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the system under which the powers of this tribunal are exercised.

It may be proper to examine in what light the decision of the State Courts, in giving a construction to their own statutes have been considered by this Court.

In the case of Mc'Keen vs. Delancy's Lessee, reported in 5 Cranch, 22, this Court held, that the acknowledgment of a deed before a justice of the Supreme Court, under a statute which required the acknowledgment to be made before a Justice of the Peace, having been long practised in Pennsylvania, and sanctioned by her tribunals, must be considered as within the statute.

The Chief Justice in giving the opinion of the Court in the case of Bodley vs. Taylor 5 Cranch, 221, says, in reference to the jurisdiction of a court of equity had this been a case of the first impression, some contrariety of opinion would perhaps have existed on this point. But it has been sufficiently shown, that the practice of resorting to a Court of Chancery in order to set up an equitable against the legal title, received in its origin the sanction of the Court of Appeals, while Kentucky remained a part of Virginia, and has been so confirmed by an uninterrupted series of decisions, as to be incorporated into their system, and to be taken into view in the consideration of every title to lands in that country. Such a principle cannot now be shaken.

In the case of Taylor vs. Brown, 5 Cranch, 255, the Court say, in reference to their decision in the case of Bodley vs. Taylor this opinion is still thought perfectly correct in itself. Its application to particular cases, and indeed its being considered as a rule of decision on Kentucky titles, will depend very much on the decisions of that country. For in questions respecting title to real estate, especially, the same rule ought certainly to prevail in both courts.'

This Court in laying down the requisites of a valid entry in the case of Massie vs. Watts, 6 Cranch, 165, say, these principles have been laid down by the courts, and must be considered as expositions of the statute. A great proportion of the landed property of the country depends on adhering to them.

In 9 Cranch, 87, the Court say, that, in cases depending on the statute of a state, and more especially in those respecting titles to lands, the federal courts adopt the construction of the State, where that construction is settled and can be ascertained. And in 5

Wheaton, 279, it is stated, that the Supreme Court uniformly acts under a desire to conform its decisions to those of the State Courts, on their local laws.'

The Supreme Court holds in the highest respect decisions of state courts upon local laws forming rules of property 2 Wheaton, 316. In constructing local statutes respecting real property, the courts of the Union are governed by the decisions of the state tribunals, 6 Wheaton, 119. The Court say in the case of Elmandorf vs. Taylor et al. 10 Wheaton, 152, that the courts of the United States in cases depending on the laws of a particular state, will in general, adopt the construction which the courts of the state have given to those laws.' This course is founded upon the principle supposed to be universally recognised that the judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government.'

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In 7 Wheaton, 361, the Court again declared that the statute laws of the states must furnish the rule of decision to the federal courts, as far as they comport with the constitution of the United States, in all cases arising within the respective states; and a fixed and received construction of their respective statute laws, in their own courts, makes a part of such statute law.' The Court again say, in 12 Wheaton, 153, that this Court adopts the local law of real property as ascertained by the decisions of the state courts, whether these decisions are grounded on the construction of the statutes of the state, or form a part of the unwritten law of the state which has become a fixed rule of property.' tations might be multiplied, but the above will that this court have uniformly adopted the decisions of the state tribunals, respectively in the construction of their statutes. That this has been done as a matter of principle, in all cases where the decision of a state court has become a rule of property.

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In a great majority of the causes brought before the federal tribunals, they are called to enforce the laws of the states. The rights of parties are determined under those laws, and it would be a strange perversion of principle, if the judicial exposition of those laws, by the state tribunals, should be disregarded. These expositions constitute the law and fix the rule of property. Rights are acquired under this rule, and it regulates all the transactions which come within its scope.

