later act is not bad as impairing the obligation of contracts within the
purview of the Constitution of the United States as the compromise,
when made, was subject to the right to repeal, reserved by the consti-
tution of the State at that time.
4. As public policy forbids the insertion in a contract of a condition which
would tend to induce crime, it also forbids the enforcement of a con-
tract under circumstances which cannot be lawfully stipulated for.
Burt v. Insurance Company, 362.
5. The promise of an insurance company to pay the beneficiary of a policy
a sum certain and all the money paid on the policy in assessments, was
not impaired by subsequent amendments to the constitution of the
company, notwithstanding the agreement of the policy holder to abide
by the constitution, etc., of the company "as they now are, or may be
constitutionally changed hereafter;" inasmuch as the amendments
operated only upon policies thereafter issued. Indemnity Company v.
Jarman, 197.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 9, 10, 11.
The statutory liability of stockholders of corporations (other than railway,
religious or charitable) equal to the amount of their stock under sec-
tions 32 and 34 of the General Statutes of Kansas of 1868, as decided
by the highest court of that State, could not be collected by the re-
ceiver of an insolvent corporation, but was an asset which a creditor
of the corporation alone could recover for his individual benefit to the
extent required to pay his judgment obtained against the corporation.
Evans v. Nellis, 271.
See CONTRACTS, 2, 3;
COURTS, 6;
EQUITY, 3, 4;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3.
1. Where Congress has given the Court of Claims jurisdiction to pass upon
the claims of certain Indians against the United States, and in an action
brought under such act a fund has been created and the mode of distri-
bution has been prescribed by the court which established the amount
of the fund, and such method has been approved by this court, its dis-
position in accordance with the course prescribed by the courts must
be held a finality. Where the circumstances are as in the case at bar any
further relief must be obtained from Congress and cannot be given by
the courts. Pam-To-Pee v. United States, 371.
2. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, as of other courts, extends be-
yond the mere entry of a judgment to an inquiry whether the judgment
has been properly executed. Ib.
1. Where an officer of the administrative department of the Government
assumes to act under the authority granted by Federal statutes in a
case not covered by them, the matter may be reviewed by the courts,
even though such action be taken after a hearing. American School
of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 94.
2. The tribunal provided for by the Act of Congress of June 6, 1900, "mak-
ing further provision for a civil government in Alaska and for other
purposes," whether newly created or an existing one continued, has
jurisdiction of all criminal cases pending at the time of the passage of
the Act of March 2, 1899, providing for a code of criminal procedure
for that district. Bird v. United States, 118.
3. Under the statutes of the State of Minnesota and the decisions of the
courts of that State construing and applying them, a creditor cannot
maintain a suit in the courts of that State for a debt against a decedent
after the expiration of the period limited by the order of the probate
court in which creditors may present claims against the deceased for
examination and allowance, and after an allowance of the administra-
tor's final account and a final decree of distribution. Security Trust
Co. v. Black River National Bank, 211.
4. Although it is a well settled principle that a foreign creditor may estab-
lish his debt in the courts of the United States against the personal
representative of a decedent, notwithstanding the fact that the laws of
the State limit the right to establish such demands to a proceeding in the
probate courts of the State, it is also equally well settled that the courts
of the United States in enforcing such claims are administering the
laws of the State of the domicile and are bound by the same rules that
govern the local tribunals; and if a foreign creditor of a Minnesota de-
cedent delays proceedings in the Federal court until after the time to
present claims fixed by the order of the probate court has expired and
the final distribution of the estate has been effected, he cannot use the
Federal courts to devolve a new responsibility upon the administrator
and interfere with the rights of other parties, creditors or distributees,
which have become vested under the regular and orderly administra-
tion of the estate under the laws of the State. Ib.
5. Although under the state statutes the probate court may, before final
settlement and upon good cause shown, extend the time for presenta-
tion of claims, this court is not called upon to determine in a case where
no application for such extension was made before final settlement
whether a Federal court might or might not, on good cause shown, ex-
tend such time. It is obvious and always has been held that the United
States Circuit Court cannot in the trial of an action at law exercise the
powers of a court of equity. Ib.
6. The receiver of an insolvent corporation of Kansas (other than railway,
religious or charitable) appointed in 1898 who has not brought an ac-
tion against the corporation and all the stockholders resident in the
State required by the statutes of the State, as construed by its courts, as
a prerequisite to an action against an individual stockholder, cannot
maintain an action in a Circuit Court of the United States against an
individual stockholder for the amount of the statutory liability. Evans
v. Nellis, 271.
7. The fact that this court has held that a clause avoiding a policy in case
the insured should die by his own hand applied only where the insured
intentionally took his own life while sane, does not estop the court
from giving a different construction to a statute embodying an impor-
tant question of public policy. Indemnity Company v. Jarman, 197.
8. This court has already sustained the power of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia to adopt a rule providing that if the plaintiff or
his agent shall file an affidavit in any action arising ex contractu setting
out distinctly his cause of action, etc., and serve the defendant with
copies thereof and of the declaration, he shall be entitled to judgment
unless the defendant shall file, along with his plea, if in bar, an affida-
vit of defence denying the right of the plaintiff as to the whole or some
specific part of his claim, and specifically also the grounds of his
defence, and has also sustained the validity of the rule as adopted
(No. 73) by said court. Smoot v. Rittenhouse, decided January 10, 1876.
Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. United States, 315.
9. Congress has the power to change forms of procedure and it has been.
decided by this court, (Smoot v. Rittenhouse, supra,) that the power to
enact rules of procedure has been delegated to the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia. Ib.
