broker of the name of Bramley, who had represented to the bankrupt that, in consequence of his having recommended Wagstaffe to the bankrupt, and as he could not pay the whole amount at once, the bankrupt should go on discounting, and that he, Bramley, should deduct one per cent. from the sums to be paid by the bankrupt, but would charge his employers, as if he had made no such deduction. I left it to the jury, whether Bramley thought himself under an honorary engagement to pay the bankrupt; and that if he did, it was not usury. A new trial was moved for, on the ground that I ought to have intimated my opinion to the jury, and that I ought to have done so in a different way. I still think, and I believe one or two of my learned brothers are of the same opinion, that if Bramley thought himself under an honorary obligation, what was done was not usury. We all, however, think that, as, notwithstanding my intimating such an opinion, I left it to the jury to draw their own conclusion upon the whole matter, we cannot disturb the verdict, in a case involving such penal consequences. (a) The statute of Anne (ante, 203, n.), like the previous statutes of 37 Hen. 8, c. 9, 21 Jac. 1, c. 17, 12 Car. 2, c. 13, which limit the rate of interest successively at 10, 8, and 6 per cent., does not proceed upon any distinction between profit and indemnity (ante, 136, n.), but fixes a maximum for the price of the use of money, which it enforces by declaring the contracts and assurances void, (ante, 203, n.), and by subjecting the lender to a penalty equal to three times the amount of the principal lent or forborne, where more than 5 per cent. is taken, (12 Ann. stat. 2, c. 16, sect. 1). Rule discharged (a). The statute of 37 Hen. 8, c. 9, Maximums of price abound 1827. SOLARTE v. MELVILLE. mise" until Michaelmas next and no longer" with the privilege of using part of the premises for specific purposes till Lady-day following, ejectment may be brought for those parts to which the privilege does not extend, in the interval between Mi Such an agree DOE on the demise of WATERS, clerk, against HOUGH TON. Upon a de- EJECTMENT for a messuage and lands at Rippingale, in the county of Lincoln. The lessor of the plaintiff was in November, 1825, instituted and inducted into the rectory of Rippingale. The premises in question had been annexed to the rectory of Rippingale by an inclosure act. The former rector, whose incumbency ended by resignation in October, 1825, had demised the premises to the defendant, who continued in possession until 23d January, 1826, when the following written agreement was entered into :-" Memorandum of an agreement between Rev. Mr. Waters, rector of Rippingale, and Mr. William Houghton, of, &c., who agree as follows, viz., Mr. Houghton to occupy the whole of the glebe lands, which chaelmas and he now occupies, belonging to the rectory of Rippingale Lady-day. aforesaid, until Michaelmas next, O. S. and no longer, at ment contain- the rent of 7007., payable, half at Lady-day next, and half ing an express provision for at the expiration of the term agreed upon; with the folgiving up the lowing privileges to Mr. Houghton, viz., to plough up the farm at Michaelmas, the Corner close (now grass) adjoining the cross roads, and the lower part of the House close in a line even with Mr. J. Shield's close, and to sow the same with beans, and to plough and sow the Bottom fen close, excepting about twenty acres, where the seeds appear to be the best; also this alteration, to plough and sow with a crop of beans, the wheat being merely stubble close which runs up to Graby hedge; also to be allowed by the in-coming tenant for the new yard fencing. Mr. Houghton also to have the use of the barns and farm-yard, to thrash and cut or consume the straw in, until Lady-day, 1827, if he can possibly clear it up by that time, and if not, until May-day, 1827. Mr. Houghton on his part agrees to leave all the house, barn, stables, and other buildings, now upon the premises, as well as all the straw and manure that has grown and arisen, or is to lessor with the assent of the lessee, adds the words "house and buildings." Semble, that an expression of what was before implied, does not require a new stamp. grow and arise, from the said farm previously to Lady-day, 1827, at which time and period Mr. Houghton agrees to give up the holding and occupation, and possession, of the said farm. Mr. Houghton is also to have the privilege of eating the turnips, if any are growing on the land, until new Lady-day, 1827. Agreed upon and signed this 23d day of January, 1826, by us, W. Waters, William Houghton." Shortly after this memorandum had been signed, the lessor of the plaintiff altered the clause, "at which time and period Mr. Houghton agrees to give up the holding and occupation, and possession of the said farm," by adding at the asterisk* the words "house and premises," and informed the