that the pauper in this case could not acquire a settlement. Neither was she irremovable; Rex v. North Weald Bassett (a). There, a widow entitled to dower, which was unassigned, upon her husband's estate, which had been mortgaged by him for 1000 years, after receiving her dower upon one half year's rent from the mortgagee in possession, became chargeable to the parish in which the property was situated, before she had resided 40 days: and it was held, that as the dower had not been assigned, she had not such an interest in the parish as to render her irremovable from what could be called her own. As this pauper can never acquire a settlement at Brington, it would be a great hardship on that parish to hold her irremovable from it; because the consequence may, and probably will, be, that she will continue there, chargeable, and a burthen, for the remainder of her life. Rex v. Aythrop Rooding, which has been so strongly relied on by the other side, though it certainly resembles the present case in some respects, is nevertheless distinguishable from it in others. There, the pauper was not actually chargeable at the time of her removal, as she was here; and Lord Mansfield said, "she cannot be removed from her husband's property, upon being only likely to become chargeable." There, the Court presumed that the wife went into the removing parish with her husband's consent; for Denison, J., said, "this woman's going thither does not appear to be against the consent of her husband; it is rather to be presumed that she went with his consent;" here, it is impossible to presume the husband's consent, for the case finds that he had been absent from her for a considerable time before she went to Brington. There, the property belonged solely and exclusively to the husband, and in his absence there was no person but the wife who had any interest or duty to take care of it; here other persons were interested in the estate, and one of them was actually residing upon it, and taking charge of it. At all events, in order to (a) 4 D. & R. 276; 2 B. & C. 724; 2 D. & R. M. C., 221. 1827. The KING V. BRINGTON. 1827. The KING V. BRINGTON. render the party irremovable, there must be a residence, in the legal import of that word, which there was not in this case. The law requires a residence, not in the character of visitor only, which this pauper was, but in the character of owner of the estate. [Bayley, J. The pauper was interested in the property jointly with her sister, and she went to live with that sister, who resided in the very house mentioned in the marriage settlement.] But she did not go to live there in her own right; she went there merely as the visitor, and resided there merely as the guest, of her sister, without any view of enforcing her own claim to the estate. She did not even go there with the purpose of residing upon the estate; that which the law requires, and which may be termed the animus residendi, was wanting. The case of Rex v. Ashton-under-Lyne (a), is somewhat applicable upon this point. There, the pauper's husband being a soldier, deserted, and left his family in the parish of S., and the wife, during his absence, took a house at 5l. a year in S., and lived in it with her family, and also took another house at five guineas a year, and put some of her husband's furniture into it, intending to remove thither, but never did remove, but underlet it; and during the time she held both, her husband came to see her, and remained seven weeks concealed in the house where she lived, and was made acquainted with her having taken the two. It was held, that the husband did not acquire a settlement by that residence. And why? Upon the ground that he was in the house, not animo residendi, but animo latitandi; for the purpose of concealing himself from danger, not for the purpose of ordinary and ostensible residence. So here, the pauper was in the house, not animo residendi, but animo visitandi; merely as a guest, not as a resident. [Bayley, J. I take that case to have been decided on a very different ground. The house was taken by the wife, independently, and without the knowledge of, the husband. The landlord treated with her, and her (a) 4 M. & S. 357. only; he never intended to make the husband his tenant: the husband never was tenant of, or had any interest in, the house; therefore his merely inhabiting it for a particular purpose, during a particular period, conferred no settlement upon him. That I take to be the ground of the decision in that case.] If the Court are of opinion that the pauper went to Brington for the purpose of residing there in her own right, and at the same time see, as they must do, that she concealed that purpose, and went apparently with the view of merely paying a visit to her sister; then they must feel that she practised a gross fraud, to the success of which they will not by their decision contribute: Rex v. St. Michael's, Bath (a), where, after deciding upon other points respecting the settlement, Lord Mansfield said, "there is still another, and a stronger ground in this case; for the possession (of the tenement) was gained by fraud" (b). Lastly, upon the question of irremovability, it is to be observed, that the order of removal comprehends not only the wife but her daughter, and as the case does not state that the daughter was within the age of nurture, and as such irremovable from her mother, her settlement, at all events, must follow that of her father, and she was removable to Badby, the place of her father's settlement. BAYLEY, J.-With respect to the point last made, I think the Sessions, by quashing the order of removal with respect to the child as well as the mother, have virtually, though not in express terms, declared that the child was within the age of nurture, and, therefore, not removable from her mother; therefore I see no reason for reversing the order of Sessions on that point. Then with respect to the mother, the only question really is, was she, or was she not, in point of law, removable from Brington? Whether she has acquired, or could by possibility acquire, a settlement there, is a very different question, and one which it is quite unnecessary to decide on the present (a) Doug. 630; Cald. 110. (b) Rex v. Birmingham, post. 1827. The KING บ. BRINGTON. 1827. The KING บ. BRINGTON. occasion. Her husband is legally settled in Badby, and is still living; primâ facie, therefore, she was settled there, and there only, and was incapable of obtaining a settlement elsewhere. There are exceptions to that rule, but we need not consider whether the present is one of the excepted cases it is sufficient for the purposes of this inquiry to say, whether the pauper was removable or not. I am clearly of opinion that she was not, but that she was within the principle of law, which says, that none are removable from their own estate. She had a clear legal interest in one fourth of the estate at Brington; that interest was her own, and not her husband's; the seisin was in her; it was her own property, and she had a right to go and live upon it. The argument that the husband alone was seised in right of his wife, of the interest in the estate, is not correct (a); the utmost that can be contended is, that they were seised jointly; and admitting that to be the case, it does not vary the rights of the wife. But even if the property was exclusively the husband's, still, according to the decision in Rer v. Aythrop Rooding (b), the wife had a natural, at least a matrimonial right, to go to her husband's estate, and being there, was not removable from it; and that is, in its circumstances, a weaker case than the present. Upon the general principle, therefore, it is clear that this pauper was not removable, if she was residing upon her own; but that has been denied, and it has been said that she was not resident in Brington, within the fair legal import of that word. I do not, however, see any thing in that objection. The pauper had a right to go and live upon the estate; she had a legal interest in it, which might naturally lead her to do so; she had a good reason for doing so, namely, to look after the rents and profits arising from the estate, as well as the desire of seeing her own sister, who was previously residing there. I am, therefore, of opinion, that she was residing upon the estate, in the fullest sense of the word, when she was removed, and that (a) Ante, 434 (b). (b) Burr. S. C. 412. she was residing upon her own, and, therefore, irremovable the result is, that the Sessions came to a right conclusion, and that their order, quashing the order of removal, must be confirmed. The other Judges concurred. Order of Sessions confirmed. 1827. The KING บ. BRINGTON. The KING V. The Inhabitants of COTTINGHAM. TWO justices made an order for the removal of Ann, The wife and children of an Irish man, who has no settlement in England, and absconds chargeable, leaving them must be removed to the place of the wife's last legal settlement, and cannot be passed to Ireland, under the 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 33. |