been amended, or sections amended, without any repeal of the original, and in some instances, former amendments and repeals were evidently overlooked. Nor was this strange, in view of the fact, that the general laws, as already stated, were not less than two thousand in number, and there had been no general revision.

From this statement it will be seen that we were often compelled to consider whether a particular statute, or section, or provision, had been repealed, or remained in force. These have always been justly regarded as questions of difficulty. Indeed, in view of the constitutional provision above referred to, it was supposed at one time there could be no repeal by implication. But the supreme court said: "We cannot think this clause was intended to abolish the doctrine of repeals by implication, and to reverse the established maxim, that where statutes are inconsistent with each other, the latter repeals the former." [15 O. S., 605.] And that is now the established doctrine.

After months of laborious research, complete and accurate collations were made of the statutes in force. It then became necessary to decide upon the arrangement. Manifestly, the legislature contemplated, by the act creating the commission, the reduction of all acts of a general nature into one statute, properly divided into parts, titles, divisions, chapters, and sections; and reflection upon the subject led us to the conclusion that nothing would be lost, but much gained, by adopting a natural or logical order, instead of the alphabetic arrangement.

Impressed with the importance of an orderly, systematic arrangement, we divided the work into four parts. The first part (Political) contains the enactments which are organic, being the frame-work and machinery of our government; the second part (Civil) relates to persons and property; the third part (Remedial) includes everything connected with civil procedure in all the courts; and the fourth part (Penal) embraces the provisions relating to crimes, criminal procedure, and jails and the penitentiary.

The only constitutional objections that have been suggested to the incorporation of the whole revision in one act, are based on a provision in art. 2, § 16. That provision, it is claimed, contains two limitations on the legislative power: 1. "No bill shall contain more than one subject." 2. The subject of the bill "shall be clearly expressed in its title." But, 1. Both clauses are directory. 2. The whole act will be devoted to one subject, the revision and consolidation of the statutes, and hence, it is not in conflict with the first clause; and the title, "An act to revise and consolidate the general statutes of Ohio," is a literal compliance with the second clause. 3. The table of contents of titles, chapters, and sections, placed at the head of the revision, may well be regarded in connection with the title, and as forming part of it; and hence, the substantial compliance with the requirement as to the title, is as complete as it has been in any bill ever presented to a general assembly. And this view is much strength

ened when we consider the principal reason for the constitutional provision, which is, that the general assembly and the public should be fairly apprised by the title as to the contents of the bill. For these, and other reasons, we were led to the conclusion that the constitutional objections are invalid.

In deciding as to the best mode of numbering the sections, we were not free from doubt. The sections in the late revision of the acts of congress, are numbered in one series, from one to five thousand six hundred and one, and that plan has been pursued in some of the states. In the Connecticut and some other revisions, the sections of each chapter, or part of a chapter where it is divided, form a series. Each plan has its advantages and disadvantages. The former plan is simple; it enables us, by placing prominently at the head of each page the numbers of the sections on that page, to readily find any section in the revision; and the work can be indexed by sections, which is important; hence, this plan has many advocates, and all agree, that for a few years following the adoption of the revision, it would be preferable. But the objection has been urged, that as it will be necessary to add chapters, subdivisions, and sections to various titles, from time to time, this plan will soon lead to confusion. By the other plan, which has the advantage of being more orderly, it has been thought the difficulty can be avoided; and the advocates of this mode say, that when it becomes necessary to add other sections to a chapter, the whole chapter should be repealed and re-enacted, with the new sections added, and that in this way the harmony of the original plan will remain undisturbed. Is it probable, however, that in all cases when it becomes necessary to add one or more sections to a chapter, the whole chapter will be repealed and re-enacted, with the additions? On the contrary, it seems to us quite clear, that sections will oftentimes be added to chapters, as they are now added to statutes, without the repeal and re-enactment of any other sections than those amended. Little, if anything, would, therefore, be gained in this way over the first plan. As the convenience of the plan of a continuous unbroken numbering is of far more importance than any supposed advantage from the orderly arrangement of the other plan, we preferred to follow the revision of the acts of congress in this particular; and the general assembly, adopting our suggestion, directed that plan to be pursued.

The form of legislation with respect to municipal corporations is of great importance, and in view of the provisions of our constitution, attended with difficulty. [Art. 2, § 26; art. 13, §§ 1, 2, 6.] The difficulty is in enacting laws which, while appropriate, or even essential to the prosperity of one or more municipal corporations, may be inappropriate or even mischievous, if made applicable to all. Our examination of the question led to the following conclusions; and it will be seen by an examination of title 12, of part 1, that it resulted in further classification:

1. There is nothing in the constitution to prohibit appropriate local legislation for a city or village; and in such a case, it is immaterial whether the corporation is designated by the number of its inhabitants, or directly named. For instance, the act relating to the police in certain cities (73 v. 70), was such an act, and Cincinnati might have been directly named, instead of describing it in the way stated. State ex rel., v. Covington, 29 O. S. 102.

2. But that can not be done where the act contains a grant of corporate power; as, for instance, the power of taxation or assessment; for the first section of article 13, above mentioned, applies to municipal corporations as well as private corporations. State ex rel., v. Mitchell, 31 O. S. 592; State ex rel., v. Cincinnati, 20 O. S. 18.

3. The power of the general assembly to classify municipal corporations is not expended when these corporations are divided into cities and villages, but that department of the state government is the sole judge of the mode and extent of such classification.