defendant he had done so, and requested to have defendant's copy of the agreement, to make a similar addition. The defendant promised to call, and alter his copy of the agreement accordingly, but this was never done. The demise in the declaration was laid on the 16th October, 1826. On the 8th of November, 1826, a distress was taken by the lessor of the plaintiff for 350l., for rent due 10th October, 1826, which rent was afterwards paid by the defendant. No notice to quit had been given. At the trial before Abbott, C. J., at the last Spring assizes for the county of Lincoln (a), it was objected on the part of the defendant, that the agreement having been altered in a material part was not admissible in evidence, and that the tenancy evidenced by the distress, must be taken to be a tenancy from year to year, entitling the defendant to notice to quit; and that by the agreement itself, the defendant was entitled to hold till Lady-day. The learned Judge over-ruled the objection, and received the evidence, being of opinion, that by the agreement, the whole tenancy was to determine at Michaelmas, but that the tenant was to have certain privileges which would extend beyond that period; that the agreement might, perhaps, be vitiated, but then there (a) Counsel for the plaintiff, Denman, C. S., Balguy, and Mac Dowell; for the defendant, Clarke, 1827. Doɛ, dem. v. HOUGHTON. 1827. Doɛ, dem. ບ. HOUGHTON. was no tenancy (a). A verdict was found for the plaintiff, with leave for the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. Clarke having moved accordingly, in Easter term last, obtained a rule to shew cause why a nonsuit should not be entered. Against which, Denman, C. S., and Balguy, now shewed cause. The alteration was made with the defendant's consent. It was in an immaterial part; and it was at all events admissible to shew the terms of the tenancy. The agreement contained express stipulations to quit at Michaelmas, 1826; though the tenant was to have certain privileges until Lady-day, 1827. As the agreement originally stood, the farm was to be given up at Lady-day. By this must have been meant what was afterwards expressed by the alteration; for if, as the defendant contends, he was entitled to hold the land up to Lady-day, it would have been wholly unnecessary to reserve to him a power of eating and consuming the turnips, &c., until Lady-day. But supposing the alteration to be material, it was acceded to by the defendant; and they cited Cole v. Parkin (b), and Paton v. Winter (c). Clarke and Reader, contrà.-It is clear that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between these parties. That is shewn by the distress (d). Before the agreement asked if it was the was read, the defendant's counsel (a) The distress, though taken after old Michaelmas, yet being for rent which had accrued before that time, would not be an affirmance of a tenancy subsisting at the period of the distress; a landlord being authorized by 4 Ann., cap. 16, to distrain within six months after the determination (b) 10 East, 471. (d) Sed vide suprà, note(a) contrà. said that he should receive it in evidence. It was altered 1827. WATERS no doubt to cure an objection to the lessor of the plain- DoE, dem. tiff's right of resuming the possession. If the alteration gives the party a right to enter earlier, it is material. Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-If the verdict was given for the glebe land it must stand. Upon the ground of assent to the alteration, this rule ought to be discharged (a). They will take out execution at their peril. BAYLEY, J.-The Court of Common Pleas have held, that where a policy has been altered, it is binding in its altered shape upon those parties who have assented to the alteration, and that it binds those who have not so assented, in the shape in which it stood originally. There the alteration was made, not by consent, but for the purpose of proposing it to the underwriters. If it had stood farm," it would have included the house and buildings (b). HOLROYD, J., and LITTLEDALE, J., concurred. (a) Vide Sutton v. Toomer, ante, 125. (b) Expressio eorum, quæ tacitè insunt, nihil operatur. For instances of the application of this maxim,see 2 Co. Inst. 365; Idle v. Cook, 1 Peere Wms, 79, 80; Elliott v. Rule discharged (c). Davenport, ib. 84; Blackborne v. 7 Taunt. 416, 1 J. B. Moore, 114, v. HOUGHTON. BRIDGETT V. COYNEY, Esq. TRESPASS, against a magistrate, for an assault and false imprisonment. At the trial, before Littledale, J., at Plaintiff appeared before defendant, a magistrate, to answer the complaint of A., for unlawfully killing his dog. Defendant advised plaintiff to settle the matter, by paying a sum of money, which plaintiff declined. Defendant then said," he would convict plaintiff in a penalty under the Trespass Act, in which case he would go to prison." Plaintiff still declined paying, and said he would appeal. De |