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and defeating every corps of the Austrians that attempted to oppose him. Elated with the advantage they had obtained over him at Ingolstadt, from whence he had not been able to move without considerable loss, they hoped, by means of that superiority and s.rength which had rendered them successful, to have it in their power to molest him as effectually, in his retrogade motions. But the judiciousness of his arrangements was such, that most of the encounters were to their disadvantage.

It was not, however, without the most extreme danger and difficulties, that he pursued his march. On reaching the Lech, Latour came up with him; an engagement ensued on the seventeenth, when the Austrians were totally defeated and pursued as far as Landsperg, in Bavaria. Moreau then crossed the Lech, and proceeded through Ulm, in Swabia, towards the Black Forest, on the confines of Switzerland. But he was so closely pressed by Latour, that he was obliged to make a stand at Steinhousen, near that forest, and give him battle. It took place on the last of September, and was fought with uncommon fury on both sides, that of the French especially, who saw no alternative between victory and ruin. They defeated the Austrians, of whom they slew and took considerable numbers, with several pieces of cannon. The corps of emigrants, under the duke d'Enghien, son to the prince of Condé, suffered greatly in this action, as they had done some time before, in a conflict with the republican troops, that happened on the twelfth of September.

Notwithstanding this defeat, Latour remitted nothing of his efforts,

and still confiding in the number and goodness of his troops, harassed incessantly Moreau's rear. This officer now perceived that he must again risk a general action, and that unless he again defeated the Austrians who were nearest, they would i speedily be joined by such numerous reinforcements, that all resistance would be vain. On the second of October, a select body attacked the right wing of the Austrian army, posted between Bibarach and the Danube. After routing this, they advanced upon the centre, which was at the same time vigorously assailedby the centre of Moreau's army. The contest lasted six hours, and was extremely bloody on both sides. At length the Austrians gave way, and were so completely defeated, that they retired with the utmost expedition to a great distance from the field of battle. Their loss amounted to near five thousand men, killed and taken, twenty pieces of cannon, with several standards, and a quan tity of ammunition.

This victory did not, however, liberate the French from the dangers that still menaced their march to the Rhine. Between them and that river was posted a numerous army, and strong bodies infested their flanks and rear. They proceeded, however, with such firmness and judgment as to make their way, through every impediment, to the Danube, which they crossed on the sixth of October, pushing the Austrians before them. On the ninth, general Desaix, a very resolute and able officer, attacked the Austrian corps commanded by generals Navandorf and Petrasch, and fully succeeded in keeping both in check, while the centre of the French boldly, entered the defile


called the Valley of Hell, from the frightful appearance of the rocks and mountains that hang over it on each side, and in many places are hardly the space of thirty-feet asunder. This valley extended several leagues; and at the opening that led out of it, a formidable body of Austrians was stationed. Moreau was duly sensible of the peril he was about to encounter; but no other method remained to extricate him from the many difficulties that surrounded him. Latour, though repeatedly defeated, was still in great force. Anxious to regain his reputation, he exerted himself incessantly whenever the least advantage seemed attainable. While this indefatigable enemy pressed upon his rear, every inlet on each side of the valley was filled with troops, awaiting the moment of assailing the flanks of the French in their passage through it. To guard against this multiplicity of dangers, Moreau disposed of his right and left in such a manner, that the rear part of them protected his entrance into that valley, by facing the forces under Latour, and the van by advancing upon Navandorf and Petrasch on their respective wings, obliged them to divide their strength and attention. Having made these dispositions, the main body of the French proceeded in compact order along the valley, at the farther opening of which a desperate fight ensued with the Austrians that guarded it. But the French cleared their way; as did also the rear of their right and left, which marched through with little molestation; and, having joined their respective divisions, presented altogether so formidable a countenance, that the Austrians, already disheartened by

their inability to prevent the passage of the French, did not attempt to attack them in the position they had taken after leaving the defile, nor in their march to Friburgh, where they arrived the next day.

