When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process or in whatever manner or under whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation. As under the laws and regulations of Russia, the Russian exporter of sugar obtains from his government a certificate solely because of such exportation, which certificate is salable and has an actual value in the open market, the government of Russia does secure to the exporter from that country, as the inevitable result of such action, a money re- ward or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia, and which is in effect a bounty upon the export of sugar which subjects such sugar, upon its importation into the United States, to an additional duty equal to the entire amount of such bounty under the act of Congress of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 205. Downs v. United States, 496.
1. Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S. C. 127, distinguished from Raub v. Carpenter, 159.
2. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, distinguished from Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 479.
3. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, distinguished from Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 617.
4. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 471, distinguished from Ayres v. Polsdorfer, 585.
5. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U. S. 92, distinguished from Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. Co. v. Herman, 63.
1. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, followed in Macfarland v. Brown, 239. 2. Bryan v. Brasius, 162 U. S. 414, followed in Romig v. Gillett, 111.
3. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, followed in Turpin v. Lemon,
4. In re Oteiza, 136 U. S. 330, followed in Grin v. Shine, 181.
5. Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 47, followed in Ayres v. Polsdorfer, 585.
6. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 619, followed in Lawder v. Stone, 281.
7. Smoot v. Rittenhouse, decided January 10, 1876, followed in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 315.
8. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, followed in Jacobi v. Alabama, 133. 9. Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93, cited in Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 301, followed in Raub v. Carpenter, 159.
Where a case has been improperly brought to this court by writ of error, it is within the powers of the court conferred by the judiciary act of
March 3, 1901, to allow a writ of certiorari and direct that the copy of the record heretofore filed under the writ of error be deemed and taken as a sufficient return to the certiorari. Dent, 237.
1. Exactly what due process of law requires in the assessment and collec- tion of general taxes has never yet been decided by this court; while it has been held that notice must be given to the owner at some stage of proceedings for condemnation or imposition of special taxes, it has also been held that laws for assessment and collection of general taxes stand upon a somewhat different footing and are construed with the utmost liberality, sometimes even to the extent of holding that no notice whatever is necessary (Mr. Justice Field's definition of "due process of law "in Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, fol- lowed), and the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied by showing that the usual course prescribed by the state laws requires notice to the taxpayers and is in conformity with natural justice. Turpin v. Lemon, 51.
2. A statute of Wisconsin enacted prior to June 25, 1898, but which was to go into operation on September 1, 1898, requiring foreign corporations to file a copy of their charter with the Secretary of State and to pay a small fee as a condition for doing business there does not impair the obligation of a contract made on June 25, 1898, by a foreign corpora- tion to do business in Wisconsin after September 1, 1898. Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 611.
3. A ruling by a state court in a criminal case in which it was held that an objection as to non-compliance with a statute requiring the jury to be placed in charge of a sworn officer was not made in time and was to be deemed as waived, was but an adjudication simply of a question of criminal and local law and did not impair the constitutional guaranty that no State shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Dreyer v. Illinois, 71.
4. The decision of the state court sustaining the Indeterminate Sentence Act of Illinois of 1899, did not infringe the constitutional guaranty of
due process of law, even though that statute confers judicial powers upon non-judicial officers. Ib.
5. If the jury in a criminal cause be discharged by the court because of their being unable to agree upon a verdict, the accused, if tried a second time, cannot be said to have been put twice in jeopardy of life or limb, whether regard be had to the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib. 6. No one is given by the Constitution of the United States the right to in- troduce into a State, against its will, live stock affected by a contagious, infectious or communicable disease, and whose presence in the State will or may be injurious to its domestic animals. The State-Congress not having assumed charge of the matter as involved in interstate com- merce-may protect its people and their property against such dangers, taking care always that the means employed to that end do not go be- yond the necessities of the case or unreasonably burden the exercise of privileges secured by the Constitution of the United States. Reid v. Colorado, 137.
7. The statute of Colorado of March 21, 1885, relating to the introduction of infectious or contagious disease among the cattle and horses of that State, is not inconsistent with the clause of the Constitution declaring that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and im- munities of citizens in the several States; for it is applicable alike to citizens of all the States. Ib.
8. An ordinance of the borough of New Hope, Pennsylvania, imposing an annual license fee of one dollar per pole and two dollars and a half per mile of wire on the telegraph, telephone and electric light poles within the limits of the borough is not a tax on the property of the telegraph company owning the poles and wires, or on its transmission of messages or on its receipts for such transmission, but is a charge in the enforce- ment of local governmental supervision, and as such is not in itself obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Tele- graph Co. v. New Hope, 419.
9. While, in a general sense, the laws in force at the time a contract is made enter into its obligation, parties have no vested right in the par- ticular remedies or modes of procedure then existing. Oshkosh Water- works Co. v. Oshkosh, 437.