It is admitted in the argument, that this court in giving a construction to a local law, will be influenced by the decisions of the local tribunals: but it is contended, that when such a construction shall be given in conformity to those decisions, it must be considered final. That if the state shall change the rule, it does not comport either with the consistency or dignity of this tribunal to adopt the change. Such a course it is insisted, would recognise in the state courts a power to revise the decisions of this court and to fix the rule of property differently from its solemn adjudications. That the federal court when sitting within a state, is the court of that state, being so constituted by the constitution and the laws of the Union: and as such, has an equal right with the state courts to fix the construction of the local law. On all questions arising under the constitution and laws of the Union, this court may exercise a revising power, and its decisions are final and obligatory on all other judicial tribunals, state as well as federal. A state tribunal has a right to examine any such questions and to determine them, but its decision must conform to that of the Supreme Court, or the corrective power may be exercised. But the case is very different where a question arises under a local law. The decision of this question by the highest judicial tribunal of a state, should be considered as final by this Court: not because the state tribunal, in such a case, has any power to bind this Court; but because in the language of the Court, in the case of Shilby et al. vs. Guy, 11 Wheaton, 361, a fixed and received construction by a state in its own courts, makes a part of the statute law.'

The same reason which influences this Court to adopt the construction given to the local law, in the first instance, is not less strong in favor of following it in the second, if the state tribunal should change the construction. A reference is here made, not to a single adjudication, but to a series of decisions which shall settle the rule. Are not the injurious effects on the interests of the citizens of a state, as great, in refusing to adopt a change of construction, as in refusing to adopt the first construction. A refusal in the one case as well as in the other, has the effect to establish, in the state, two rules of property.

Would not the change in the construction of a law of the United States, by this tribunal, be obligatory on the state courts? The statute as last expounded, would be the law of the Union: and

why may not the same effect be given to the last exposition of a local law by the state court? The exposition forms part of the local law and is binding on all the people of the state, and its inferior judicial tribunals. It is emphatical ly the law of the state; which the federal court, while sitting within the state, and this court, when a case is brought before them, are called to enforce. If the rule as settled, should prove inconvenient or injurious to the public interests, the legislature of the state may modify the law or repeal it.

If the construction of the highest ju dicial tribunal of a state form a part of its statute law, as much as an enactment by the legislature, how can this Court make a distinction between them? There could be no hesitation in so modifying our decisions as to conform to any legislative alteration in a statute; and why should not the same rule apply, where the judicial branch of the state government, in the exercise of its acknowledged functions, should by con struction, give a different effect to a stat ute, from what had at first been given to it. The charge of inconsistency might be made with more force and propriety against the federal tribunals for a disre gard of this rule, than by conforming to it. We profess to be bound by the local law, and yet they reject the expo sition of that law which forms a part of it. It is no answer to this objection, that a different exposition was formerly given to the act which was adopted by the federal court. The inquiry is, what is the settled law of the state at the time the decision is made. This constitutes the rule of property within the state, by which the rights of litigant parties must be determined.

As the federal tribunals profess to be governed by this rule, they can never act inconsistently by enforcing it. If they change their decision, it is because the rule on which that decision was founded has been changed.

The case under consideration illus trates the propriety and necessity of this rule. It is now the settled law of Tennessee, that an adverse possession of sev en years under a deed for land that has been granted, will give a valid title. But by the decision, such a possession, under such evidence of right, will not give a valid title. In addition to the above requisites, this court have decided that the tenant must connect his deed with a grant. It therefore follows, that the occupant whose title is protected under the statutes, before a state tribu

nal is unprotected by them, before the federal court. The plaintiff in ejectment, after being defeated in his action before a state court, on the above construction, to insure success has only to bring an action in the federal court. This may be easily done by a change of his residence, or a bona fide conveyance of the land.

Here is a judicial conflict, arising from two rules of property in the same state, and the consequences are not only deeply injurious to the citizens of the state, but calculated to engender the most lasting discontents. It is therefore essential to the interests of the country, and to the harmony of the judicial action of the federal and state governments, that there should be but one rule of property in a state.

In several of the States, the English statute of limitations has been adopted, with various modifications; but in the saving clause, the expression beyond

the seas,' is retained. These words in some of the states are construed to mean out of the State,' and in others a literal construction has been given them.

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from a state where the construction of the same words had been long settled to mean literally beyond seus,' would not this Court conform to it? And might not the same arguments be used in such a case, as are now urged against conformning to the local construction of the law of Tennessee. Apparent inconsistences in the construction of the statute laws of the states, may be expected to arise from the organization of our judicial systems: but an adherence by the federal courts to the exposition of the local law, as given by the courts of the state, will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the exercise of the judicial power in the state and federal tribunals. This rule is not only recommended by strong considerations of propriety, growing out of our system of jurisprudence, but it is sustained by principle and authority.