This celebrated action took place on the twelfth of October. It completed the security and success of one of the most memorable retreats recorded in the military annals of modern times. It covered with glory the troops that performed it, and the general that commanded them. Throughout the whole of his expedition, Moreau had displayed consummate abilities. He had surmounted obstacles of every kind, and penetrated into the very heart of the empire. He had taken possession of Augsburgh and of Munich, the capitals of Bavaria, and compelled the elector to sue for peace. Had not the ill-fortune attending Jourdan's army disconcerted his plan, it was highly probable that he would have marched into Austria, and forced the emperor to accept of any peace, that he could have obtained, discomforted as he then was in every quarter, and deprived of any other means to save himself from apparent destruction.

In the mean time, it cannot be denied, that the light in which the French directory perceived and represented the expeditions of its armies into Germany, was a true one. The princes of the empire were detached from the coalition; immense sums were levied, which defrayed the expences of the invasion; and a powerful diversion was formed in favour of the expedition into Italy.

But it ought equally to have been acknowledged, as above, that these expeditions contributed to remove the partiality entertained


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for the French, from the minds of all the people in Germany, when they saw with how little reason they had expected to be benefited by the successes of those licentious invaders. Nothing less than their infamous conduct to the people, who had long viewed them with benevolence, and had received them with cordiality, could have effaced the impression which had so universally taken place in their favour. The Germans now became convinced of their error, in expecting that a foreign nation would be sincerely solicitous to rid them of their grievances, and would not rather make use of the opportunity of rendering them subservient to their own purposes.

But that consequence of the forced retreat of the French from Germany, which politicians esteemed most deserving of consideration, was the immediate influence it had over the councils of the court of Berlin. While the French appeared irresistible, it harboured and undertook designs of a nature tending at once to revolutionize the whole empire, and to exact the dominion of Prussia equally on the fall of Austria and the ruin of the smaller states of Germany. The movements and successes of the French in Italy and on the Rhine, and the establish. ment on the part of Prussia of a great military force in Nuremberg, seemed to indicate a plan for surrounding the emperor, by a wide circle, at the same time that they laboured for his destruction, by interior attacks. The French armies contracted more and more the quarters of the Austrians on the Rhine; the position of the Prussians, at Nuremberg, precluded the army under the archduke from retreating

by the way of the Danube, other. wise than through their connivance, which, according to the usual policy of the court of Berlin, must be purchased by some important conces⚫ sion. In a word, according to human views, the abasement, if not the ruin, of the house of Austria seemed to be fast approaching; and the liberties of the inferior states already to have fallen. It was, therefore, with universal satisfaction that Germany beheld the Prussian monarch's associates in these iniquitous designs, disabled from giving him assistance or countenance. The world indignantly beheld the affected moderation he assumed, by pretending to relinquish his usurpations on the ground, that the inhabitants of the districts he had seized, would not consent to become his subjects, a nor the empire itself be prevailed upon to authorize him to accept of their submission. His ambition appeared altogether of a mean and contemptible kind. It was evident he would have sacrificed his common country to strangers, for the sake of promoting some paltry interests, the compassing of which would never have indemnified him from the danger he must have incurred by introducing so formidable and restless a people into Germany as the French. Their interference in its internal affairs would, in all likelihood, have been exerted without consulting his inclinations and interest, and might, much more shortly than he imagined, have been extended to his own concerns, in a manner that would have affected him most detrimentally,and afforded him ample cause to repent of the sordid motives that had induced him to act against his country.

France, though disappointed in the great projects it had formed in


the expedition to Germany, still preserved its general preponderance against the coalition. The directory had, previously to the opening of the campaign, published to all Europe a desire to terminate the war upon equitable conditions; but these did not appear such to the two remaining powers in alliance against the republic. They well understood, that the cession of the Netherlands would be required, together with the restoration of all the conquests made by the British army in both the Indies.

It was to confirm its pretensions to these lofty demands, that France made those venturous attempts in the empire that had almost succeeded. But the failure did not induce the rulers of the republic to abate in their demands, which they still insisted on with as much obstinacy as if they had been completely successful in those vast enterprizes.

