1821. Cohens V. Virginia. nected with the internal police and economy of the several States. If this system knew no exception in its operation, the present question would never have arisen; for no man would ever dream of calling a law of Virginia or Maryland, a law of the United States. But there are certain portions of territory within the United States, of which the District of Columbia is one, in which there is no State government to act in relation to these, Congress, by the constitution, exercises not only federal, but municipal legislation also: and as the whole difficulty in this case has arisen out of this blending together of two different kinds of legislative power; so, that difficulty will be removed by a careful attention to the difference in the nature and character of these powers, and the extent of their operation respectively. Whenever a question arises, whether a law passed by Congress is a law of the United States, we have only to inquire whether it is constitutionally passed in execution of any of the federal powers: if it be, it is properly a law of the United States; since the federal powers are co-extensive with the limits of the United States; and this, though the particular act, may be confined to certain persons, places or things. Thus, a law establishing federal Courts in a particular State, is a law of the United States; for though its immediate operation is upon one State, yet it is in execution of a power co-extensive with the United States; but if a law, though passed by Congress, be passed in execution of a municipal power, as a law to pave the streets of Washington, then it cannot, in any propriety of lan guage, be called a law of the United States. It is an axiom in politics, that legislative power has no operation, beyond the territorial limits under its authority. I do not now speak of the doctrine of the lex loci; of that comity, by which the different States of the civilized world, receive the laws of others, as governing in certain cases of contract, or questions of a civil nature. I speak of the intrinsic energy of the legislative power, its operation per se. If this principle be true, is there any thing in this case to impair its force? It is admitted on all hands, that this law was passed in virtue of the power given by the constitution to exercise exclusive legisla tion, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as should become the seat of the federal government. If we look into the history of the country, the debates of the Conventions, or the declarations of the Federalist, we shall alike arrive at the conclusion, that this power was given in consequence of an incident which had occurred in Philadelphia, and the necessity which thence seemed to result, of Congress deliberating uninterrupted and unawed. The motive, then, for granting this power, would not lead to an extension of it; still less will the terms; for, they are as restrictive as could by possibility be used. The district shall not exceed ten miles square, and as was argued in the Convention of Virginia, may not exceed one mile: so far from the principle being impaired then, it is greatly strengthened by the language of this provision. See to what consequences we should be led by the doctrine, that because this lottery was authorized by Congress, therefore, the tick 1821. Cohens V. Virginia. 1821. Cohens v. Virginia. ets might be sold in any State, against its laws, with impunity. The same charter authorizes the Corporation of Washington to grant licenses to auctioneers and retailers of spirituous liquors: now, upon the doctrines contended for, what will hinder the Corporation from granting licenses to persons, to vend goods and liquors in Virginia, by a Corporation license, contrary to the laws of Virginia? and thus, greatly impair the revenue which the State raises from these licenses; as it is said, that a saleable quality is of the essence, and constitutes the only value of a lottery ticket, and that therefore it is not competent to any State to abridge the value of that, which was rightfully created by the Legislature of the Union? Would not the same reasoning justify the holders of these Corporation licenses, equally to trample upon the laws of the State; lest, for want of a market, their merchandise and liquors might not be sold, and thus the value of their license diminished. These are cases, in which the revenue of a State would be impaired, as well as the laws for the protection of its morals. Such is the law of Virginia, prohibiting the use of billiard tables. If Congress should authorise licenses to be issued, by the Corporation of Washington, for using them, and if this law have an operation beyond the territorial limits of the District, then has Virginia lost all power of regulating the conduct of her own citizens. The solution of the whole difficulty lies in this : That though the laws of Congress, when passed in execution of a federal power, extend over the Union, and being laws of the United States, are a part of the supreme law of the land: yet, a law passed like the one in question, in execution of the power of municipal legislation, extends only so far, as the power under which it was passed—that is, to the boundaries of the District; that, therefore, it is no law of the United States, and consequently not a part of the supreme law of the land. Nor is there any thing novel in the idea of two powers residing in the same body, at the same time, and over the same subject, of a different kind. The idea is familiarly illustrated by cases of ordinary occurrence in the judiciary. For the same trespass, an action, or indictment, may be brought before the same Court, and a different judgment pronounced, as one or the other mode is pursued. So the same Court has frequently common law and chancery jurisdiction, and pronounces a different judgment in relation to the same subject, as they are exercising the one or the other jurisdiction. Let us look further at the consequences of calling the laws of the District, laws of the United States. By the sixth article of the Constitution, laws of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared a part of the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the laws of their State to the contrary notwithstanding. If, then, laws of the District be laws of the United States, within the meaning of the constitution, it will follow, that they may be carried to the extent of an interference with every department of State legislation; and whenever they shall so interfere, they are to be considered 1821. Cohens V. Virginia. 1821. Conens v. Virginia. of paramount authority. Suppose the law of Virginia to declare a deed for land void against a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, unless recorded upon the party's acknowledgment, or the evidence of three witnesses. Suppose a law of the District to dispense with record, or to be satisfied with two witnesses. If one citizen should convey to another citizen of the District, land lying in Virginia, in conformity with the District law, upon the principle now contended for, the party must recover, in the teeth of the law of Virginia. It will be admitted, that a law passed, like the one in question, by one State, might be repelled by another: it will, also, be admitted, that if Congress had, (as some think they have a right to do, but in which I do not concur,) established here a local legislature, which had passed the law in question, its effects might have been repelled from the States by penal sanctions. But if it be said, that as the dominion over the District flows from the same source with every other power possessed by the government of the Union, as it is executed by the same Congress, as it was created for the common good, and for universal purposes, that it must be of equal obligation throughout the Union in its effects, with any power known to the constitution; from whence it is inferred, that the law in question can encounter no geographical impediments, but that its march is through the Union : The answer is, that the federal powers of Congress, in their execution, encounter no geographical impediments, because no limits, short of the boundaries |