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1827.

The KING

V.

STOKE DAMA

REL.

If there was a valid binding of the pauper as an apprentice, either by the parties themselves, independently of that statute, or by the parish officers pursuant to its provisions, a settlement has been gained; but it is submitted, that there was no valid binding, and therefore that the sessions have done right in quashing the order of removal. It will probably be contended, and perhaps may be admitted, that, but for the enactments of the 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, the binding in this case would be valid, as the act of the parties themselves; Rex v. Arundel (a), where it was held that an infant may bind himself an apprentice by indenture, because it is for his benefit (b); and that though he is a. pauper in the parish workhouse at the time of the binding, and the parish officers pay the premium, still, it is not necessary for them to sign the indenture, or that the parties should assent thereto, if the infant is not a parish apprentice within the meaning of the 43 Eliz. c. 2. [Bayley, J. Does not the 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, apply exclusively to parish bindings? If it does, your admission concludes you].

prenticeship before the same shall
be executed by any of the other
parties thereto, &c."

Section 2, after regulating the
allowance of the indenture in cases
where the master and the appren-
tice reside in different counties or
jurisdictions, provides that" notice
shall be given to the overseers of
the poor of the parish or place in
which such child shall be intended to
serve an apprenticeship, before any
justice for the county or district,
within which such parish or place
shall be, shall allow such inden.
ture; and such notice shall be
proved, before such justice shall
sign such indenture, unless one of
such overseers shall attend such
justice, and admit such notice."

Section 5, provides, that " ΠΟ settlement shall be gained by any

child, who shall be bound by the officers of the parish, &c., by reason of such apprenticeship, unless such order shall be made, and such allowances of such indenture of apprenticeship shall be signed, as hereinbefore directed."

Section 11, provides, that " no indenture of apprenticeship, by reason of which any expense whatever shall at any time be incurred by the public parochial funds, shall be valid and effectual, unless approved of by two justices, under their hands and seals, according to the provisions of the 43 Eliz. (entitled, an act for the relief of the poor), and of this act."

(a) 5 M. & S. 257.

(b) See Rex v. Wigston, 5 D. & R. 339; 3 B. & C. 486; 2 D. & R. M. C., 445.

Some parts of the act do apply exclusively to parish bindings; but the eleventh section is more general: that applies to all bindings where any expense is incurred by the parish, and is to be read as connected with, and referring to, the preceding sections. Rex v. Bawburgh (a). Then, if the provisions of this statute are applicable, generally, to all bindings where expense is incurred by the parochial funds, whether made by the parish officers or by the parties, this indenture is clearly void; and it seems reasonable to give the statute that general application; for the object of the legislature in passing it manifestly was, to enforce the same investigation and allowance by the magistrates, the same notice to the parish officers, and the observance of the same formalities in all respects, in bindings by private parties where the parochial funds incurred expense, as in parish bindings. In this point of view there are two fatal defects in this indenture. First, no previous notice of the binding was given to the overseers of the parish of Charles. The pauper belonged to the parish of Stoke Damarel; the master belonged to the parish of Charles, within the borough of Plymouth, the justices of which have an exclusive jurisdiction therefore, notice to the officers of the latter parish of the intended binding was necessary, by the express provisions of the second section of the act (b). That was expressly decided in Rex v. Newark (c). There, the overseers of a county parish, in pursuance of an order of county magistrates, bound a pauper apprentice to a master residing in a borough within the same county, having magistrates with exclusive jurisdiction, and gave no notice of the binding to the overseers of the borough parish; and it was held that the indenture was void under the statute. Secondly, the allowance of the indenture here was only signed by the magistrates, whereas it ought to have been under their hands and seals. It will be contended on the

(a) 3 D. & R. 338; 2 B. & C. 222; 3 D. & R. M. C., 23. (b) Ante, 460.

(c) 4 D. & R. 745; 3 B. & C. 59; 2 D. & R. M. C., 366.

1827.

The KING

V.

STOKE DAMA

REL.

1827.

The KING

บ.

