ACTS OF CONGRESS.
See STATUTES, B.
See APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR, 5;
COURTS, 3.
See APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR, 5;
COURTS, 2.
See ANIMAL INDUSTRY ACT;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 7;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 2.
The act of Congress of May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. 31, c. 60, known as the
Animal Industry Act, does not cover the whole subject of the trans-
portation of live stock from one State to another. The statute of
Colorado of March 21, 1885, relating to the introduction of infectious
or contagious diseases among the cattle and horses of that State,
relates to matters not covered by the Animal Industry Act of Con-
gress, and is not in violation of the Constitution of the United
States. Reid v. Colorado, 137.
APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR.
1. One convicted in a state court for an alleged violation of the criminal
statutes of the State, and who contends that he is held in violation of
the Constitution of the United State, must ordinarily first take his
case to the highest court of the State in which the judgment could
be reviewed, and thence bring it, if unsuccessful there, to this court
by writ of error. Reid v. Jones, 153.
2. The distinction between a writ of error which brings up matter of law
only, and an appeal, which, unless expressly restricted, brings up both
law and fact, has always been observed by this court and recognized by
the legislation of Congress from the foundation of the Government.
Elliott v. Toeppner, 327.
3. Judgments and decrees of the Circuit Court of Appeals in all cases
arising under the patent laws and under the criminal laws are made
VOL. CLXXXVII-42
(657)
final by section six of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, and cannot be
brought from that court to this by appeal or writ of error.
And even
if a constitutional question so arises in the Circuit Court that a party
may bring his case directly to this court under section five of that act,
yet if he does not do so, but carries his case to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, he must abide by the judgment of that court. Cary Mfg. Co.
v. Acme Flexible Clasp Co., 427.
4. The jurisdiction referred to in the first subdivision of the fifth section
of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, is the jurisdiction of the Circuit
and District Courts of the United States as such; and when a case
comes directly to this court under that subdivision, the question of
jurisdiction alone is open to examination. Mexican Central Ry. Co. v.
Eckman, 429.
5. Where an applicant files with the District Court of Alaska a petition for
a license for vessels and salmon canneries under section 460 of the act
of 1889 providing a criminal code for Alaska, 30 Stat. 1253, 1336, and
with it a protest against being required to take out or pay for such
license on various grounds stated therein, to which petition and pro-
test the clerk of the District Court is not made a party—although the
papers may have been served on the district attorney-and the District
Court thereafter makes an order granting the license, stating therein
that so far as the protestant seeks relief against the payment of the
licenses "the same is overruled, denied and ignored," an appeal to
this court will not lie as there is no action, suit, or case, within the
constitutional provision (Article III, section 2) in which was entered
a final judgment or decree such as entitled the petitioner to appeal to
this court. Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. United States, 447.
6. A motion to dismiss for want of a Federal question cannot be sustained
when the title involved depends upon a Spanish grant claimed to have
been perfected under the treaty of 1819 with Spain, and a patent of
the United States in alleged confirmation of such claim. Transporta-
tion Co. v. Mobile, 479.
7. The construction given by the Supreme Court of Kansas to the Kansas
statutes holding that real estate situated in that State, the title to
which was vested in a non-resident executor, to whom letters testa-
mentary had been issued by a court of another jurisdiction, may be
attached and sold in an action of debt against the non-resident execu-
tor, is binding on this court. And, treating the statutes as having
such import as a decision upon a matter of local law, this court must
determine whether as so construed they violate the Federal right in-
volved. Manley v. Park, 547.
8. When the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States is in-
voked, solely on the ground of diversity of citizenship, two classes of
cases can arise, one in which the questions expressed in section 5 of
the Judiciary Act of 1891 appear in the course of the proceedings and
one in which other Federal questions appear. Cases of the first class
may be brought to this court directly or may be taken to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, but if they are taken to the latter court they can-
not then be brought here. Cases of the second class must be taken to
the Circuit Court of Appeals and its judgment will be final. Ayres v.
Polsdorfer, 585.
See CERTIORARI;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION.
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.
1. The question whether a general assignment for the benefit of creditors
is rendered invalid by reason of a provision that the "preferred credi-
tors shall accept their dividends in full satisfaction and discharge of
their respective claims" is one determinable by the local law of the
jurisdiction from which the question arises. Robinson & Co. v. Belt,
2. Under the laws of Arkansas, made applicable to the Indian Territory, a
stipulation for a release in a general assignment, which is made only
as a condition of preference, does not invalidate the instrument. Ib.
