BOUNTY.

When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all
sugar exported, then, by whatever process or in whatever manner or
under whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation.
As under the laws and regulations of Russia, the Russian exporter of
sugar obtains from his government a certificate solely because of such
exportation, which certificate is salable and has an actual value in the
open market, the government of Russia does secure to the exporter
from that country, as the inevitable result of such action, a money re-
ward or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia, and which is
in effect a bounty upon the export of sugar which subjects such sugar,
upon its importation into the United States, to an additional duty equal
to the entire amount of such bounty under the act of Congress of
July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 205. Downs v. United States, 496.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

See TAX SALE.

CASES DISTINGUISHED.

1. Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S. C. 127, distinguished from Raub v. Carpenter,
159.

2. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, distinguished from
Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 479.

3. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, distinguished
from Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 617.

4. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 471, distinguished from
Ayres v. Polsdorfer, 585.

5. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U. S. 92, distinguished from
Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. Co. v. Herman, 63.

CASES FOLLOWED.

1. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, followed in Macfarland v. Brown, 239.
2. Bryan v. Brasius, 162 U. S. 414, followed in Romig v. Gillett, 111.

3. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, followed in Turpin v. Lemon,

51.

4. In re Oteiza, 136 U. S. 330, followed in Grin v. Shine, 181.

5. Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 47, followed in Ayres v.
Polsdorfer, 585.

6. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 619, followed in Lawder v. Stone, 281.

7. Smoot v. Rittenhouse, decided January 10, 1876, followed in Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. United States, 315.

8. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, followed in Jacobi v. Alabama, 133.
9. Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93, cited in Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293,
301, followed in Raub v. Carpenter, 159.

CERTIORARI.

Where a case has been improperly brought to this court by writ of error,
it is within the powers of the court conferred by the judiciary act of

March 3, 1901, to allow a writ of certiorari and direct that the copy of
the record heretofore filed under the writ of error be deemed and
taken as a sufficient return to the certiorari.
Dent, 237.

Security Trust Co. v.

1. Exactly what due process of law requires in the assessment and collec-
tion of general taxes has never yet been decided by this court; while
it has been held that notice must be given to the owner at some stage
of proceedings for condemnation or imposition of special taxes, it has
also been held that laws for assessment and collection of general taxes
stand upon a somewhat different footing and are construed with the
utmost liberality, sometimes even to the extent of holding that no
notice whatever is necessary (Mr. Justice Field's definition of "due
process of law
"in Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, fol-
lowed), and the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied by showing that
the usual course prescribed by the state laws requires notice to the
taxpayers and is in conformity with natural justice. Turpin v. Lemon,
51.

2. A statute of Wisconsin enacted prior to June 25, 1898, but which was to
go into operation on September 1, 1898, requiring foreign corporations
to file a copy of their charter with the Secretary of State and to pay a
small fee as a condition for doing business there does not impair the
obligation of a contract made on June 25, 1898, by a foreign corpora-
tion to do business in Wisconsin after September 1, 1898. Diamond
Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 611.

3. A ruling by a state court in a criminal case in which it was held that an
objection as to non-compliance with a statute requiring the jury to be
placed in charge of a sworn officer was not made in time and was to be
deemed as waived, was but an adjudication simply of a question of
criminal and local law and did not impair the constitutional guaranty
that no State shall deprive any person of liberty without due process
of law. Dreyer v. Illinois, 71.

4. The decision of the state court sustaining the Indeterminate Sentence
Act of Illinois of 1899, did not infringe the constitutional guaranty of

due process of law, even though that statute confers judicial powers
upon non-judicial officers. Ib.

5. If the jury in a criminal cause be discharged by the court because of
their being unable to agree upon a verdict, the accused, if tried a second
time, cannot be said to have been put twice in jeopardy of life or limb,
whether regard be had to the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.
6. No one is given by the Constitution of the United States the right to in-
troduce into a State, against its will, live stock affected by a contagious,
infectious or communicable disease, and whose presence in the State
will or may be injurious to its domestic animals. The State-Congress
not having assumed charge of the matter as involved in interstate com-
merce-may protect its people and their property against such dangers,
taking care always that the means employed to that end do not go be-
yond the necessities of the case or unreasonably burden the exercise of
privileges secured by the Constitution of the United States. Reid v.
Colorado, 137.

7. The statute of Colorado of March 21, 1885, relating to the introduction
of infectious or contagious disease among the cattle and horses of that
State, is not inconsistent with the clause of the Constitution declaring
that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of citizens in the several States; for it is applicable alike to
citizens of all the States. Ib.

8. An ordinance of the borough of New Hope, Pennsylvania, imposing an
annual license fee of one dollar per pole and two dollars and a half per
mile of wire on the telegraph, telephone and electric light poles within
the limits of the borough is not a tax on the property of the telegraph
company owning the poles and wires, or on its transmission of messages
or on its receipts for such transmission, but is a charge in the enforce-
ment of local governmental supervision, and as such is not in itself
obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Tele-
graph Co. v. New Hope, 419.

9. While, in a general sense, the laws in force at the time a contract is
made enter into its obligation, parties have no vested right in the par-
ticular remedies or modes of procedure then existing. Oshkosh Water-
works Co. v. Oshkosh, 437.

10. The Legislature may not withdraw all remedies, and thus, in effect, de-
stroy the contract; nor impose such new restrictions or conditions as
would materially delay or embarrass the enforcement of rights under
the contract, according to the course of justice as established when the
contract was made. Neither could be done without impairing the
obligation of the contract. But the Legislature may change existing
remedies or modes of procedure, without impairing the obligation of
contracts, if a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is provided,
by means of which a party can enforce his rights under the contract. Ib.
11. The contract clause of the Constitution of the United States has refer-
ence only to a statute of a State enacted after the making of the con-
tract whose obligation is alleged to have been impaired. Ib.

12. The act of the legislature of Alabama of January 31, 1867, conveying to
the city of Mobile the shore and soil under Mobile River is not uncon-

stitutional as impairing vested rights of owners of grants bordering on
Mobile River, as the rule in Alabama that a grant by the United States
of lands bordering on a navigable river includes the shore or bank of
such river and extends to the water line at low water, does not relate to
land bordering on tidal streams. As the State held the lands under
water below high water mark as trustee for the public it had the right
to devolve the trust upon the city of Mobile. There is a difference be-
tween the legislature of a State granting land beneath navigable waters
of the State, and below high water mark, to a private railroad corpo-
ration and granting it to a municipal corporation whose mayor, alder-
men and common council are created and declared trustees to hold,
possess, direct, control and manage the shore and soil granted in such
manner as they may deem best for the public good. Illinois Central R.
R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, distinguished. Transportation Co. v.
Mobile, 479.

13. Where the courts of one State fully consider a statute of another State
and the decisions of the courts of that State construing it, and the case
turns upon the construction of the statute and not upon its validity, due
faith and credit is not denied by one State to the statute of another
State, and the manner in which the statute is construed is not neces-
sarily a Federal question. Johnson v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
491.

14. The statutes of Louisiana and the ordinances of the city of New Or-
leans which provide and regulate the method for paving streets at the
cost of the owners of abutting lots, as such statutes and ordinances have
been construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, are not obnoxious,
under the facts of this case to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. Chadwick v. Kelley,
540.

15. Where an ordinance of the city of New Orleans and specification for
the paving of a street require the contractor to employ only bona fide
resident citizens of the city of New Orleans as laborers, a resident citi-
zen of New Orleans, who is not one of the laborers excluded by the
ordinance from employment and who does not occupy any representa-
tive relation to them, cannot have a lien on his property for his pro
rata share of the improvemente invalidated on the ground that citizens
of Louisiana and of each and every State are deprived of their privi-
leges and immunities under article IV, section 2, of, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States. Ib.

16. If a person owning property affected by the assessment for the work
done under such ordinance wishes to raise such question on the ground
that the ordinance is prejudicial to his property rights because confin-
ing the right to labor to resident citizens increases the cost of the
work he must raise the question in time to stay the work in limine. Ib.
17. The provision in article IV, section 26 of the constitution of California
providing that "all contracts for the sales of shares of the capital stock
of any corporation or association, on margin, or to be delivered at a
future day, shall be void, and any money paid on such contracts may
be recovered by the party paying it by suit in any court of competent

jurisdiction," is not contrary to the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, so far as it relates
to sales on margins. Otis v. Parker, 606.

See ANIMAL INDUSTRY ACT; INDIANS, 8;

1. Where members contributed property to a society under an agreement
that the value thereof was to be refunded on withdrawal from mem-
bership, and by a subsequent agreement it was provided that each in-
dividual was to be considered as having finally and irrevocably parted
with all his former contributions, and on withdrawing should not be
entitled to demand an account thereof as a matter of right, but it should
be left altogether to the discretion of the superintendent to decide
whether any, and if any, what, allowance should be made to such mem-
ber or his representatives as a donation, in an action by descendants of
members long since retired from the society, for the distribution of the
property and assets of the society on the ground that it had ceased to
exist and that its assets should revert to the heirs of the original con-
tributors: Held that the facts do not show that there was any dissolu-
tion of the society; that the relations of the members and the society
were fixed by contract; that the plaintiffs could not have other rights
than their ancestors had; that no trust was created by the agreement
of 1836, and under its terms when the plaintiffs' ancestors (who had
not contributed any property) died or withdrew from the society their
rights were fixed by the terms of that agreement; the members who
died left no rights to their representatives, and had no rights which
they could transmit to the plaintiffs. Schwartz v. Duss, 8.

2. When a Maryland corporation, chartered in 1827, and possessing certain
immunities from taxation, which under the then constitution might
have been irrepealable, becomes merged with other corporations in an
entirly new corporation possessing new rights and franchises created
after the adoption of the constitution of 1850, under which the legisla-
ture has power to alter and repeal charters of, and laws creating, cor-
porations, the right of exemption, if it ever passed to the new corpora-
tion, is subject to the right of repeal, and hence is not protected from
repeal by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Northern
Central Ry. Co. v. Maryland, 258.

3. An act of the legislature compromising litigation between the State and
such new corporation arising from the claim of the latter that it was
exempt from taxation under the immunities at one time possessed by
one of its constituent corporations, and fixing a rate of taxation to be
paid annually thereafter by the new corporation, cannot be regarded
as a legislative contract granting an irrepealable right forbidden by the
then existing constitution of the State. If, therefore, the legislature
subsequently passes another act fixing a higher rate of taxation, and
the highest court of the State decides that such act repeals the former
act and subjects the corporation to the higher rate of taxation, the