As it appears to this Court, that the construction of the statutes of limitations is now well settled, differently from what was supposed to be rule at the time this Court decided the case of Patton's Lessee vs. Easton, and the case of Powell's Lessee vs. Green; and as the instructions of the circuit court were gov. erned by these decisions, and not by the settled law of the state, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Mr Justice Baldwin dissented.

The State of New Jersey, vs. the People of the State of New York.

At January Term, 1831, an order was made giving the state of New York leave to appear in this case on the second day of this term and answer the complainants' bill; and if there should be no appearance, that the Court would proceed to hear the cause on the part of the complainants, and to decree on the matter of the bill. On the first day of the term, a demurrer to the complainants' bill was filed, which was signed Green C. Bronson, attorney general of New York. No other appearance was entered on the part of the defendants. Mr Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court have had the return made in this case under consideration. It considers the demurr

er filed in this case by the Attorney General of New York, as being an appearance for the state, he being a practitioner in this court: and therefore that the demurrer is regularly filed. If the Attorney General did not so mean it, it is not a paper which can be considered as in the cause, or be placed on the files of the Court. We say this now, that the Attorney General may have due notice if he did not intend to enter any appearance for the state: it being otherwise a paper not to be received.

The demurrer then being admitted as containing an appearance by the State, the Court is of opinion, that it amounts to a compliance with the order at the last term. In that order the word' an

swer,' is not used in a technical sense, as an answer to the charges in the bill under oath but an answer, in a more general sense, to the bill. A demurrer is an answer in law to the bill, though not in a technical sense an answer ac

cording to the common language of prac

tice.

The Court, therefore, direct the demurrer to be set down for argument, on the first Monday of March of this term, according to the motion of the plaintiffs.

THE CHEROKEE CASE.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AT JANUARY TERM, 1832, DELIVERED BY MR CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL, TOGETHER WITH THE OPINION OF MR JUSTICE MC LEAN, IN THE CASE OF SAMUEL A. WORCESTER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, VS. THE STATE OF GEORGIA: WITH A STATEMENT OF THE CASE, EXTRACTED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE SU PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Samuel A. Worcester, Plaintiff in Error, vs. The State of Georgia.

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A writ of error was issued from the supreme court of the United States, directed to the honorable the judges of the superior court for the county of Gwinnett, in the state of Georgia,' commanding them to send to the said supreme court of the United States, the record and proceedings in the said superior court in the county of Gwinnett, between the state of Georgia, plaintiff, and Samuel A. Worcester, defendant, on an indictment in that court.'

This writ of error was returnable on the second Monday of January, 1832, and was attested by the honorable Henry Baldwin, one of the associate justices of the supreme court of the United States.

A citation was issued, directed to the state of Georgia,' dated October 27, 1831, and signed by the honorable Hen-. ry Baldwin, by which the said state was cited to show cause why the error in the judgment against Samuel A Worcester, in the writ of error mentioned, if there was any error, should not be arrested, and why speedy justice should not be done to the parties in that behalf.

The citation was served on his excellency Wilson Lumpkin, governor of the state of Georgia, on the 24th November, 1831, and on Charles J. Jenkins, Esq. attorney general of the said state, on the 22d November, 1831.

The writ of error was returned to the supreme court of the United States, with the record of the proceedings in the court for the county of Gwinnett annexed thereto, and with the following certificate, under the seal of the court.

Georgia, Gwinnett county, ss.

I, John G Park, clerk of the superior court for the county of Gwinnett, and state aforesaid, do certify that the annex. ed and foregoing is a full and complete exemplification of the proceedings and judgment had in said court, against Sam uel A. Worcester, one of the defendants in the case therein mentioned as of rec

ord in the said superior court.

Given under my hand, and the seal of the court, this 28th day of Nov. 1831. JOHN G. PARK, clerk.

