clear an intent to abandon as here shown amounts to an absolute abandonment; so that the right to the possession and use must be held to have vested in the defendant.

Some other questions are raised, which we do not think warrant discussion under the view we take of the questions here discussed.

The judgment below must be affirmed.

MCGRATH, C. J., GRANT and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concurred. HOOKER, J., did not sit.

VALENTINE LEWIS V. CHARLES M. SHELDON.

Landlord and tenant-Lease upon shares-Forfeiture-Summary proceedings.

A lease upon shares is not assignable without the consent of the lessor, and its attempted assignment and delivery of possession thereunder to the assignee works a forfeiture of the lease, and the lessor may take immediate steps to regain possession; citing Randall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311.

Error to Clinton. (Moore, J., presiding.) Argued November 2, 1894. Decided December 18, 1894.

Summary proceedings to recover the possession of land. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Lyon & Dooling, for appellant.

Fedewa & Walbridge, for complainant.

MONTGOMERY, J. This is a summary proceeding to recover possession of a farm in Clinton county. On April

11, 1892, the complainant leased to one James Kennedy the farm in question on shares. Kennedy went into possession of the land under the lease. and remained in possession until September 18, 1893, when he made an assignment thereof to the defendant, Sheldon. The lease was assigned by Kennedy after the complainant had notified him that he objected to his doing so, and that he claimed that the lease was not transferable to the defendant. The complainant learned of the assignment three days after it was made. On or about the 22d of September, he caused notice to be served on Sheldon, the defendant, not to do any work on the land. On the 29th of November this proceeding was instituted to get possession, under section 8295, How. Stat.

But two questions are raised: First, it is claimed that the court erred in holding that the lease was not assignable; and, second, it is contended that the defendant became a tenant at will, and entitled to three months' notice to quit.

The lease, in form, is not to be distinguished from that which was passed upon by this Court in Randall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311. The defendant earnestly contends against the doctrine of that case, but we see no reason to doubt its correctness. The conclusion was that the nature and character of the lease show that it was a personal one with the lessee, and could not be assigned by him to a third party without the consent of the lessor. Moreover, the doctrine of the case has become a rule of property, and certainly ought not to be overturned without the very best of reasons, which we do not think exist. Nor do we think the other cases in Michigan cited by defendant's counsel are in conflict with the ruling there made.

The same case is authority upon the question of the right of the complainant to recover possession. It was said:

"The attempt to assign this lease, and put another in possession thereunder, worked a forfeiture thereof, and enabled the lessor to take immediate steps to regain possession."

See, also, Wilkinson v. Williams, 51 Mich. 155; Benfey v. Congdon, 40 Id. 283.

The judgment will be affirmed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

MELVINA R. McCAMMON AND HANNAH RICE V. THE
DETROIT, LANSING & NORTHERN RAIL-

ROAD COMPANY.

[See 66 Mich. 442.]

Practice in Supreme Court-Assignments of error—Deed—Recording laws-Evidence-Mortgage foreclosure—Sheriff's deed.

1. Where the correctness of the ruling of the court in directing a verdict depends entirely upon the correctness of prior rulings admitting certain evidence, error should be assigned upon such earlier rulings as well as upon such direction.

2. An objection to the introduction in evidence of the record of a deed executed in another state, and certified so as to entitle it to record under the law then in force in this State, on the ground that the certificate does not show another fact made essential by a later statute, is untenable.

8. The introduction in evidence of a sheriff's deed executed on the foreclosure by an assignee of a mortgage by advertisement under chapter 218, Comp. Laws 1871, was objected to because:

a-The notice of sale did not state at what particular place the sale would be made.

b-The notice did not state where the assignment of the mortgage was recorded.

c-The notice did not assert that the sale would be made to the highest bidder.

d-There was no proof that any showing was furnished the sheriff prior to or at the time of the sale that the notice of sale had ever been published at all.

e-There was no proof that the mortgaged premises were offered for sale, bid upon, or struck off to the highest bidder. f-There was no proof that the deed was forthwith" deposited with the register of deeds.

66

And said objections are disposed of as follows:

a-"At the court-house in the village of Mason, Ingham county" (being the county in which the mortgaged premises were situated), sufficiently described the place of sale.'

b-A failure to give the book and page where the assignment was recorded was not a fatal omission, its date and the date of its record being given.

c-An "auction sale" implies a sale to the highest bidder, and it will be presumed that a sale, made pursuant to a notice that the mortgaged premises would be sold at public auction, was made to the highest bidder.

d-The production of copies of the newspaper in which the notice of sale was published, showing its publication for 13 consecutive weeks prior to the sale, was sufficient proof of the publication required by the statute, and it was not necessary that the sheriff should, at the time of the sale, have an affidavit of such publication before him.

e-In the absence of proof in the printed record that the sheriff's deed was filed with the register of deeds, it will be presumed that the deed was so filed.

f-The sheriff's deed, which (as appears by the original record) was filed on the day of the sale, but not acknowledged by the sheriff until five days afterwards, was notice to the mortgagor, and he was not deprived of the right of redemption.

Error to Ingham. (Person, J.) Argued November 2, 1894. Decided December 18, 1894.

Ejectment.

Defendant brings error. Affirmed. The

facts are stated in the opinion.

The statute provided that the sale should be made "at the place of holding the circuit court within the county in which the premises to be sold, or some part of them, are situated."

M. V. & R. A. Montgomery, for appellant.

Cahill & Ostrander, for plaintiffs.

GRANT, J. After the decision in 66 Mich. 442, defendant took a new trial under the statute, at which the plaintiffs again recovered judgment. In the chain of title shown by the plaintiffs upon the trial, the record of two deeds was introduced, to each of which the defendant objected, upon the ground that the deeds were not properly certified to entitle them to record. The original deed executed by the sheriff of Ingham county upon a foreclosure sale by advertisement was also introduced, under objection and exception. The defendant introduced no evidence, and the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs.

Only one error is assigned, viz., that the court erred in directing a verdict. The correctness of this ruling depends entirely upon the correctness of the ruling admitting these deeds. No error is assigned upon the admission of the testimony. We think counsel should have assigned error upon the rulings of the court admitting the evidence. Johnson v. Ballou, 25 Mich. 460; Alberts v. Village of Vernon, 96 Id. 549; Hecock v. Van Dusen, 96 Id. 573. We are, however, inclined, under the circumstances of this case, to dispose of it upon the merits.

Of the first two deeds above mentioned, one was executed in the state of New York and the other in Connecticut. Defendant's counsel suggest, rather than insist, that they were inadmissible, under Brown v. Cady, 11 Mich. 535. They were executed and recorded in 1839. The certificates attached thereto bear date, respectively, July 1 and July 12, 1839. The objection is that the certificates do not state that the deeds were executed according to the laws of these states. This was not required by the registry law then in force.

Laws of 1839, Act No.

115, p. 219, § 34. This law only required the certificate