and which may properly be deemed a regulation of such commerce, is
paramount throughout the Union. Reid v. Colorado, 137.
2. When the entire subject of the transportation of live stock from one
State to another is taken under direct national supervision and a sys-
tem devised by which diseased stock may be excluded from interstate
commerce, all local or state regulations in respect of such matters and
covering the same ground will cease to have any force, whether form-
ally abrogated or not; and such rules and regulations as Congress may
lawfully prescribe or authorize will alone control. The power which
the States might thus exercise may in this way be suspended until na-
tional control is abandoned and the subject be thereby left under the
power of the States. Ib.
3. A statute of Wisconsin enacted prior to June 25, 1898, but which was
to go into operation on September 1, 1898, requiring foreign corpora-
tions to file a copy of their charter with the Secretary of State and to
pay a small fee as a condition for doing business there, does not in-
terfere unlawfully with interstate commerce in the case of a foreign
corporation contracting on June 25, 1898, to do business in the State
after September 1, 1898, notwithstanding the fact that the business
was the production of a product which naturally would be sold outside
the State. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 611.
4. The transportation of goods on a through bill of lading from Fort
Smith, Arkansas, to Grannis, Arkansas, over respondent's railroad by
way of Spiro in the Indian Territory, a total distance of one hundred
and sixteen miles, of which fifty-two miles is in Arkansas and sixty-
four in the Indian Territory, is interstate commerce, and is under the
regulation of Congress, free from interference by the State of Ar-
kansas; a railway company operating such a line can maintain an ac-
tion for equitable relief restraining the state railroad commissioners
from fixing and enforcing rates between points within the State, when
the transportation is partly without the State and under the conditions
above stated. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S.
192, distinguished as applying to taxation on freight received on mer-
chandise transported from one point to another within the same State
by a route partly through another State and not to the regulation of such
transportation. Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 617.
5. An ordinance passed by the board of aldermen of the city of Greens-
boro, North Carolina, in pursuance of powers conferred by the legis-
lature of the State, that every person engaged in the business of sell-
ing or delivering picture frames, pictures, photographs or likenesses of
the human face in the city of Greensboro, whether an order for the
same shall have been previously taken or not, shall pay a license tax
of ten dollars for each year, is an attempt to interfere with, and to
regulate commerce, and as such is invalid as to an agent of a corpora-
tion residing out of the State. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 622.
6. Where a portrait company, carrying on business in one State obtains
orders through an agent in another State for pictures and frames, the
fact that in filling the orders it ships the pictures and frames, in sepa-
rate packages, for convenience in packing and handling, to its own
agent, who places the pictures in their proper places or frames and
delivers them to the persons ordering them, does not deprive the
transaction of its character of interstate commerce or take it out of
the salutary protection of the commerce clause of the Federal Consti-
tution. Ib.
See ANIMAL INDUSTRY ACT;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 8.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
The Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission is entitle to be
reimbursed for telegrams sent by him pursuant to directions of the
Commission, on presenting vouchers in the form prescribed by law to
the proper auditing officer of the Treasury Department, approved by
the chairman of the Commission and accompanied by the request of the
chairman that the rules of the Comptroller as to the production of
copies of telegrams for which credit is asked be disregarded on ac-
count of the confidential character of the messages, the secretary hav-
ing also offered to submit the books of the Commission to the Comp-
troller and Auditors of the Treasury. United States v. Moseley, 322.
1. A judgment or decree to be final, within the meaning of that term as
used in the acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeals
and writs of error, must terminate the litigation between the parties
on the merits of the case, so that if there should be an affirmance here,
the court below would have nothing to do but to execute the judgment
or decree it had already rendered. When, therefore, the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia reverses an order of the Supreme
Court of the District in proceedings for the condemnation of land
under the act of Congress of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1381, and remands
the case to the lower court for further proceedings as directed by the
statute, the decree of the Court of Appeals is not such a final judg-
ment as is reviewable in this court and an appeal therefrom will be
dismissed. Macfarland v. Brown, 239.
