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LITTLEDALE, J.-This rule ought to be discharged. I
BRAMWELL do not enter into the question whether the defendant knew that Richards was named in the warrant, or whether the warrant against the plaintiff was sufficient. The expression "labourers employed in any other manner," does not apply to such a case as this. The labourer must be employed in some description of work in which the justices may fix the rate. This was quite out of their province. If the property was valuable it might be necessary that he should employ other people under him. He might be entitled to one or two guineas a day.
Rule discharged (a).
(a) And see Wilson v. Weller, 1 Bro. & Bingh. 57; post.
JOHN JONES v. TANNER, executor of BENJAMIN JONES, deceased.
does not lie for
share of the
of an intestate,
admitted by the administrator, to be in his hands.
ASSUMPSIT. First count, for money lent by the plain the amount of tiff to the testator. Second count, for money paid by the the plaintiff's plaintiff to the use of the testator. Third count, for money had and received by the testator to the use of the personal estate plaintiff. Fourth count, upon an account stated between the plaintiff and the testator. In these four counts, the promises were laid as made by the testator. The fifth count was for money lent to, and paid, laid out, and expended for the use of the testator, and money had and received by the testator to the use of the plaintiff, and upon an account such adminis- stated between the plaintiff and the testator, laying the trator, upon an promise by defendant as executor. Sixth count, on an account stated by the defendant, of money owing by him as executor. Plea-first, non-assumpsit; secondly, to the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th counts, a set-off for money due from the plaintiff to the testator; and thirdly, to the same counts, testator non assumpsit infra sex annos. At the
A fortiori, it will not lie against the executor of
made by the former.
trial at the last Bridgewater assizes, before Burrough, J.(a), it appeared, that William Jones, the father of the plaintiff, and of the testator, having died intestate, the testator possessed himself of his personal property, either as administrator to his father, or as executor de son tort. The testator died in July, 1816 (6). It was stated, that this action was brought to recover 797. and upwards, in respect of moneys which the testator had held as the plaintiff's distributive share of their father's property. It appeared that after the death of the testator, the plaintiff's sister applied to the defendant for 707. due to the plaintiff on her father's account. The defendant said it was the plaintiff's right, and he should be paid; and he furnished the following account:
"The net amount of Mr. W. Jones's effects, after deducting debts and other expenses, is as under :
Gross amount 640 3 1
Deduct debts, &c. 221 12 51
£418 10 71
• Net amount to be divided
A servant of the testator's stated that the plaintiff conducted the testator's business for him; and that being together about six weeks before the testator's death, the testator said there was not work enough done, upon which the plaintiff said, "If you'll pay me the 2007. thee hast had of me"-to which the defendant said, "I've had thy 2007., but I've maintained thee all the while." Upon this evidence, it was objected on the part of the defendant, first, that there was no sufficient admission to take the case out of the statute as to the 2007. (a); and, secondly, that the action could not be sustained upon the promise, and the account furnished by the defendant, inasmuch as no action would have lain against the testator in his own right, for any portion of the produce of the estate of William Jones, the father; and that if the testator could not have been sued in his own right, no action would lie against his executor. The learned Judge overruled both objections, giving leave to move upon the first point; but he refused to reserve the second; and the Jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 2901.
C. F. Williams having obtained a rule to shew cause why a nonsuit should not be entered, or a new trial had,
Erskine and Bayly shewed cause. No leave was granted as to the 737., therefore there can be no nonsuit, as the first objection goes only to part of the damages found by the jury. If Benjamin Jones made such a contract as would render him personally liable, the action is maintainable against his executor. [Bayley, J. The promise was made by the defendant, not by Benjamin Jones, this acknowledgment ought only to bind himself.] Benjamin Jones had obtained possession of his father's goods, and this the defendant admits. [Holroyd, J. Does the
(a) The objection as to the date of this recognition was not taken. At the trial, it appeared that the testator made his will in 1822, and
died in 1826. The struggle was not on the date, but on the form, of the acknowledgment.
executor of an executor de son tort, represent the first testator? Bayley, J. You don't sue as representative of William Jones. Littledale, J. There is no count charging the defendant with having money. Holroyd, J. Benjamin Jones received the effects of his father, not for any particular party]. As against the defendant who makes the promise, it must be taken that Benjamin Jones received the money to the use of the plaintiff. In Deeks v. Strutt (a), it was held, that no action at law lies for a legacy upon an implied promise from the executor. And Grose, J. relied upon the circumstance of there being no express promise in that case. Here, an express promise was proved. They also referred to Gorton v. Dyson (b). [Bayley, J. There the defendant was a depositary, and did not hold as an executor. If an executor were to write to a legatee, “I will hold the money to your use, and allow you interest," he would make himself personally liable. Littledale, J. In a case before me in Sussex, a brother appeared to have told his brothers and sisters that he would hold the money which he had received as executor, and would pay them interest; upon which I held, that he was personally liable. Bayley, J. The account does not shew that the money had ever been in Benjamin Jones's hands]. In Powell v. Graham (c), the court of Common Pleas held, that in an action against an executor, on an account stated of money due from him in his representative capacity, he was personally liable. Deeks v. Strutt merely decided that where there is no express promise, a promise will not be inferred. [Bayley, J. This inconvenience might arise. There might be a claim upon William Jones's estate. Would an action lie against an executor to pay a distributive share upon an express promise?] In Atkins v. Hill (d) it was held, that assumpsit lies upon a promise by an exe
(u) 5 T. R. 690.
(b) 1 Brod. & Bingh. 219; and see 3 J. B. Moore, 558; Gow's N. P. Cases, 78; Manning, N. P.
Digest, 2d edit. 194, 356.
(c) 7 Taunt. 580; and see 1 J. B. Moore, 305, S. C.
(d) Cowp. 284.
cutor to pay a legacy in consideration of assets. There an
BAYLEY, J.-This is one of the most singular actions I have ever known brought. An action is not to be brought here for a distributive share. It is not a common law right, but is given by statute, sub modo. The party
(a) Vide Reech v. Kennegal, 1 Vez. sen. 126; 1 Wms. Saund.
210 b. n.
(b) Vide ante, 422 («).