question is, whether it has adequate jurisdiction: and if it has not, equity will and ought to interfere : as in the case of a bond given for the purchase money of lands, and a suit at law brought upon it; and after judgment, a fatal defect discovered in the title ; a Court of equity will enjoin and relieve against the judgment, although it has no natural jurisdiction over a suit brought for a specialty or simple contract debt. In the view of a Court of equity, a party who elects an incompetent forum, is not concluded by its judgment. The question still recurs, had he, and could he have justice there? The terms of the averment of the present plea, are also important to be considered. The plea alleges, that the merits were fully and fairly tried. But if it appears that, in the nature of things, there were inherent difficulties in opposition to a full trial of the real merits, the plea cannot be true. The general rule, that whatsoever might have been, and was litigated at law, is concluded, need not be denied, if taken with this qualification, that it be fully and fairly litigated, and there be no equitable reason why the judgment should be set aside. But if there be new evidence discovered, or fraud, or an unconscientious advantage taken by the opposite party, or matters of equity which a Court of law could not effectually investigate and decide, then the judgment at law is not conclusive. Let us now see whether this case, as it appears on the bill, and the record pleaded as a bar, was properly and effectually relievable at law. And, in order to do this, it is necessary to examine the counts of 1821. Hughes V. Blake 1821. Hughes V. Blake. the plaintiff's declaration in the suit at law, which a Court of equity will do with a hypercritical eye, when it becomes necessary to inquire whether a judgment of a Court of law is fit to bar its own jurisdiction. It does not act on such an occasion as an appellate Court: but it looks to the case with a view to see whether justice could be effectually done by the Court of law. Lord Redesdale, in the case before alluded to, inquired what was open before the jury and an examination of the counts in this declaration has the same object, and the further object, to ascertain whether any judgment could have been recovered upon them. The learned counsel here entered into a minute analysis of the counts, in order to show that complete justice could not be done in the action at law, upon the equitable merits of the case, considered as a case of trust, complicated accounts, and fraud. The original trust was never tried, and could not be tried. A declaration could not be framed to try it fully and effectually. A complicated account may indeed be examined at law. There is no defect of jurisdiction but there is an insurmountable difficulty in doing justice. A Court of law is not adapted, although it has jurisdiction, to arrive at a just result on such a subject: and as matters of account are a proper subject of equitable jurisdiction, equity will interpose on the mere ground of that difficulty, notwithstanding there has been a trial at law. The want of the defendant's oath, which this bill, in seek a 1 Scho. & Lefr. 204. ing relief, calls for, was alone an insurmountable obstacle: This is not a bill for discovery merely; if it was, it could not be maintained; for then it would not be a case for equitable cognizance, and the plaintiff should have come here for a discovery during the lis pendens at law. But although it is a bill for relief, discovery is most important to that relief. The relief was always in the power of a Court of equity, and one of the reasons why this Court ought not to be satisfied with what has been done at law, is, that at law, there could be no discovery. The examination into the trust, and its abuses, could not be complete without the defendant's oath. If the plaintiff had come into equity seeking discovery and relief, while the suit was depending at law, the Court of equity would have taken the whole cause under its care, and would have determined it as now required to do: and the principle is not altered by the suit at law having proceeded to judgment, since the cause has not yet been decided upon the defendant's oath. Where a bill alleges that a verdict has been obtained, on a matter of equitable cognizance, against the defendant's knowledge of the merits, a reliance upon such verdict is as much against conscience as to that defendant, as the alleged breach of trust itself. In this case, the plea is no bar to the relief, if the defendant's knowledge makes the verdict unconscientious. A judgment may, indeed, be pleaded in bar, where the matter has been fully tried, and where the judgment is not impeached through the conscience of the defendant. If the bill alleges nothing, that if true, convicts the defendant of knowledge that his 1821. Hughes V. Blake. 1821. Hughes V. Blake. verdict is against conscience, the plea is good. But a Court of equity ought not to relinquish its jurisdiction, until the defendant has maintained the verdict, on a matter of equitable cognizance, by his oath. 2. It has already been shown, that the merits of the cause could not have been fully and fairly tried at law, and the judge's charge shows that they were not. But it is said that the plaintiff ought then to have moved for a new trial: and certainly upon a matter which a Court of law only had a right to dispose of, this would have been the proper course: But this is a matter of equity, and if the party will set up a trial at law as a bar to equitable relief, he must show it, as he alleges it to be, a full and fair trial, and that the equitable merits were really lest open to the jury. 3. But supposing the plea to be proved, is its sufficiency now open for inquiry? And certainly the general rule would exclude that inquiry: pleas are not usually forestalled by the bill: but if the bill shows what, if true, would invalidate the plea, taking issue on it does not cure the defect." But, it has been before shown, that this bill does allege such matter, and the plea admits the whole of it by not denying it. It is true that the defendant cannot amend his plea, but he may be ordered to answer, reserving him the benefit of his plea at the hearing, and in that mode justice will be done. a Coop. Pl. 227, Mr. Webster, and Mr. Jones, contra, insisted, that no question could arise on the sufficiency of the plea in point of law, for by going to issue on the facts alleged in the plea, the parties have waived all objections of that nature: or, in the words of Gilbert, "if a party replies to a plea before it comes on to be argued, this is as full an admission of the plea, as if it had been argued and allowed; for the plea by this replication is allowed to be good; only the defendant is put to the proof thereof; and so he may be, when it is argued and allowed. But if he proves his plea, the bill must be dismissed at the hearing." Thus, if the defendant, in pleading a purchase for a valuable consideration, omits to deny notice; if the plaintiff replies to it, all that the defendant has to do, is to prove his purchase; and even if the plaintiff proves notice, it is immaterial; for it is the plaintiff's own fault if he does not set down the plea to be argued, in which case it would be overruled." So here, if the plea had been bad, the plaintiff should have set it down for argument. The plea consists of two material parts; it alleges a judgment at law, for the same cause of action, in a Court of competent jurisdiction; and it avers that there is no ground to impeach that judgment, and no new evidence discovered to enable the plaintiff to go behind it. There is the same strictness of pleading in equity, as at law but if the rule were not so, this plea is a Gilb. For. Rom. 98. Mitf. Pl. 244. Beames' Eq. Pl. 317. 2 Eq. Abr. 79. Wyatt's Prac. Reg. 376. 1 Scho. & Lefr. 725. b Harris v. Ingleden, 3 P. Wms. 95. 2 Atk. 632. 1821. Hughes V. Blake. |