It is, I am aware, very difficult to convey an accurate idea of development by words; but as I cannot at present send you a cast, I may remark, that the inner part of the eyebrow has a heavy appearance from the very peculiar configuration; and the arch of the eyebrow, instead of springing, as generally, from the root of the nose, commences nearly over the middle of the eye. From that to the root of the nose is nearly a straight line. Upon the whole, it is the most decided case of development in this organ that I have seen; and though this communication appears anonymously, I leave the designation of both the subject and writer of it with you, Mr Editor, and either of us will be very happy to answer any inquiries that are made for philosophical purposes.

I am yours respectfully,

J.

ARTICLE III.

An Apology for the Study of Phrenology. Wood and Cunnigham, Bath; Longman & Co. London; and John Anderson, Junior, Edinburgh.

This is a well-written and unassuming pamphlet, the object of which is explained in the following extract :-"The ob"ject of these pages is to represent Phrenology so as to vindicate its "claim to candid examination, rather than to furnish any complete

"development of its principles; to shew, that, as a branch of na"tural science, it rests precisely on that foundation by which all "natural truth is upheld, namely, induction from well-established "facts; and to obviate certain prejudices hastily urged and heedlessly admitted, by which irreligious tendency has been ground"lessly imputed to it." It consists of four sections containing, 1st, Introductory Remarks; 2d, Phrenology founded on Observation and Induction; 3d, Phrenology not at variance with Re'ligious Faith; and, 4th, Uses of Phrenology.

The following passage is from section 3d.-" What does Phrenology profess? Not to investigate the abstract nature of "mind, but merely to develop its phenomena, and to establish, by "observation and induction, the real faculties which it possesses, to"gether with the dependence of those faculties on the conformation "of the brain. In representing the brain as the organ of thought " and moral feeling, the Phrenologist never dreams of attributing to "it an independent agency; nor ever regards it save as the instru"ment by which the spiritual principle exercises its powers."

"It is almost descending too much to advert to the close analogy "that subsists between the general doctrines of Phrenology and those "which have ever been maintained with respect to the external 66 senses. We s We see with the eye, hear with the ear-who, in pursuing "the studies of optics or acoustics, ever imagines that these organs "alone are capable of such functions, or conceives otherwise than "that they make returns which are perceived by the intelligent inmate to whom they are subservient? Phrenology does no more; "it traces to the brain, by a close induction from innumerable facts, an agency by which thought and feeling are exercised. It esta"blishes a direct connexion between the several faculties of the mind " and those respective portions of the brain with which it has found "them uniformly to co-exist, and it denominates these portions the organs of the respective faculties. The peculiar mechanism of the "eye and ear, so directly suited to their respective functions, procures an unreluctant assent to the conclusion that they are the per organs of sight and hearing. The mode in which the brain "exercises its functions of thought and feeling is less obvious: but "when the fact, that it is essential to their manifestation, is esta"blished by such proofs as are deemed sufficient in all other physi"cal investigations, why should we rely on its truth with less con"fidence? Are no truths demonstrable or capable of proof, but "such as are displayed in all their intimate operations to our view? "The advocates of religious faith will do little service to the cause "which they espouse by maintaining such doctrine. We have in "the inductions of Phrenology the only proofs which the nature of "the inquiry permits; the intimate operations of the brain in the "exercise of the alleged functions we cannot see, and most probably "never shall discover. In all human inquiry into the laws esta"blished by the Creator in the economy of this world, there is a point beyond which we cannot soar; but so far as we are permit

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"ted to penetrate into the mysteries of the Most High, it is clearly our "bounden duty not to forego, through indolence or misconception, "any investigation of nature's laws to which our comprehension is "equal. To me it appears, that we have not only a direct inter"est in pursuing phrenological inquiries, from the advantages to "which, in common with all natural truths, they necessarily lead, "but that we are under a positive obligation to scrutinize that which our Maker, by enduing us with faculties suited to the investiga"tion, not only permits but enjoins us to explore."

This little work proceeds from the press of Bath, and from the intelligence, modesty, and purity of moral sentiment employed in it, we have no doubt that it will produce a beneficial effect.

ARTICLE IV.

ON THE FACULTY OF CONCENTRATIVENESS.

To the Editor of the Phrenological Journal.