10. Exceptions based on disputable considerations of the spirit of the rule
will not be taken against the interpretation of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia, which has administered the rule for many
years. Ib.
11. This court will adopt the construction of the state courts of a state stat-
ute as to the necessity of a demand being made before commencement
of action. Insurance Company v. Lewis, 335.
See BANKRUPTCY, 3;
EQUITY, 1, 2, 3;
INDIANS, 5, 6, 7, 8.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 5; INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 1, 2, 3;
EMBEZZLEMENT;
1. Section 23 of the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, permit-
ting importers to abandon imported articles to the United States and
be relieved from the payment of duties thereon, provided the portion
so abandoned amounts to at least ten per cent of the total value or
quantity of the invoice, does not apply to a cargo of fruit, a portion
whereof (which is less than ten per cent) decays on the voyage becom-
ing utterly worthless, and necessarily dumped overboard under the
Lawder v.
sanitary regulations of the port after arrival of the vessel.
Stone, 281.
2. It would be unequitable and presumably not within the intention of Con-
gress to assess duty upon articles which on a voyage to this country
and before arrival within the limits of a port of entry had become ut-
terly worthless by reason of casualty, decay or other natural causes,
and which the importer might rightfully abandon and refuse to receive
or enter for consumption. Ib.
3. Articles thus circumstanced are not in truth within the category of goods,
wares and merchandise imported into the United States, within the
meaning of the tariff laws. Ib.
4. Article 1236 of the Customs Regulations of 1899, which is based upon
sec. 2984, Rev. Stat., relates to merchandise which is destroyed or de-
teriorates after actually having been entered and is not applicable where
the merchandise, as in this case, was never actually entered because it
was destroyed before it could be entered. Ib.
See BOUNTY;
LEGISLATION, 2.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 3, 4.
1. Under a statute punishing embezzlement of property which has come
under the control or care of the defendant by virtue of his employment
as clerk, agent, or servant, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant
while so employed embezzled money entrusted to, and received by, him
in his capacity as clerk, etc. Grin v. Shine, 181.
2. Where a cheque is delivered to a clerk with instructions to draw money
from the bank, take it to the railway, and forward it to another city, he
obtains possession of both the cheque and the money honestly and with
the consent of his principal, and if he subsequently converts the money
to his use, it is prima facie a case of embezzlement and not of larceny,
within the definitions of both crimes under the laws of California. Ib.
See EXTRADITION, 3.
1. Before a court of equity will in any way help a party to thwart the intent
of Congress, as expressed in a statute, it should affirmatively and clearly
appear that there is an absolute necessity for its interference in order
to prevent irreparable injury. Corbus v. Gold Mining Co., 455.
2. If the party primarily and directly charged with a tax is unable to make
a case for the interference of a court of equity no one subordinately
and indirectly affected by the tax should be given relief unless he shows
not merely irreparable injury to the tax debtor as well as to himself,
but also that he has taken every essential preliminary step to justify
his claim of a right to act in behalf of such tax debtor. Ib.
3. The fact that this court entertained the bill of equity in Pollock v. Farm-
ers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, does not determine to what extent
a court of equity will permit a stockholder to maintain a suit nominally
against the corporation, but really for its benefit; and where a bill is
filed by a stockholder to enjoin the officers of a corporation from pay-
ing a tax as required by a statute of the United States, this court will
examine the bill in its entirety and determine whether, under all the
circumstances, the plaintiff has made such a showing of wrong on the
part of the corporation as will justify the suit, and if it appears that
the suit is collusive or that the plaintiff has not done everything which
ought to have been done to secure action by the corporation and its
directors, and justify under the assumption of a controversy between
himself and the corporation his prosecution of a litigation for its bene-
fit, the bill will be dismissed.
4. In an action similar to the preceding, Corbus v. Gold Mining Company,
p. 455, ante, brought by a stockholder to restrain a corporation from
paying certain taxes in which the bill does not show where the direct-
ors reside and does not contain any averment of an application to the
directors, or to the president and treasurer, to take action to relieve
from the burden of the taxes, the bill was properly dismissed. Stewart
v. Steamship Company, 466.
ESTOPPEL.
See COURTS, 7;
INSURANCE, 5.
1. On the trial of issues as to a will, a witness who was a physician and a
relative of deceased, after testifying in regard to certain facts as to
health, actions of deceased, cause of death and results of an autopsy,
was asked, "Doctor, have you formed any opinion from your uncle's
general condition of health and the conditions disclosed by his brain
at this investigation, and from all you know about him yourself, what
his condition of mind was ?" The trial court sustained the objection
taken by the caveators to the words in italics on the ground that no
sufficient basis had been laid for that portion of the evidence, and that
the facts relied upon in this particular should be first adduced. Held,
that the exclusion was not error. Raub v. Carpenter, 159.
2. The sufficiency of evidence properly certified under section 5 of the act
of August 3, 1882, to establish the criminality of the accused for the
purposes of extradition, cannot be reviewed upon habeas corpus. Grin
v. Shine, 181.
3. Where depositions and other documents offered in evidence in an ex-
tradition case are certified by the proper officer as required by act of
Congress, except that the certificate of such officer says that the papers
"are properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be re-
ceived and admitted as evidence for similar purposes by the tribunals
of Russia," the language being a literal conformation to the statute,
adding only the words italicized, the introduction of those words does
not invalidate the certificate. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, 5, 6, 7;
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
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