Opinion of the Court.

But it should be observed that such power to extend the time limit must be exercised, on good cause shown, "before final settlement," and, in the present case, no such good cause was shown, either to the probate court or to the Circuit Court of the United States, before final settlement. It is evident that the discretion to extend the time for proof of claims was to be appealed to for some good reason, that is, reason showing why the claim was not made or the suit brought before the expiration of the time fixed in the original order.

The Circuit Court of Appeals admits that "there is much reason for saying that citizens of other States ought not to be allowed to maintain an action in the Federal court against a local executor or administrator after the expiration of a period when, by the express command of the legislature, no such action can be maintained in the local courts, provided the period fixed by the legislature is reasonable, but the right of a non-resident creditor to bring his action in the national courts ought not to be conditioned or made to depend upon the time that a local court chances to approve a final settlement when the time of such approval rests in its discretion and is largely a matter of convenience." But the legislation of Minnesota does not make the limit within which claims must be made against the estates of decedents to depend on the exercise of discretionary power by the courts. It does provide that the probate court shall fix a time within which claims must be presented, to wit, not less than six nor more than eighteen months. Between those limits of six and eighteen months the probate court may have power of discretionary action on good cause shown. But having once exercised that power, as in the present case, by fixing the term of probation at six months, any extension of that term could only be had, upon good cause shown, "before final settlement.”

We are not called upon, by the facts of the present case, to determine whether a Federal court might or might not, on good cause shown, extend the time in which a claim might be asserted against a decedent's estate beyond the term previously fixed by the probate court. But it is sufficient to say that, in the present case, no application was made to the Federal court to exercise such a power, either before or after the limitation prescribed

Syllabus.

under the state statute had expired. All that was before the Circuit Court of the United States was an action at law upon a cause of action against a decedent's estate, which, under the laws of the State of Minnesota, could not be maintained in the courts of that State, because barred by the operation of the laws of the State regulating the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Moreover, it is obvious, and it has always been held, that the Circuit Court cannot, in the trial of an action at law, exercise the power of a court of equity. An application to the Federal court to decree an extension of time beyond the period previously prescribed by the probate court would have to be made by a bill in equity, showing good cause. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499.

Following our previous and repeated decisions, that the courts of the United States, when exercising jurisdiction over executors and administrators of the estates of decedents within a State, are administering the laws of that State, and are bound by the same rules which govern the local tribunals, we conclude, in the present case, that

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed; the judgment of the Circuit Court is also reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court, with directions to enter judgment in conformity with the opinion of this

. court.

SECURITY TRUST COMPANY v. DENT.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 42. Argued April 21, 22, 1902.-Decided December 1, 1902.

Where a case is originally brought to this court by writ of error, but it appears that the proper course was to have brought the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for review by writ of certiorari, this court under the powers given by the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, may allow a writ of certiorari and direct that the copy of the record heretofore filed under the writ of error be taken and deemed as a sufficient return to the certiorari.

Opinion of the Court.

The facts and questions of law involved in this case are similar to those decided in the case of Security Trust Company v. Black River National Bank, p. 211, ante.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Edmund S. Durment for petitioner. Moore was with him on the brief.

Mr. Albert R.

Mr. Edward C. Stringer for respondent. Mr. McNeil V. Seymour was with him on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS stated the facts and delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action brought in January, 1897, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, by William H. Dent, as receiver of the First National Bank of Decorah, Iowa, against the Security Trust Company of St. Paul, Minnesota, as administrator of the estate of Sumner W. Matteson, deceased, to recover the sum of $13,535.06, being the amount of principal and interest of certain promissory notes made by said Matteson in his lifetime, and which were the property of the said national bank. The execution and ownership of the notes were not denied, nor that the Security Trust Company had been, on September 3, 1895, duly appointed by the probate court of Ramsey County, Minnesota, administrator of the estate of said Matteson.

The defendant, however, alleged in its answer that the action was not brought until after the expiration of the time limited by the order of the probate court for the filing, examination and allowance of claims against Matteson's estate, nor until after the examination and allowance of the administrator's final account, whereby, under the laws of the State of Minnesota, the official existence of the defendant company as administrator had ceased, and that therefore no action could be maintained against it; and also that the right to a judgment on the notes in suit was, by the laws of Minnesota, forever barred, notwithstanding they were owned by a non-resident of the State, and that recovery was sought in a Federal court.

Syllabus.

The plaintiff obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court, and that judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The case is reported in 104 Fed. Rep. 380. The cause was then brought here by a writ of error. We think the proper course was to have asked for a writ of certiorari to bring the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals here for review. However, under the powers possessed by us under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, we now allow a writ of certiorari, and direct that the copy of the record heretofore filed under the writ of error shall be taken and deemed as a sufficient return to the certiorari.

The questions presented are similar to those just decided in the case of Security Trust Company v. Black River National Bank, tried in the same court, and where the parties were represented by the same counsel which appear in this one.

Accordingly, for the reasons given in the opinion in that

case,

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed; the judgment of the Circuit Court is likewise reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the opinion of this court.

MACFARLAND v. BROWN.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 331. Argued November 5, 1902.-Decided December 1, 1902.

A judgment or decree to be final, within the meaning of that term as used in the acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeals and writs of error, must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, so that if there should be an affirmance here, the court below would have nothing to do but to execute the judgment or decree it had already rendered. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, followed. When, therefore, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reverses an order of the Supreme Court of the District in proceedings for the con

Statement of the Case.

demnation of land under the act of Congress of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1381, and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings as directed by the statute, the decree of the Court of Appeals is not such a final judgment as is reviewable in this court and an appeal therefrom will be dismissed.

See also Macfarland v. Byrnes decided this term, p. 246, post.

UNDER the act of Congress entitled "An act for the extension of Pennsylvania avenue southeast, and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1381, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia were by the terms of section 5 of said act "authorized and directed to institute by a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court, a proceeding to condemn the land necessary for the extension and widening of Sherman avenue from Florida avenue to Whitney avenue with the uniform width of one hundred feet." The provisions of said section 5 are as follows:

"SEC. 5. That within ninety days after the approval of this act the Commissioners of the District of Columbia be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed to institute by a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court, a proceeding to condemn the land necessary for the extension and widening of Sherman avenue from Florida avenue to Whitney avenue with the uniform width of one hundred feet.

"That of the amount found due and awarded for damages for and in respect of the land condemned under this act for the extension and widening of said Sherman avenue not less than one half thereof shall be assessed by said jury in said proceedings against those pieces or parcels of ground abutting on both sides of Sherman avenue, and the extension thereof as herein provided, to a distance of three hundred feet from the building lines on the east and west sides of Sherman avenue as widened and extended: Provided, That no assessment shall be made against those pieces or parcels of ground out of which land has already been dedicated to the District of Columbia for the purpose of widening Sherman avenue as herein provided for."

Under the authority thereby conferred a petition was filed by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia in the Su