The question whether under section 67ƒ of the bankruptcy act of 1898
where a final decree recovered within four months of the petition, but
which was based on a judgment creditors' bill in equity filed long
prior thereto, the creditor had a lien on the assets involved in the ac-
tion which was superior to the title of the trustee in bankruptcy, or
whether (as was held by the District Court) section 67ƒ prevented the
complainant from acquiring any benefit from the lien, or the fund at-
tached except through the trustee in bankruptcy pro rata with other
creditors. Held, that while the lien created by a judgment creditors'
bill is contingent in the sense that it may possibly be defeated by the
event of the suit, it is in itself, and so long as it exists, a charge, a
specific lien, on the assets, not subject to being divested save by pay-
ment of the judgment sought to be collected, and a judgment or decree
in enforcement of an otherwise valid preëxisting lien is not the judg-
ment denounced by the bankruptcy statute which is plainly confined
to judgments creating liens. Metcalf v. Barker, 165.
2. When a judgment creditor files his bill in equity long prior to the bank-
ruptcy of the defendant, thereby obtaining a lien on specific assets,
and diligently prosecutes it to a final judgment, he acquires a lien on
the property of the bankrupts which is superior to the title of the
trustee, and a District Court of the United States does not have juris-
diction to make an order in bankruptcy proceedings against the de-
fendants enjoining them from enforcing such lien. Ib.
3. Where a judgment creditor filed a bill in a state court to set aside a con-
veyance made by a person, who during the pendency of the action and
years after its commencement is adjudged a bankrupt, and to apply
the proceeds of the property affected towards the payment of the debt,
the state court acquires such complete jurisdiction and control over
the bankrupt and his property that jurisdiction is not divested by pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, and it is the duty of the state court to pro-
ceed to final decree notwithstanding the adjudication in bankruptcy,
under the rule that the court which first acquires rightful jurisdiction
over the subject matter should not be interfered with; and the Dis-
trict Court of the United States in which the bankruptcy proceedings
are pending has no jurisdiction to restrain the complainants in the
state court from executing their decree obtained in that court. Pickens
v. Roy, 177.
4. Nor does the mere fact that the complainant in such an action in a state
court proved up her judgment as a preferred debt in bankruptcy
"without waiving her preference," operate to deprive the state court
of jurisdiction or amount to a consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the District Court to restrain her from executing the judgment. Ib.
5. The right of a person, against whom an involuntary petition of bank-
ruptcy has been filed, to a trial by jury under section 19 of the bank-
ruptcy act is absolute and cannot be withheld at the discretion of the
court. Elliott v. Toeppner, 327.
6. The trial is a trial according to the course of the common law and the
court cannot enter judgment, as the chancellor may, contrary to the
verdict, but the verdict may be set aside or the judgment may be re-
versed for error of law as in common law cases. Ib.
7. Congress did not attempt by section 25a of the bankrupt act, which pro-
vides for appeals as in equity cases from the District Court to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals from judgments adjudging or refusing to adjudge
the defendant a bankrupt, to empower the appellate court to reëxam-
ine the facts determined by a jury under section 19, otherwise than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. The provision applies to
judgments where trial by jury has not been demanded and the court
proceeds on its own findings of fact. In such case the facts and the
law are reëxaminable on appeal; but in case of a jury trial the judg-
ment is reviewable only by writ of error for error in law, and alleged
errors in instructions, the giving or refusal of instructions or in the
admission or rejection of evidence which must appear by exceptions
duly taken and preserved by bill of exceptions in the absence of which
such alleged errors cannot be considered, although the transcript of
the record contains what purports to be the evidence heard by the jury,
exceptions reserved to evidence, admitted or excluded, the charge and
exceptions, instructions asked and refused and exceptions. Ib.
8. A seat or membership in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange belonging to
a person adjudicated a bankrupt is property which the bankrupt could
have transferred within the meaning of subdivision 5 of section 70 of
the bankruptcy act of 1898, and it therefore passes to the trustee in
bankruptcy of the owner. Page v. Edmunds, 596.
9. There is nothing in the bankruptcy act or the statutes of Pennsylvania,
as the latter have been construed by the highest courts of that State,
exempting such seat from sale by the trustee in bankruptcy. Ib.
Bonds required by the State in exercise of the powers granted to it, are
exempt from taxation by the General Government. Ambrosini v.
United States, 1.
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