decided that such statutes do not impair the obligations of contracts, unless they are made retroactive. A similar decision has been rendered concerning usury laws. Section 10, Clause 2.-No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. Section 10, Clause 3.-No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. 407. INSPECTION LAWS.-The great object of inspection laws is to bring certain commodities offered for sale, as meats, flour, oil, and the like, up to a given standard of excellence. This is in the interest of both producer and consumer. The inspector examines the commodity, and marks the cask or package. Inspection laws cannot be kept up without expense, and the above clause permits the States, without asking the consent of Congress, to lay such duties on exports and imports, in the form of fees, as may be necessary to defray this expense. But if there is an excess of fees collected, over and above defraying such cost, then the States must pay such excess into the National treasury. Moreover, Congress has the full power to revise and control all inspection laws. 408. LIMITS OF THESE POWERS.-How far the provision in regard to inspection laws extends, is a question that has been often before the Supreme Court. A law of Maryland requiring importers of goods in bales or packages to take ou a license was declared unconstitutional. Chief Justice Marshall laid down the rule that the right to import goods involves the right to sell them, and that so long as such goods remain in the original 1 Sturgis v. Crowninshield 4, Wheaton 122. packages they are a part of the foreign commerce of the country, and not taxable by the State. But licenses imposed by States on retail liquor-dealers are constitutional, even when the liquors sold are imported, such dealers not being importers, or not selling the liquors in bulk.1 Massachusetts and New York enacted laws levying taxes upon alien passengers arriving in their ports, to raise money for the support of marine hospitals. But the Court set these laws aside as invasions of the right of Congress to regulate commerce.❜ 409. TONNAGE DUTIES.-A duty of tonnage is a tax laid on ships according to their burden or carrying capacity, and is computed by the ton. The States may tax ships belonging to their citizens as other property is taxed, according to their value. The imposition of tonnage duties by States would be plainly inconsistent with the regulation of commerce by Congress. It would soon derange the whole commercial system and might even throw the country back into the commercial condition that existed before 1789. 410. STATE TROOPS, SHIPS OF WAR, ETC.-The concluding prohibitions of the clause are absolutely essential to the peace and security, and even the existence of the Nation. If the States could keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; enter into agreements or compacts with one another, or with foreign powers; or engage in war, unless invaded or in imminent danger, the Union would, in a short time, be wholly broken up. Unions would be formed within the Union; State treaties with foreign powers would be made; war would result; and disintegration would surely follow. 411. THE STATES NOT SOVEREIGN.-It is idle to hold that any body politic is sovereign, in the proper sense of the word, which is denied such powers as entering into treaties and compacts, granting letters of marque, coining money, emitting bills 1 The License Cases, 5 Howard, 504. The Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 283 of credit, establishing legal-tender, laying imposts and tonnage taxes, keeping troops and ships of war in times of peace, and engaging in war. 412. THE DIVISION OF POWERS.-In 1776 the powers of government that the Crown and the Colonies together had exercised, were divided into two parts. Some powers were delegated to the Union tacitly, and were afterwards incorporated in the Articles of Confederation. Other powers were at the same time denied to the States. All powers not so delegated or so denied were left in the possession of the States. In 1787 a new distribution was made; the powers of the Union were now greatly enlarged, and those of the States greatly diminished. Still, the Constitution left the National and State governments on quite different footings. 413. DELEGATED AND INHERENT POWERS.-The powers of the Nation are all delegated; the powers of the States are all inherent. The National Constitution is a grant of powers; but the State Constitutions, as Judge Cooley says, “merely apportion and impose restrictions upon powers which the States inherently possess." He lays down these two rules:1 "To ascertain whether any power assumed by the government of the United States is rightfully assumed, the Constitution is to be examined in order to see whether expressly or by fair implication the power has been granted." "To ascertain whether a State rightfully exercises a power, we have only to see whether, by the Constitution of the United States, it is conceded to the Union, or by that Constitution or that of the States prohibited to be exercised at all." 414. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.—The National authority and the State authority somewhat overlap; Congress and the State legislatures legislate on many of the same subjects; but sometimes the powers of Congress exclude State legislation. Mr. Justice Story says a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution necessarily leads to the conclusion that the powers granted to Congress are never exclusive of similar powers existing in the States, unless (1) "The Constitution has 1 Principles of Constitutional Law, 31. ፡፡ expressly, in terms, given an exclusive power to Congress;" or (2) "The exercise of a like power is prohibited to the States;" or (3) There is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility in the exercise of it by the States." Taxation well illustrates this concurrent jurisdiction. The Constitution gives Congress the most ample revenue powers, but it denies to the States only the laying of customs-duties and duties on tonnage. Congress is empowered to levy internal taxes, and the States are not forbidden to do so. The whole field of internal taxation is open to the States, as well as to the Union. Generally, however, the States avoid taxes that would overlap those already imposed by Congress, lest property and industry be unduly burdened. 1 Houston v. Moore, 2 Wheaton, 259. CHAPTER XIII. VESTING THE EXECUTIVE POWER. ARTICLE II. Section 1, Clause 1.-The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows. 415. THE NEED OF A NATIONAL EXECUTIVE.-With the throwing off of allegiance to the British Crown, the States ceased to be subject to any common executive authority. The governors were but State executives. The President of Congress was merely a presiding officer. Congress had some slight executive powers, but there was no proper National executive. Much of the weakness of the Confederation was due to this fact, and there was in the Convention of 1787 practical unanimity of opinion that this defect must be removed. Accordingly, the Virginia plan and the Jersey plan, Pinckney's draft and Hamilton's draft, all provided for an executive power. 416. AN INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE.-The leading members of the Convention were determined to make the Executive Department thoroughly independent of the other departments, and especially of the Legislature. Mr. Madison said: "Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the American Constitutions, and suggested the necessity of giving every defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican |