1827. CADDY V. BARLOW. of any thing which can fall in evidence against the King, or in his disadvantage (a). May it please (you) to ordain by statute, that search and exemplification be made for all persons (fait as touts gentz) of whatever record touches them in any manner, as well as that which falls against the King as other persons. Le Roy le voet." And see 3 Inst. 71. In Brangan's case, 1 Leach, C. C. 32, Willes, C. J., is reported to have said, "that by the laws of this realm, every prisoner, upon his acquittal, has an undoubted right and title to a copy of the record, for any use which he may think fit to make of it; and, that, after demand, the proper officer may be punished for refusing to make out a copy." The first restriction of this general right appears to have been imposed by an order made by some of the Judges, (the first who are recorded to have refused to seal a bill of exceptions in criminal cases,) for the regulation of the Old Bailey Sessions, (Directions for Justices at the Old Bailey, prefixed to Kelyng's Rep. p. 3, order. 3), in the reign of Car. 2, by which it was ordered, "that no copies of any indictment for felony be given without special order, upon motion made in open Court, at the general gaol delivery; for the late frequency of actions against prosecutors, which cannot be without copies of the indictment, deterreth people from (a) The words of Lord Coke are, "Et ja de novell refusent en la court nostre dit seign' de serche ou evidence encountr' le Roy ou disadvantage de ly." But this is manifestly a mistake of the printer or transcriber. In the Parliament Rolls it stands thus :-- prosecuting for the king upon just occasions." It has, however, been decided, in a decided, in a case argued long subsequent to that of Jordan v. Lewis, 2 Stra. 1122, namely, in Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East, 302, that the formalities specified in that order, are not absolutely necessary for the reception in evidence of a copy of an indictment. There, the plaintiff, in an action for a malicious prosecution, produced, by means of the clerk of the court of quarter sessions, before which the indictment had been tried, a copy, which was rejected for want of an order, and the plaintiff nonsuited. The Court of K. B. were of opinion that the evidence ought to have been received, and set aside the nonsuit; and Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said "It is very clear that it is the duty of the officer charged with the custody of the records of the Court, not to produce a record but upon competent authority, which at the Old Bailey is obtained upon application to the court, pursuant to the order that has long prevailed there; and with respect to the general records of the realm, upon application to the Attorney-General. But if the officer, even without authority, shall have given a copy of a record, or produce the original, and that is properly proved in evidence, I cannot say that such evidence shall not be received. He may incur the penalty of his contempt of the "Et ja de novel refusent en la court nostre dit seign' de serche ou exemplification faire des nulles riens que purra chier en evidence encontr' le Roi ou des avantage de ly." 2 Rot. Parl. (46 Edw. 3), fo. 314. See also 10 Runnington's Statutes, Appendix, 45. CLEMENT v. FISHER, in Error. A declaration stating, that defendant "published a false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel of and concerning the plaintiff, con amongst other THE first count of the declaration stated, that Fisher, the plaintiff below, was a married man, the father of eight children; that one John Joseph Stockdale had printed and published of and concerning plaintiff, a certain false, &c., libel, containing amongst other things, the false, &c., matter following, of and concerning the said plaintiff. The declaration then went on to set out a libel upon the plaintiff, purporting to be written by one Har- taining riette Wilson, in which the plaintiff is charged with things, the "making love to several women at the same time, although false, scandalous, malihe is a married man," and is called "a dirty Devonshire cious, defamalawyer," and " a wretch." The declaration then stated, tory, and that Fisher impleaded Stockdale, for the printing and publishing of such libel; that Stockdale pleaded not guilty, and that a verdict was found for the plaintiff Fisher, damages 7001; that Clement contriving to injure, &c. Fisher, and to cause it to be believed that he had been guilty of the misconduct thereby imputed to him, and that he, being such husband and father, was an abandoned and profligate man, and had been, and was frequently engaged in intrigues and immoral connections with . libellous and concern ing the plain tiff;" unless the words set out distinctly point to the plaintiff, or that applica tion is given to them by an innuendo. 1827. CLEMENT บ. FISHER, females, did print and publish, &c. The first count then proceeded to set out a libel published by defendant below, upon which nothing turned upon the argument of the writ of error. The second count stated, that the defendant contriving, &c., did print and publish of and concerning the said plaintiff, and of and concerning the said first mentioned libel, and of and concerning the said verdict, a certain other false, &c., libel, containing therein, amongst other things, the false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libellous matter, following (a), that is to say. The declaration then proceeded to set out some doggrel lines, entitled "St-ckd-le and Harriette W-ls-n, a London Eclogue." These lines represented a conversation between Stockdale and Harriette Wilson, designated throughout by the above imperfect words, respecting the publications of the latter. The parts which were supposed to relate to the plaintiff Fisher, were these-"With recent verdicts out of tune. To Fisher (thereby meaning the said plaintiff), Blore, large sums were given, to one three hundred, t'other seven. Much St-ckd-le feared lest such a sample, make others follow the example. Stockdale. "Twould be too hard to pay for truth.-Harriette. But truth has a far keener tooth than falsehood, for we may despise what we all know a pack of lies. I wrote what was not only new, but also in its substance,-(thereby meaning in its substance, true)." To this declaration Clement pleaded not guilty, and upon the trial before Best, C. J., at the sittings at Guildhall, after last Michaelmas term (b), a general verdict was found for the plaintiff, damages, 301. Judgment was given for these damages, and also for 777. 10s. costs. The errors assigned were. (a) The words "of and concerning the plaintiff," which had stood in the special pleader's draft, were here accidentally omitted. 1st. The insufficiency (b) Counsel for the plaintiff, Wilde, Serjt., and Manning; for the defendant, Taddy, Serjt., and Platt. of the declaration. 2d. That the alleged false, &c., matters set forth in the first and second counts of the declaration, and for the said Clement's, printing and publishing of which, Fisher has in those counts respectively complained against Clement, are not described in those counts or either of them, as scandalous, defamatory, and libellous, of and concerning Fisher. 3d. That the alleged false, &c., matters in the several counts of the said declaration set forth, and described as having been contained in the alleged libels, with the printing and publi cation whereof said Fisher had in those counts charged the said Clement, do not appear in or by those counts, or any or either of them, to be scandalous, defamatory, or libellous, of and concerning the said Fisher. 4th. That it does not appear, in or by the said declaration, that the said Clement did, at any time, print or publish any specific matter which by the law of the land could be deemed scandalous, defamatory, or libellous, of or concerning the said Fisher. 5th. That it does not appear in or by the said record, that the said Clement was guilty of any wrongful act towards, against, or as regards the said Fisher, the commission of which by the said Clement could have entitled the said Fisher, by the law of the land, to maintain an action for recovery of damages against the said Clement. 6th. That judgment ought to have been given for the defendant below.-Joinder in error. Platt, for the plaintiff in error. It is sufficient to shew that one of the counts of this declaration is bad. In the second count, the libellous matter is not alleged to have been published of and concerning the plaintiff. In Rer v. Marsden(a), judgment was arrested for want of an averment, that the libel was published of and concerning the plaintiff. [Lord Tenterden, C. J. That was the case of an indictment]. In Wright v. Clements (b), a declaration stating that the defendant published of and concerning the (a) 4 M. & S. 164, post, 287. (b) 3 B. & A. 503. 1827. CLEMENT v. FISHER. 1827. CLEMENT V. FISHER. plaintiff, a libel containing amongst other things, certain false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words, of and concerning the said plaintiff, in substance as follows, that is to say, was held bad in arrest of judgment. [Bayley, J. Here the first libel is stated at length]. What is called the first libel conveys no imputation against the plaintiff. He is called a provincial Adonis, a six feet high, black eyed, Devonshire attorney. The doggrel lines which the defendant published were meant as an attack upon Stockdale and Harriette Wilson, but do not affect the plaintiff. Manning, contrà. The libel published by Stockdale, contained a gross attack upon the plaintiff's moral character, and the second publication by the defendant, averring the truth of the former libel, is equally defamatory of the plaintiff. In Rex v. Marsden, it was not averred that the libel was so published, and the omission to repeat these words in setting out the libellous matter is cured by the verdict. Here the matter published by the defendant, and forming part of a libel, of and concerning the plaintiff, either contained a charge against the plaintiff, or against some other person, or was no libel at all. Upon the two latter suppositions, it cannot be intended that any damages were given by the jury in respect of this count. But the principle upon which judgment is arrested after a general verdict, where there is a bad count, is, that the jury must be taken to have given something in respect of the bad count. Supposing this rule to apply to a case where the objection to the count, is, not that the count discloses an insufficient ground of complaint subsisting in the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff is not sufficiently connected with the injury, the jury cannot be presumed to have given damages in respect of this count, without its being proved to the satisfaction of the learned Judge who tried the cause, that the libellous matter was published of and concerning the plaintiff. The rule is, that the omission of any cir |