, 1826, the distress overtook the merchants and manufacturers, thousands of them were ruined, and their workmen thrown idle; agricultural produce began to fall, and suffering and gloom have extended over the whole empire. These events have carried awful misery into the bosoms of numberless families. The Phrenologist, who knows the nature of the propensities and sentiments, and their objects, is well able to conceive the deep, though often silent agonies that must have been felt when Acquisitiveness was suddenly deprived of its long-collected stores;when Self-esteem and Love