The following is a copy of the record:

Georgia, Gwinnett county:

The grand jurors, sworn, chosen, and selected for the county of Gwinnett, In the name and behalf of the citi zens of Georgia, charge and accuse Elizur Butler, Samuel A. Worcester, James Trott, Samuel Mays, Surry Eaton, Austin Copeland, and Edward D. Losure. white persons of said county, with the offence of residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation, without a license: For that the said Elizur Butler, Samuel A. Worcester, James Trott, Samuel Mays, Surry Eaton, Austin Copeland, and Edward D. Losure, white persons as aforesaid, on the fifteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and thirtyone, did reside in that part of the Cherokee nation attached by the laws of said State to the said county, and in the county aforesaid, without a license or permit from his excellency the governor of said state, or from any agent authorised by

his excellency the governor aforesaid to grant such permit or license, and with out having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia, and uprightly to demean themselves as citizens thereof,

contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace, and dignity, thereof. TURNER H. TRIPPE, Sol. Gen'l. JNO. W. A. SANFOD, Pros'r. True bill:-JOHN S. WILSON, Foreman. SEPTEMBER, 1831.

GWINNETT SUPERIOR COURT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1831.

Stale of Georgia, vs. Samuel A. Worcester, Elizur Butler, and others. [Indictment for a misdemeanor.]

And the said Samuel A. Worcester, in his own proper person, comes and says, that this court ought not to take further cognizance of the action and prosecution aforesaid, because, he says, that, on the fifteenth day of July, in the year 1831, he was, and still is, a resident in the Cherokee nation; and that the said supposed crime, or crimes, and each of them, were committed, if committed at all, at the town of New Echota, in the said Cherokee nation, out of the jurisdiction of this court, and not in the county of Gwinnett, or elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this court. And this defendant saith, that he is a citizen of the state of Vermont, one of the United States of America, and that he entered the aforesaid Cherokee nation in the capacity of a duly authorised missionary of the American board of commissioners for foreign missions, under the authority of the President of the United States, and has not since been required by him to leave it: that he was, at the time of his arrest, engaged in preaching the gospel to the Cherokee Indians, and in translating the sacred scriptures into their language, with the permission and approval of the said Cherokee nation, and in accordance with the humane policy of the government of the United States, for the civilization and improvement of the Indians; and that his residence there, for this purpose, is the residence charged in the aforesaid indictment and this defendant further saith, that this prosecution the state of Georgia ought not to have or maintain, because, he saith, that several treaties have, from time to time, been entered into between the United States and the Cherokee nation of Indians, to wit: at Hopewell, on the 28th day of November, 1785; at Holston, on the 2d day of July, 1791; at Philadelphia, on the 26th day of June, 1794; at Tellico, on the 2d day of October, 1798; at Tellico, on

the 24th day of October, 1804; at Tellico, on the 25th day of October, 1805; at Tellico, on the 27th day of October, 1805; at Washington city, on the 7th day of January, 1805; at Washington city, on the 22d day of March, 1816; at the Chickasaw council house, on the 14th day of September, 1816; at the Cherokee agency, on the 8th day of July, 1817, and at Washington city, on the 27th day of February, 1819; all which treaties have been duly ratified by the senate of the United States of America; and, by which treaties, the United States of America acknowledge the said Cherokee nation to be a sovereign nation, authorised to govern themselves, and all persons who have settled within their territory, free from any right of legislative interference by the several states composing the United States of America, in reference to acts done within their own territory; and, by which treaties, the whole of the territory now occupied by the Cherokee nation, on the east of the Mississippi, has been solemnly guaranteed to them; all of which treaties are existing treaties at this day, and in full force. By these treaties, and particular ly by the treaties of Hopewell and Holston, the aforesaid territory is acknowledged to lie without the jurisdiction of the several states composing the union of the United States; and, it is thereby specially stipulated, that the citizens of the United States shall not enter the aforesaid territory, even on a visit, without a passport from the governor of a state, or from some one duly authorised thereto, by the president of the United States; all of which will more fully and at large appear, by reference to the aforesaid treaties. And this defendant saith, that the several acts charged in the bill of indictment, were done, or omitted to be done, if at all, within the said territory so recognised as belonging to the said nation,

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