STOKE DAMA

REL.

other side, that the act of Parliament is, in this respect, merely directory, and that as the clause requiring the approval of two justices, under their hands and seals (a), refers to the 43 Eliz. c. 2, which does not require the allowance to be under seal; it could not have been intended to make that an indispensable requisite under this act. The argument, however, cannot be sustained; for this is the case of the execution of a power given to particular persons, but binding and operating on other parties, and which must, therefore, be executed strictly and literally as given; and the magistrates have no discretionary right to dispense with any one of the formalities which they are directed to observe. This distinction between the execution of deeds which bind the parties only, and of those which operate upon third persons, was clearly laid down by Lord Ellenborough in his very learned judgment in the case of Rex, v. Austrey (b), and is quite decisive of the point in the present case. There, a certificate was signed by two churchwardens and one overseer, but had only two seals; and it was held to be not properly executed within the 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 30, which requires certificates to be under the hands and seals of the churchwardens and overseers, or the major part of them. The language of Lord Ellenborough upon the point was this:-"In considering how far the cases of deeds are applicable to the present, it is to be recollected, that in those cases the parties alone, under whose authority the deeds were executed, are bound by them. But the present is the case of the execution of a power, which binds and operates upon other persons at their peril, and subjects them to indictments as for crimes, in case of their disobedience to the power, if it be duly executed. In the execution of powers, all the circumstances required by the creators of the power (however unessential and otherwise unimportant) must be observed, and can only be

(a) Sect. 11; ante, 460.

(b) 1 Phil. Ev.469, 5th edit. And see Sugden on Powers, 215.

satisfied by a strictly literal and precise performance (a).. It is also a general principle of law, wherever a power is given to particular persons to do a written act in a particular manner, or under certain peculiar circumstances, whether it be to parish officers or magistrates, (as, to grant certificates, under which, if duly executed, other persons, especially public officers, are bound to act, or to grant warrants, or make orders), that their authority must appear upon the instrument itself. It must thereby appear, that they are the persons authorized, and that the certificate, warrant, or order, was made in the manner and under the circumstances required; otherwise, the certificate, warrant, or order, is not obligatory, but void. The statute is to be construed, in a case like this, according to common parlance and understanding, and so as to be a security to persons, who are bound to obey the powers given by it at their peril; and it is not to be construed according to what may be brought within its words by nice legal reasoning, applicable merely to deeds."

Bolland and Coleridge, contrà. The indenture in this case cannot possibly be considered as falling within the provisions of the first, second, and fifth sections of the act of Parliament; and the eleventh section is a separate and independent enactment, which ought not to be read with reference to, or in connexion with, the preceding clauses. The first ten sections are confined entirely to parish bindings; but here the binding was the act of the father, and the indenture is affected by the eleventh section only. Rex v. Arundel (b), is decisive to show that none but a binding by the parish officers, is a parish binding within the meaning of the acts of Parliament; and that the mere circumstance of the premiums being paid by the parish, does not vary the case. Rex v. Bawburgh (c), and Rex

(a) See Hawkins v. Kemp, 3 East,

440.

(b) 5 M. & S. 257.

(c) 3 D. & R. 338; 2 B. & C. 222; 2 D. & R. M. C., 23.

1827.

The KING

บ.

STOKE DAMA

REL.

1827.

The KING

V.

STOKE DAMA

REL.

v. Newark (a), therefore, are no authorities for the present case, because they differ from it in this essential particular, that there the pauper was bound out by the parish officers, and here she was bound out by her father. Then with respect to the construction of the eleventh section, to which single point the question now before the Court is reduced, it is clearly unconnected with all that precedes it in the statutes; it appears to have been added after the rest of the act had been drawn ; and it is evidently framed merely for the purpose of preventing clandestine appropriations of the parish funds. It is, in effect, a statute of itself, introduced by a regular preamble, the language of which plainly indicates that the enactment which follows is meant to be distinct and independent, and that the section itself is to stand alone, as if it were a separate act of Parliament (b). It does, undoubtedly, require the approval of the indenture by two justices "under their hands and seals," but it is evident that the latter words were not intended to be inserted, but have crept in through mistake; because it goes on to say, according to the provisions of the said act, and of this act :" and neither the said act, the 43 Eliz. c. 2, nor the preceding sections of this act, require the allowance of the indentare to be under seal. All, therefore, that was meant to be required by this section, was an allowance according to the provisions of the 43 Eliz. c. 2, and the previous sections of the 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, namely, an allowance signed by two justices; and as there has been such an allowance in this case, it follows that the indenture is valid. But, admitting that this indenture may be voidable as between the parties, it by no means follows that it is absolutely void in law, so as to deprive the party who has served under it of a settlement. The eleventh section does not appear to have been intended in any manner to affect the settlement, for its language is, that "no inden

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