10. The Legislature may not withdraw all remedies, and thus, in effect, de- stroy the contract; nor impose such new restrictions or conditions as would materially delay or embarrass the enforcement of rights under the contract, according to the course of justice as established when the contract was made. Neither could be done without impairing the obligation of the contract. But the Legislature may change existing remedies or modes of procedure, without impairing the obligation of contracts, if a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is provided, by means of which a party can enforce his rights under the contract. Ib. 11. The contract clause of the Constitution of the United States has refer- ence only to a statute of a State enacted after the making of the con- tract whose obligation is alleged to have been impaired. Ib.
12. The act of the legislature of Alabama of January 31, 1867, conveying to the city of Mobile the shore and soil under Mobile River is not uncon-
stitutional as impairing vested rights of owners of grants bordering on Mobile River, as the rule in Alabama that a grant by the United States of lands bordering on a navigable river includes the shore or bank of such river and extends to the water line at low water, does not relate to land bordering on tidal streams. As the State held the lands under water below high water mark as trustee for the public it had the right to devolve the trust upon the city of Mobile. There is a difference be- tween the legislature of a State granting land beneath navigable waters of the State, and below high water mark, to a private railroad corpo- ration and granting it to a municipal corporation whose mayor, alder- men and common council are created and declared trustees to hold, possess, direct, control and manage the shore and soil granted in such manner as they may deem best for the public good. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, distinguished. Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 479.
13. Where the courts of one State fully consider a statute of another State and the decisions of the courts of that State construing it, and the case turns upon the construction of the statute and not upon its validity, due faith and credit is not denied by one State to the statute of another State, and the manner in which the statute is construed is not neces- sarily a Federal question. Johnson v. New York Life Insurance Co., 491.
14. The statutes of Louisiana and the ordinances of the city of New Or- leans which provide and regulate the method for paving streets at the cost of the owners of abutting lots, as such statutes and ordinances have been construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, are not obnoxious, under the facts of this case to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend- ment to the Constitution of the United States. Chadwick v. Kelley, 540.
15. Where an ordinance of the city of New Orleans and specification for the paving of a street require the contractor to employ only bona fide resident citizens of the city of New Orleans as laborers, a resident citi- zen of New Orleans, who is not one of the laborers excluded by the ordinance from employment and who does not occupy any representa- tive relation to them, cannot have a lien on his property for his pro rata share of the improvemente invalidated on the ground that citizens of Louisiana and of each and every State are deprived of their privi- leges and immunities under article IV, section 2, of, and the Fourteenth Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
16. If a person owning property affected by the assessment for the work done under such ordinance wishes to raise such question on the ground that the ordinance is prejudicial to his property rights because confin- ing the right to labor to resident citizens increases the cost of the work he must raise the question in time to stay the work in limine. Ib. 17. The provision in article IV, section 26 of the constitution of California providing that "all contracts for the sales of shares of the capital stock of any corporation or association, on margin, or to be delivered at a future day, shall be void, and any money paid on such contracts may be recovered by the party paying it by suit in any court of competent
jurisdiction," is not contrary to the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, so far as it relates to sales on margins. Otis v. Parker, 606.
See ANIMAL INDUSTRY ACT; INDIANS, 8;
1. Where members contributed property to a society under an agreement that the value thereof was to be refunded on withdrawal from mem- bership, and by a subsequent agreement it was provided that each in- dividual was to be considered as having finally and irrevocably parted with all his former contributions, and on withdrawing should not be entitled to demand an account thereof as a matter of right, but it should be left altogether to the discretion of the superintendent to decide whether any, and if any, what, allowance should be made to such mem- ber or his representatives as a donation, in an action by descendants of members long since retired from the society, for the distribution of the property and assets of the society on the ground that it had ceased to exist and that its assets should revert to the heirs of the original con- tributors: Held that the facts do not show that there was any dissolu- tion of the society; that the relations of the members and the society were fixed by contract; that the plaintiffs could not have other rights than their ancestors had; that no trust was created by the agreement of 1836, and under its terms when the plaintiffs' ancestors (who had not contributed any property) died or withdrew from the society their rights were fixed by the terms of that agreement; the members who died left no rights to their representatives, and had no rights which they could transmit to the plaintiffs. Schwartz v. Duss, 8.
2. When a Maryland corporation, chartered in 1827, and possessing certain immunities from taxation, which under the then constitution might have been irrepealable, becomes merged with other corporations in an entirly new corporation possessing new rights and franchises created after the adoption of the constitution of 1850, under which the legisla- ture has power to alter and repeal charters of, and laws creating, cor- porations, the right of exemption, if it ever passed to the new corpora- tion, is subject to the right of repeal, and hence is not protected from repeal by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Maryland, 258.
3. An act of the legislature compromising litigation between the State and such new corporation arising from the claim of the latter that it was exempt from taxation under the immunities at one time possessed by one of its constituent corporations, and fixing a rate of taxation to be paid annually thereafter by the new corporation, cannot be regarded as a legislative contract granting an irrepealable right forbidden by the then existing constitution of the State. If, therefore, the legislature subsequently passes another act fixing a higher rate of taxation, and the highest court of the State decides that such act repeals the former act and subjects the corporation to the higher rate of taxation, the
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