be taken, is a question of great importance: there would be difficulty in making the returns of the votes: those who collected and compared the votes might defeat the choice of the peeple. Not that these objections are insuperable; and the course of things, under the present mode of choosing a president, is in its nature pernicious, and has a tendency to prevent the object intended by the constitution of a pure elective magistracy. Men now live, who will probably see the end of our government, as we now go on: terminate when it will, the termination will not be in favour of public liberty. For five years past, I have seen a character developing itself, the predominance of which I fear. Not a people on earth are more capable of high excitement than this people. During the excitement of the passion, to which I refer, if a contested election oecurs, the gownsmen must stand aside; another character supersedes them; and there can be little difficulty in judging what will be the result. The march from military rule to despotism is certain, invariable. Those who think they see the probable tendency of our present system should interpose something remedial. The people in this particular are the best keepers of their own rights; and any device to remove that power from them weakens its security. I know that this proposition, if agreed to, will break down the power of the great states. I have no objection, if in curtailing their power, the same measure regulates the rights of the whole nation equally. I am willing to let the election for the presidency rest wholly on the people."

And in the same debate, General Harper, a senator from Maryland, said, that" as to the main proposition, he was decidedly in its favour, for this general reason, that its adoption would tend to make the elections of President less a matter of juggle and intrigue than they now are. He would not say that it would have the effect of wholly excluding intrigue; of placing this great election on the footing on which the great men who framed the constitution vainly imagined they were placing it, of a free, unbiassed expression of the public will; but

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it would bring it nearer than at present. Party arrangements and bargains would not be so easy. Bargains could not be so readily struck with one state for this great office, with another for that, as according to the present mode of election. Districting the states for electors would have a tendency to render the presidential election more free and independent; to remove it more from the grasp of party arrangements; to prevent bargains between profligate agents, and the selling of the nation for offices to the highest bidder."

The President, at stated times, receives for his services a compensation, that can neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he is elected; nor can he receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any single state. Before he enters on the execution of his office, he takes the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear, (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States." The president is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States. He may require the opinion in writing of the principal officers in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he has power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. He has power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds af the senators present concur; and he no minates; and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoints ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the constitution, and which are established by law. But Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as

they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

As to the propriety of vesting the constitutional powers allotted to the President in that officer, the Federalist enters into a most elaborate and able discussion, more particularly upon the treaty-making power, which he shares with the senate. During the session of 1815-16, Congress discussed, with great ability, the propriety of confining the power of making treaties with foreign states to the president and senate, and excluding the House of Representatives from all interference on that subject. In that debate, Mr. Pinckney, late American minister in London, and now ambassador from the United States to Russia, particularly distinguished himself; and the able speeches of Messrs. Randolph, Gaston, Calhoun, Forsythe, and Hopkinson, threw great light on some of the fundamental principles of the constitution. The right, asserted by the House of Representatives, to interpret and sanction treaties, was negatived; and properly, because the senate is a popular body of representatives, and the addition of the Lower House could furnish no new principle of safety or control. The practice of the British House of Commons, in sanctioning treaties, is no precedent for the lower branch of the American Congress; because, in England, the executive is without any check in the conclusion of treaties, except the subsequent discussion and appropriation of the inferior house of parliament. The lords have no share in the treaty-making power, although they, like the crown, are hereditary; whereas our senate, as well as our executive, is popular and elective.

The British government also, in its collective branches of king, lords, and commons, is all-powerful; and the distribution of its respective authorities very much blended together. But, under the federal constitution, the powers are precisely measured out to each branch of the general government, and the power of making treaties with foreign potentates is specifically

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given to the President and senate, as other powers are given separately to the House of Representatives; and others, to all the departments of government conjointly.

The President is empowered to fill up all vacancies that happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions, which expire at the end of their next session. He must, from time to time, give Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he may judge necessary and expedient. He may, on extraordinary occasions, convene either, or both houses; and if they disagree as to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to what time he thinks proper. He receives ambassadors, and other public ministers; takes care that the laws are faithfully executed, and commissions all the officers of the United States. The President, VicePresident, and all civil officers of the United States, are removeable from office on impeachment for the convic tion of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

In many of the states the electors of the President are chosen by the people; in some, by the state legislature. The constitution has left this point undetermined; it has only given Congress the power to determine the time of choosing the electors, and to fix a uniform day, throughout the United States, on which they shall give their votes. From the executive power to pardon, cases of impeachment, as in Britain, are excepted in all the American constitutions; and in some of the states murder and forgery are also excepted.

If there be any one principle of municipal government more imperatively important than the rest, it is that the❤ executive should be one and indivisible. This position is most ably enforced and illustrated by General Hamilton, in the Federalist. The framers of the federal constitution were too wise to encumber the President of the United States with a constitutional council, which he is compelled to consult. He is only authorized to require of the principal executive officers their opinions in

writing, on any subject relating to their official duties. The several states differ on this part; some having a council, established by the constitution, which the executive must consult, and without whose assent he cannot act; while others have no council. The general effects, resulting from the institution of a constitutional council are, that they serve as a cloak to the executive, to cover him from punishment when he does wrong; and act as obstacles to impede his motions, when he wishes to do right. It is always best that the chief magistrate of every republic should act upon his own responsibility in difficult questions of the law he can consult the attorney-general; and on complicated political cases he can have recourse to the state secretaries, and high officers. In a multitudinous executive the subdivision of responsibility weakens the hold of public opinion and power upon the executive councils and measures; in a single executive the responsibility is concentred and operative. Wherever a constitutional council exists, every act of the executive, whether relating to appointments to office, or to qualified negatives upon the legislature, or to the pardoning of criminals, or any other matter, is done by the executive, with the advice and consent of such council.

A notion has long prevailed among a numerous body of American politicians, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government; and, accordingly, not a single constitution, state or federal, gives sufficient power to the executive. If the position so prevalent with us were true, republican government would be just good for nothing; because the experience of all time has shown, that energy in the executive is a leading feature in all good government, whatever be its form or substance. It is essential to the protection of the commonwealth against the assaults of foreign power; it is equally necessary to the steady administration of municipal laws to the protection of private property (the sheet-anchor of human society), from all arbitrary encroachment; to secure liberty, both personal and political, against the intrigues, enterprises,