Austria did not display less resolution. It relied on that constant good fortune which had, in the criúcal occurrences of many ages,never permitted it to be reduced to distress, without finally providing it with the means of deliverance. Hence, in the midst of difficulties, the spirit of that high-minded family, though frequently staggered at the reverses that befel it, and bending occasionally before unavoidable necessity, still remained unbroken, and silently cherished the hope, that the hour of prosperity would return, as it had so often done, and richly repay it for its past


While such ideas were prevalent, the court of Vienna felt more indignation than despondency at the suc cess of the republican arms. The

persuasions of a similar kind, that were no less current among the people of its hereditary dominions in Germany, contributed wonderfully to animate them in the defence of a family, that seemed, at all times, the peculiar favourite of fortune, and destined, however liable to temporary depression, ultimately to succeed against all its enemies, and to verify the epithet, bestowed upon it so long ago, of fortunate.

The inferior sovereigns, and petty states of the empire, had, in the beginning of the contest between the coalition and the republic, wavered in their opinion concerning the justice and propriety of requir ing them to join against a people that had given them no provocation. Hence flowed those discontents, and murmurs, against the Imperial mandates, and requisitions, to that purpose, which were gradually converted into an enmity to those that issued them, and into good wishes to the cause against which they combated. But this hostile disposition had no activity. A long and habitual subserviency to the politics of the court of Vienna was too firmly established among most of the secondary princes, and Imperial cities, as they are styled,to be shaken by transitory events. The court of Berlin was more feared than respected, and its tergiversation destroyed all influence but that which proceeded immediately from the ter ror of its arms. Thus the Austrian interest, though it sometimes fluctuated, still recovered its influence, and the inimical designs of Prussia, against the lesser states of the empire, together with the flagitious behaviour of the French, restored, in a great measure, the preponder

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ance of the Imperial court, and the former readiness to coincide with its wishes. The return of this complying temper was also partly due to the necessity which Austria felt, of paying a competent regard to the ideas and inclinations of the people at large, and of carefully avoiding to give them just cause of offence.

The frontiers of France, on the Rhine, were now in danger of becoming again the theatre of war. The spirit and activity of the archduke, increased by his late successes, had prompted him to an enterprize, from which, if he succeeded, much utility and honour would be derived. This was to retake, by a sudden and vigorous attack, the fortress of Kehl. To this end he detached, from his army, a corps of chosen men, who attacked the French general, Scherer, at Bruchsal, in the proximity of the Rhine, on the thirteenth of September, and, pushing him before them as far as Kehl, forced the outworks on the nineteenth, and had nearly carried that strong fortress. A tremendous fire, from the French batteries, compelled them, at length, to retire: but the boldness and resolution displayed in this enterprize did great honour to the assailants, and shewed how little the Austrian troops were daunted by the successes of the French.

The same enterprizing disposition continued to characterize the archduke in his operations against the French, after their retreat to Friburgh, where Moreau had now established his quarters. On the seventeenth of October, his advanced posts, at Kindringen, in the vicinity, were assailed with great fury by the Imperial army, commanded by the

archduke in person. All the gene. rals hat had been employed against Moreau, in the course of the cam paign, were present in this action, which was maintained with remarkable obstinacy by both parties. The personal intrepidity of the archduke was conspicuous on this occasion. The right wing of his army, under Latour, being repulsed, and on the point of abandoning the attack of Kindringen, he put himself at the head of a body of grenadiers, who returned to the charge and carried it. The left wing, and the centre of the Austrians, met with the firmest resistance, and, though the French were worsted, the action was not decisive.

General Moreau, finding himself overpowered by the immense superiority of numbers that occupied the positions around, concentrated his force in such a manner, as either to make a vigorous defence, or a secure retreat,as circumstances should render it most expedient. He was attacked upon the strong ground he had chosen at Schlingen, situated upon a height, near Friburgh, on the twenty-third of October. The dispositions made by General Moreau, to receive the enemy, were so judicious, that, notwithstanding the number and valour of the Austrians, and the expertness of their commanders, the contest lasted three days, when the French, after disputing every inch of ground, retired, in the best order, across the Rhine, at Huninghen, on the twenty-sixth. Their retreat was conducted with such firmness in the men, and skill in their commander, that the Austrians were neither able, nor willing, to attempt a close pursuit.


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