of the constitutionality of the purchase, which he regarded as the crowning event of his administration, and for the consummation of which he was ready to proceed to any extreme. On August 30, 1803, he wrote to Levi Lincoln:

The less that is said about any constitutional difficulty, the better; and it will be desirable for Congress to do what is necessary, in silence.

On Sept. 7, 1803, Jefferson wrote to Wilson C. Nicholas:Whatever Congress shall think it necessary to do should be done with as little debate as possible, and particularly so far as respects the constitutional difficulty. * * * As the constitution expressly declares itself to be made for the United States, I cannot help believing the intention was not to permit Congress to admit into the Union new States to be formed out of the territory, for which, and under whose authority alone they were then acting. * • I had rather ask

an enlargement of power from the Nation where it is found necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make our power boundless. * * * * Let us go on then, perfecting it, by adding, by way of amendment to the Constitution, those powers which time and trial show are still wanting. * I think it important, in the present case, to set an example against broad construction, by appealing for new power to the people. If, however, our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall acquiesce with satisfaction;-confiding, that the good sense of our country will correct the evil of construction when it shall produce its ill effects.

On August 12, 1803, Jefferson wrote to Mr. Breckenridge:This treaty must of course be laid before both Houses. They, I presume, will see their duty to the country in ratifying and paying for it; * but I suppose they must then appeal to the Nation for an additional article to the Constitution, approving and confirming an act which the Nation had not previously authorized. The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The Executive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of his country, has done an act beyond the Constitution. The Legislature, in casting behind them metaphysical subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful servants, must ratify and pay for it, and throw themselves on their country for doing for them unauthorized, what we know they would have done for themselves had they been in a situation to do it. It is the case of a guardian investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important adjacent territory, and saying to him when of age, 'I did this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you; you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can; I thought it my duty to risk myself for you.' But we shall

not be disavowed by the Nation, and their act of indemnity will confirm and not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly marking out its lines.

Although Jefferson here acknowledges that he had gone beyond the letter of the Constitution, he evidently believed that he had not violated the spirit of Republican Government which was behind that instrument, nor the fundamental principles upon which it was based;-and he was willing to accept as its proper interpretation, that many of the powers of the Government under it are implied;-and that, as the people made the Constitution, they could also amend it whenever it became necessary to do so;-but that the purchase of new territory, not being in violation of the underlying spirit of the Constitution, could be made without any amendment to it.

OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL.

This view of Jefferson was upheld and confirmed twentyfive years later, by United States Chief Justice John Marshall. In the case of the American Insurance Company vs. David Canter, reported in 1st Peters, page 511, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, in January, 1828, said:

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union, the powers of making war and making treaties;-consequently that Government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty. The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed;-either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose. On such transfer of territory it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed.

The language of the learned Chief Justice clearly establishes the right of one nation to transfer to another, any territory, and the allegiance and loyalty of its inhabitants, with

out their consent. It is also evident, from an examination of that portion of the opinion of the court which is not quoted above, that the court believed that the Constitution and laws of the United States did not extend by their own force over territory so acquired, but that Congress alone could determine all questions involved in their government.

Many of the most eminent jurists of our country believe that the liberal powers which Chief Justice Marshall gave to the Constitution during the thirty-four years that he interpreted it, were necessary to its durability, and that a strict adherence to its letter would have destroyed it. Judge Story said:

The Constitution, since its adoption, owes more to him than to any other single mind for its true interpretation and vindication.

No amendment of the Constitution has ever been deemed necessary to confirm the purchase of Louisiana, as the general power of the government to acquire territory and also to govern any territory it chooses to acquire, cannot be enlarged or strengthened by any such amendment. And as the Nation did not disavow the President of the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century in acquiring Louisiana, so it will not disavow its President at its close, in acquiring the Philippines.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE.

It is interesting to note the radical attitude of Jefferson at this time, on the subject of forming an Anglo-American alliance, and the length to which he was willing to go in this respect in order to acquire Louisiana.

I have already adverted to Jefferson's letter to Monroe, in which he wrote that if Louisiana could not be purchased from Napoleon, it might be necessary for him (Monroe) to cross the Channel into England. For what purpose did he think this might become necessary? It was to form an alliance with England, in case of a failure of the negotiations for the purchase of Louisiana. In a letter to Robert Livingston, dated April 18, 1802, he boldly declared his policy in case of the refusal of France to sell Louisiana to the United States. On that day he wrote to Livingston:

The cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, works most sorely on the United States. It completely reverses all the polit

ical relations of the United States.

There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market. * France, placing her

self in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific disposition, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the place would hardly be felt by us, and it would not be very long before some circumstance might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands of France. The impetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character, placed in a point of eternal friction with us, and our character, which, though quiet and loving peace and the pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, despising wealth in competition with insult or injury, enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth;-these circumstances render it impossible that France and the United States can continue long friends, when they meet in so irritable a position. They, as well as we, must be blind if they do not see this;-and we must be very improvident if we do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans, fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and Nation. We must turn all our attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high ground;-and having formed and connected together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up of any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the United British and American Nations. * * * In that case France will have held possession of New Orleans during the interval of a peace, long or short, at the end of which it will be wrested from her.

This letter to Chancellor Livingston was enclosed by Jefferson to M. 'Dupont de Nemours, an eminent and influential citizen of France, whose good offices in behalf of our government Jefferson sought, and to whom he wrote on April 25, 1802:

You may be able to impress on the Government of France the inevitable consequences of their taking possession of Louisiana;-and though, as I here mention, the cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to us would be a palliation, yet I believe it would be no more, and that this measure will cost France, and perhaps not very long hence, a war which will annihilate her on the ocean and place that element under the despotism of two nations, which I am not reconciled to the more be

cause my own would be one of them. Add to this the exclusive appropriation of both continents of America as a consequence.

These letters reveal the length to which Jefferson was willing to carry the Nation on this issue. It was not only Louisiana, but it was the whole of North America and South America that he proposed to hold jointly with England, under an alliance which would sweep France from the ocean, and place it-"that element," as he terms it,-under the control of America and England. The wildest imagination cannot carry us farther than this. All our present purposes of expansion, and all suggestions of the present concerning an Anglo-Saxon alliance, are dwarfed into insignificance when compared with this proposal of Jefferson.

Mr. Breckenridge did not share in the fears of his colleagues, concerning the purchase of Louisiana. In the stirring reply which he made to them, he asks:

Is the Goddess of Liberty restrained by water-courses? Is she governed by geographical limits? Is her dominion on this continent confined to the east side of the Mississippi? So far from believing that a Republic ought to be confined within narrow limits, I believe on the contrary that the more extensive its dominion, the more safe and durable it will be. In proportion to the number of hands you intrust the precious blessings of a free government to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their preservation.

The measure providing the means for the purchase of the territory finally became a law, and the United States thereby added to its original domain twelve hundred and sixty thousand (1,260,000) square miles, including Texas, which, in 1819, was relinquished to Spain in exchange for the Floridas, and was re-annexed to the United States in 1845. This vast acquisition was more than one-third greater than the whole area of the United States and their territorial possessions at the time of the purchase.

FEARS OF EASTERN STATESMEN.

The fears entertained by our early statesmen are all forgotI have recalled them, not to illustrate any deficiency in the foresight or wisdom of the men of that day, but to show how remarkable has been the progress of improvement, discovery, and invention, by which we have been enabled, during nearly a century of national expansion, to incorporate not only