On the question, which was put without debate,— New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -7; Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no—3.

Ordered, that tomorrow be assigned for the reconsideration;-Connecticut and Pennsylvania, no; all the rest, aye.

Mr. GERRY moved, that the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a National Government (except the part relating to the Executive) be referred to a Committee to prepare and report a Constitution conformable thereto.

General PINCKNEY reminded the Convention, that if the Committee should fail to insert some security to the Southern States against an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by duty to his State to vote against their report.

287

The appointment of a Committee, as moved by Mr. GERRY, was agreed to, nem. con.

On the question, Shall the Committee consist of ten members, one from each State present ?-all the States were no, except Delaware, aye.

Shall it consist of seven members ?-New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, aye-5; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—5.

The question being lost by an equal division of votes, it was agreed, nem. con., that the Committee should consist of five members to be appointed to

morrow.

Adjourned.

TUESDAY, JULY 24TH.

In Convention,-The appointment of the Executive by Electors being reconsidered,—

Mr. HOUSTON moved that he be appointed by the National Legislature, instead of " Electors appointed by the State Legislatures," according to the last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improbability that capable men would undertake the service of Electors from the more distant States.

Mr. SPAIGHT seconded the motion.

Mr. GERRY opposed it. He thought there was no ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. HousTON. The election of the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance, and will create great earnestness. The best men, the Governors of the States, will not hold it derogatory from their character to be the Electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be necessary to make the Executive ineligible a second time, in order to render him independent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely repugnant to his way of thinking.

Mr. STRONG supposed that there would be no necessity, if the Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him ineligible a second time; as new Elections of the Legislature will have intervened; and he will not depend for his second appointment on the same set of men that his first was received from. It had been suggested that gratitude for his past appointment would produce the same effect as dependence for his future appointment. He thought very differently. Besides, this objection

would lie against the Electors, who would be objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great importance not to make the government too complex, which would be the case if a new set of men, like the Electors, should be introduced into it. He thought, also, that the first characters in the States would not feel sufficient motives to undertake the office of Electors.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for going back to the original ground, to elect the Executive for seven years, and render him ineligible a second time. The proposed Electors would certainly not be men of the first, nor even of the second, grade in the States. These would all prefer a seat in the Senate, or the other branch of the Legislature. He did not like the unity in the Executive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in three men, taken from three districts, into which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of interests between the Northern and Southern States, particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part of the Union, to the part from which he is not taken. The case is different here from what it is in England; where there is a sameness of interests throughout the kingdom. Another objection against a single magistrate is, that he will be an elective king, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his children. It was pretty certain, he thought, that we should at some time or other have a king; but he wished no pre

caution to be omitted that might postpone the event as long as possible. Ineligibility a second time appeared to him to be the best precaution. With this precaution he had no objection to a longer term than seven years. He would go as far as ten or twelve years.

Mr. GERRY moved that the Legislatures of the States should vote by ballot for the Executive, in the same proportions as it had been proposed they should choose Electors; and that in case a majority of the votes should not centre on the same person, the first branch of the National Legislature should choose two out of the four candidates having most votes; and out of these two the second branch should choose the Executive.

Mr. KING seconded the motion; and on the question to postpone, in order to take it into consideration, the noes were so predominant, that the States were not counted.

On the question on Mr. HouSTON's motion, that the Executive be appointed by the National Legislature,-New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no-4.

Mr. L. MARTIN and Mr. GERRY moved to re-instate the ineligibility of the Executive a second time.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. With many this appears a natural consequence of his being elected by the Legislature. It was not the case with him. The Executive he thought should be re-elected if his conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to render himself worthy of it if he be

rewardable with it. The most eminent characters, also, will be more willing to accept the trust under this condition, than if they foresee a necessary degradation at a fixed period.

Mr. GERRY. That the Executive should be independent of the Legislature, is a clear point. The longer the duration of his appointment, the more will his dependence be diminished. It will be better, then, for him to continue ten, fifteen, or even twenty years, and be ineligible afterwards.

Mr. KING was for making him re-eligible. This is too great an advantage to be given up, for the small effect it will have on his dependence, if impeachments are to lie. He considered these as rendering the tenure during pleasure.

Mr. L. MARTIN, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility, moved, "that the appointment of the Executive shall continue for eleven years."

Mr. GERRY suggested fifteen years.

Mr. KING twenty years.*

life of princes.

Mr. DAVIE eight years.

This is the medium

Mr. WILSON. The difficulties and perplexities into which the House is thrown, proceed from the election by the Legislature, which he was sorry had been re-instated. The inconvenience of this mode was such, that he would agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid of the dependence which must result from it. He was persuaded that the longest term would not be equivalent to a proper

* This might possibly be meant as a caricature of the previous motions, in order to defeat the object of them.