2. A decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversing
an order of the Supreme Court of the District and remanding the
cause to the lower court with directions to vacate the part appealed
from and to take further proceedings according to law, is neither in
form nor intention a final decree and is not reviewable in this court
on appeal. Macfarland v. Byrnes, 246.
See APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR, 3;
1. Where the master, the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
have concurred in a finding of fact, this court will not, on account of
such concurrence and under the rules of the court, review the dis-
puted facts involved in that finding. Schwartz v. Duss, 8.
2. The jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and decrees of state
courts in suits involving the validity of statutes of the United States
can only be exercised when the decision is against their validity.
Baker v. Baldwin, 61.
3. Where the title claimed by the State of Iowa to land formerly the bed
of a lake rested solely upon the proposition that the State became
vested, upon its admission into the Union, with sovereignty over the
beds of all lakes within its borders, and upon the act of the General
Government in meandering such lakes and excluding from its survey of
public lands all such as lay beneath their waters, and the Supreme
Court of the State has decided adversely to the State and in favor of
one who claimed under the act of Congress of September 28, 1850,
known as the swamp land act, there is no question involving the valid-
ity of any treaty or statute of the United States or the constitutionality
of any state statute or authority which gives this court jurisdiction.
Iowa v. Rood, 87.
4. The mere fact that a State asserts title to the land beneath its lakes,
under a clause of the Constitution or an act of Congress, or that such
act or a patent of the United States appears in the chain of title, does
not constitute such a right, title or immunity as to give the Federal
courts jurisdiction, unless there is either a plausible foundation for
such claim, or the title involves the construction of the act or the de-
termination of the rights of the party under it. Ib.
5. Evidence of the former testimony of a witness was admitted against de-
fendant's objections based on several grounds, one of which was that
he had the constitutional right to be confronted by the witness, but as
no reference to the Constitution of the United States was made in the
objections, and the constitution of Alabama provides that in all crim-
inal prosecutions the accused has a "right .. to be confronted
by witnesses against him "; Held: that the constitutional right was
asserted under the state, and not the Federal, Constitution. Jacobi v.
Alabama, 133.
6. In the state Supreme Court error was assigned to the admission of the
evidence as being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but as the
court did not refer to that contention, and as the settled rule in Ala-
bama in criminal cases is that when specific grounds of objection are
assigned all others are waived, the Supreme Court of the State was not
called upon to revise the judgment of the lower court, and this court
will not interfere with its action, although if the Supreme Court of the
State had passed upon that question the jurisdiction of this court
might have been maintained. Ib.
7. Where objection to testimony on the ground that it is in violation to the
Constitution of the United States is taken in the highest court of the
State for the first time, and that court declines to consider such objec-
tion because it was not raised at the trial, the judgment of the state
court is conclusive, so far as the right of review by this court is con-
cerned (following Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131). Ib.
8. If the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States is invoked
on the ground that the judgment of the state court has denied a right,
title, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States, it should appear that such right, title, privilege or immunity
was specially set up or claimed in the state court. Home for Incurables
v. New York City, 155.
9. This court cannot acquire jurisdiction to review the final judgment of
the highest court of the State by reason of a certificate of the Chief
Justice of the state court, not made while the case was before it or under
its control, stating that the party seeking the intervention of this court
raised Federal questions before the state court. While it has been said
in some cases that such a certificate is entitled to great respect, and in
other cases that its office is to make that more certain and specific
which is too general and indefinite in the record, the certificate is in-
sufficient in itself to give jurisdiction or to authorize this court to de-
termine Federal questions that do not appear in any form from the
record to have been brought to the attention of the state court. Ib.
10. The jurisdiction of a United States commissioner in extradition pro-
ceedings is not dependent upon a preliminary requisition from the de-
manding government. Grin v. Shine, 181.
11. The jurisdiction to review judgments or decrees of the courts of the
Territory of Hawaii is to be determined, not by the law governing as
respects Territories generally, but by Rev. Stat. § 709, relating to the
power to review judgments and decrees of state courts. Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 308.