SIR, I have derived much amusement, and, I may add with truth, instruction, from the study of Phrenology; and although with much that has been said in illustration of the science I do not wholly agree, it yet appears to me that a mass of substantial facts and legitimate inferences has been accumulated in support of its leading principles, which is very unlikely to be overthrown by any future counter-experience. As Phrenology makes every one who studies it, by a sort of necessity, an examiner of nature, the following observations have occurred to me, from time to time, with reference to one of the faculties; and they are now submitted, with deference to your editorial judgment and to the opinions of more practised observers, for the use of your Journal.

"If we consider the human mind," says Mr Hume in his Dissertation on the Passions, "we shall observe that, with regard to the "passions, it is not like a wind-instrument of music, which, in running over all the notes, immediately loses the sound when the "breath ceases; but rather resembles a string-instrument, where, "after each stroke, the vibrations still retain some sound, which

"gradually and insensibly decays." From this he infers, that when an object, which occasions a variety of emotions, is presented to the mind, each impulse will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. In his observations on the laws of the suggesting principle, Dr Thomas Brown remarks the same fact, of permanence or co-existence, as taking place in our mental conceptions in general, when associated with the interest of any mental emotion. "I look at a volume on "my table; it recalls to me the friend from whom I received it,— "the remembrance of him suggests to me the conception of his family, of an evening which I spent with them, and of various "subjects of our conversation. Yet the conception of my friend "may continue, mingled indeed with various conceptions, as they "rise successively, but still co-existing with them."* Dr Brown proceeds, with the felicity and ingenuity which so generally distinguish his writings, to explain how this co-existence of ideas gives us the capacity of prosecuting with steadiness a mental design or plan of thought. His words cannot be abridged without doing injustice to his meaning. "When we sit "down," he says, "to study a particular subject, we must have a "certain conception, though probably a dim and shadowy one, of "the subject itself. To study it, however, is not to have that con"ception alone, but to have successively various conceptions, its re"lations to which we endeavour to trace. The conception of our particular subject, therefore, must, in the very first stage of our progress, suggest some other conception. But this second sugges"tion, if it alone were present, having various relations of its own, "as well as its relation to the subject which suggested it, would probably excite a third conception, which had no reference to the "original subject,-and this third a fourth,-and thus a whole se

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ries, all equally unrelated to the subject which we wish to study. "It would hence seem impossible to think of the same subject even "for a single minute. Yet we know that the fact is very different, "and that we often occupy whole hours in this manner, without any remarkable deviation from our original design. Innumerable conceptions, indeed, arise during this time, but all more or less inti"mately related to the subject, by the continued conception of which they have every appearance of being suggested; and if it be allow"ed that the conception of a particular subject both suggests trains "of conceptions, and continues to exist together with the concep

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"tions which it has suggested, every thing for which I contend in "the present case is implied in the admission."

I apprehend that this principle suggests the true metaphysical theory of that mental power which has been distinguished in the language of the Scots Phrenologists by the term Concentrativeness. If we conceive that the simple function of this faculty is to give duration or fixity to whatever conceptions or emotions occupy the mind, the various operations ascribed to Concentrativeness will flow from that function as from an elementary principle. In Mr Combe's most interesting work lately published, the "primitive feeling" which gives rise to the phenomena of Concentrativeness is said to be, "the tendency to concentrate the mind within itself, and to "direct its powers in a combined effort to one object." This, however, may be considered rather as a description of the operation of the power, than a statement of the primary element to which its phenomena may be traced. If we attend to what passes in our minds when we endeavour to concentrate our thoughts upon a subject, we shall find that we do not attempt any direct coercion on our different faculties, but simply endeavour to seize upon the object of thought, and keep it steadily before the mind. We are all occasionally conscious of ineffectual efforts of attention; if we examine what we do on such occasions, we shall find that it consists in an attempt to think of some subject which is, for the moment, less attractive than some other objects which are the causes of distraction. An effective concentration of the faculties takes place only when the original leading conceptions are of themselves powerful and permanent; and the concentration will be found, consequently, to be most perfect when there is least effort to produce it. We are sensible of this on occasions which may be either painful or pleasant, when a subject, associated with strong emotion, has taken possession of the mind; and when we find ourselves incapable of banishing from our

System of Phrenology. 1825.