4. The passage of an act which provides, that all cities which, at the federal census of 1870, contained more than ninety thousand, and less than two hundred thousand inhabitants, shall be cities of the second grade of the first class, and have certain specified corporate powers, is not classification in contemplation of the constitution, as that instrument requires the act to be general; but it is simply an attempt to do indirectly what the constitution prohibits when directly attempted, that is, to confer corporate power by an act which is essentially local and special; for the act can never apply to any other municipal corporation than Cleveland.

5. But the designation of a class into which other municipal corporations may, by increase of population, enter and from which they may pass into other classes, is not prohibited. To illustrate: An act is passed providing that all cities which, on the first day of March last, had, and those which hereafter, on the first day of March, in any year, shall have, according to some official report or abstract of the then next preceding federal census, more than ninety thousand, and less than two hundred thousand inhabitants, shall be cities of the second grade of the first class. No constitutional objection seems to exist to such an act, nor to conferring corporate powers under it. To be sure, it would apply, at present, to Cleveland alone; but, under a plan of classification thus indicated, other cities might, without any change of the statute, pass, by growth of population, into that grade, and Cleveland itself, obeying the same law of increase, pass from it. As already indicated, the mode and extent of classification is left to the conscience of the legislature-its sense of right and public necessity.

In the government of Cincinnati, Cleveland, Toledo, Columbus, and Dayton, the five large cities of the state, it is found that their necessities are diverse, and the occasion for legislation, in a sense special, relating to their corporate powers,

occurs frequently with respect to each of them. Besides, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a proposed act, which is, in the main, administrative in its character, may not contain some provision which may be construed as a grant of corporate power. Even where there is no such grant of corporate power, mere local administrative power may be granted and exercised as well under a general as a special act. Thus, division 5, chapter 5, sub-division 1, of title 12, which relates to the police, is general in form, though local and special in fact, and there would be no constitutional objection, in that case, to legislation in which Cincinnati would be directly named. For the reasons given, however, it is necessary to legislate for those cities by general laws, and this was done by classification, in the way above indicated.

In the act of 1852, provision was made for the incorporation of special road districts; but the phrase was not appropriate, in view of the powers conferred on those corporations; and in the revision of 1869, the cumbrous expression, "incor porated village for special purposes," was substituted. In this revision the latter designation has given place to the old word, hamlet. And the word "incorporated," which had been constantly used wherever the word village occurred, was omitted.

At the second session of the sixty-second general assembly, part fourth of the revision, containing a codification of the statutes in relation to crimes and offenses, criminal procedure, and jails and the penitentiary, was reported to the legislature, and adopted by that body.

At the first session of the sixty-third general assembly, the commission reported to the legislature, and that body adopted, the following titles: municipal corporations; taxation; procedure in the courts of common pleas and superior courts, and in district courts on appeal; procedure in probate courts; procedure before justices of the peace and mayors; error, mandamus, and quo warranto; and the militia.

At the second session of the sixty-third general assembly, the whole work was completed, and reported by the commission to that body. It contained not only the titles which had been enacted in 1877 and 1878, but also those which had not been previously reported. And the revision was adopted by the legislature without the slightest change in the arrangement of the various parts of the work which had been made by the commission. Nor was there any material alteration even in form, except as the legislature desired to change the existing laws. In saying so, we do not intend to detract from the just merits of the legislative department. Great praise is due to the sixty-first general assembly, which inaugurated this work; to the sixty-second general assembly, which adopted the work as far as it was then reported by the commission; and to the sixty-third general assembly, which adopted the work of the commission as a whole. It cannot be claimed that either of those bodies failed, in any respect, to perform the duties devolved

upon it in regard to the work; and we have no doubt the people are indebted to the legislature for many improvements in the laws, which the commission did not feel warranted in making.

The statute creating the commission was repealed by the act of June 23, 1879 (76 v. 192), which provides for the publication of this revision. But it will be seen that, by the repealing act, the commission is virtually continued until the work is issued. The third section is as follows:

"There shall be published in two volumes, in permanent form, twelve thousand copies of the revised and consolidated statutes, enacted at the present session of the general assembly; the printing and other work shall be let out by special contract as hereinafter provided, and M. A. Daugherty, John S. Brasee, and George B. Okey shall prepare, edit, and superintend such publication, including proof-reading. The following mentioned matter shall be prepared by them, and shall be published in either of the volumes as they may find most practicable, viz: the articles of confederation; the constitution of the United States; the ordinance of seventeen eighty-seven; the constitutions of the state of Ohio, of 1802 and 1851, properly annotated with the decisions of the supreme court; the laws of congress in force on the subject of naturalization, extradition of fugitives, authentication of records, and removal of causes of state to federal courts; the revised statutes, with annotations of the decisions of the supreme court; an appendix containing all other laws in force of a general nature properly arranged; and a complete, accurate, and analytic index to the revised statutes, and to the appendix, but the annotations to the revised statutes, and notes accompanying the same, if any, shall be placed in said volumes as foot notes on the pages in connection with the sections to which they relate, and as near to the same as practicable; which volumes shall be completed and ready for distribution not later than December 1, 1879."

We regret that the time allowed for annotating and indexing the work was so short. We have done the best it was possible for us to do with that part of the work-indeed, with every part of the work-in the time allowed. We think the revision, in those respects, as well as in the text, will compare favorably with any revision in the country. The whole work has been done in four and onehalf years. No one acquainted with the magnitude of the undertaking will claim that there has been any unreasonable consumption of time.

We have stated that the principal part of the code of civil procedure, prepared by Messrs. Kennon, Groesbeck, and Morton, remains substantially as it was reported by those commissioners in 1853. There was a disposition among thinking people to change its provisions as little as possible. In closing our preface, we trust it may not be out of place to invoke the same regard for this revision. Let no change be made in any part of it, unless it is clear that such change is needed; for, probably, on greater familiarity with the work as a whole,