12. Where in a case coming within the purview of section 709 of the Revised
Statutes, a Federal question—not inherently such-has been explicitly
raised below, if the claim be frivilous or has been so absolutely fore-
closed by previous rulings of this court as to leave no room for real
controversy, a motion to dismiss will prevail. İb.
13. A New York life insurance corporation did business in Hawaii and,
under statutory regulations, was there subject to suit. It delivered a
policy in Hawaii to a person there domiciled, which was among the
effects of such person in Hawaii of which possession was taken by an
administrator appointed by the Hawaiian courts. Suit was brought
in Hawaii upon the policy and judgment was recovered. Held, that
the assertion that the policy had its situs, for the purposes of suit,
solely at the domicil of the corporation was unfounded. Ib.
14. This court cannot review the final judgments of state courts on the
ground that the validity of state enactments under the constitution of
the United States had been adjudged, where those courts merely de-
clined to pass upon the Federal question because not raised in the
trial court as required by the state practice. Layton v. Missouri, 356.
15. Where a general guardian has the legal right to bring a suit in his own
name in the courts of the State of which he is a citizen, and the ward
is not a citizen of the State, a Federal court has jurisdiction in an action
by the guardian against a foreign corporation, inasmuch as such juris-
diction is dependent upon the citizenship of the guardian and not that
of the ward. Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 429.
16. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the Federal courts depends
not on the relative situation of the parties concerned in interest, but
on the relative situation of the parties named in the record. Ib.
17. While this court can decide as an original question the power of a State
to convey property to a corporation, when the case comes from the
Circuit Court of the United States, if the case comes up on writ of error
to a state court, and the highest court of the State has itself put a con-
struction upon an act of its own legislature, and upon its conformity
to the constitution of the State, the decision of such court upon those
questions is obligatory on this court. Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 479.
18. The serious duty of condemning state legislation as unconstitutional
and void cannot be thrown upon this court except at the suit of parties
directly and certainly affected thereby. Chadwick v. Kelley, 540.
19. Where the Supreme Court of Utah has construed the statutes and con-
stitution of Utah to the effect that a foreign corporation had no ex-
istence as a corporation in the State, and could acquire, therefore, no
rights as such, and that an individual connected with the corporation
had no independent rights to the premises, these conclusions do not in-
volve the decision of Federal questions, but only the meaning and effect
of local statutes and a finding of fact, neither of which is reviewable
by this court. Whatever rights the plaintiff in error in this action may
have had under § 2339, Revised Statutes of the United States, depended
upon questions of fact and of local law, which are not reviewable by
this court. Telluride Power Co. v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 569.
20. A domestic judgment of a state court entered after the defendant had
appeared generally and whose validity it would have been the duty of
this court to uphold on direct proceedings to obtain a reversal thereof,
should be treated by courts of the United States so far as it relates to
Federal questions which existed at the commencement of the action,
as valid between the parties to the judgment, and if no claim to the
protection of the Constitution of the United States was set up in any
form in the proceedings had in the state court prior to judgment, such
protection cannot be invoked for the first time in this court to annul
the judgment on the ground that it is absolutely void and of no effect
under the Constitution of the United States. Manley v. Park, 547.
See APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR; COURT OF CLAIMS;
COURTS, 2.
After decree on the verdict of a jury in the trial of issues as to a will, the
caveator moved to vacate the decree on the ground that one of the jurors
was incompetent propter delictum for service, but the trial court denied
the motion, the record stating that the court was of the opinion that at
the trial there was no evidence of mental incompetency, fraud or undue
influence. Held, that the verdict and judgment were not absolutely
void, and that it was within the discretion of the trial court to grant
or deny the motion, and as no other verdict could have been rendered
consistently with the facts, the presence of the juror objected to could
not have operated to the prejudice of the plaintiffs in error, and as there
was nothing to show that injustice was done to them, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. Raub v. Carpenter, 159.
See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.
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