suggestion in the bill, that when this case was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for this district, parties were not allowed, as now in our State courts, to be called, or to offer themselves as witnesses, affords not the slightest ground for our interference." § 63. Application is sometimes made to enjoin proceedings in chancery. $64. It is held that an injunction to restrain the execu tion of a decree in equity cannot be granted. In Jackson v. Leaf, Lord Eldon remarked: "I do not remember any instance where this court has enjoined a party from proceeding in another court of equity. In the same court of equity you do restrain them, when there are different suits for the same purpose." But a court of equity may withdraw its own process, in a proper case, or stay execution by supersedeas (a). § 65. Where it was competent for the officer allowing an injunction to allow it either as injunction master or judge of the Court of Chancery, and where it does not appear clearly in which capacity he did act, it will be presumed that he acted as judge of the court.❜ § 66. It is held in New York, that, where an injunction has been granted by a judge at chambers, a motion for its dissolution may be made directly to the court, without having first applied to the judge who granted it." But, in a recent case, section 324 of the Code is held to apply to injunction orders. 1 Per Ames, C. J., Kendall v. Win sor, 6 R. 1. 462. 2 Greenlee v Equ. 481. McDowell, 4 Ired. 31 Jac. & W. 232. 44 Ired. Equ. 481. 5 Frost v. Myrick, 1 Barb. 362. Woodruff v. Fisher, 17 Barb. 224. (a) The Supreme Court of Ohio cannot by injunction restrain a suit in chancery in the Court of Common Pleas, and take jurisdiction of the same subject matter, of which the courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Merrill v. Lake, 16 Ohio, 373. Hence a judge of the Supreme or County Court may, on application ex parte, vacate or modify an injunction order made by him without notice. The power, however, should not be exercised, except to prevent serious loss by delay. And where the application had been delayed for a year, and all the defendants but one had appeared and answered; such an order was held to have issued improvidently.' § 67. In a case where a bottomry bond had been given for an amount grossly exceeding the value of the ship, an injunction was granted to restrain an admiralty suit upon such bond, nothing having been done towards determining the rights of the parties in the Admiralty Court before the filing of the bill, though money had been paid into court and bail given. The ground of decision was, that the matters could be more conveniently, directly, and effectually determined in equity than in admiralty.' § 67 a. In Ohio, it has been held that the power to grant an injunction, in a case pending in the Court of Common Pleas, cannot constitutionally be conferred upon the Supreme Court. The court remark, "that we can allow an injunction in a case pending in this court upon an appeal is very clear. An injunction may be the very object of the suit-the final decree sought-and so a provisional injunction, during the pendency of the suit, may be necessary for the purposes of justice. The power to allow these, is a part of the appellate jurisdiction, the grant of which is authorized by the constitution, and has been made by the law. But to allow an injunc tion in a case pending in another court, would be an exercise of original, and not of appellate jurisdiction. Now the original jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution, is limited to quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, and procedendo. Art. 4, Sec. 2. It would be wholly inconsistent with, and in a great measure destructive of the judi Peck v. Yorks, 41 Barb. 547. 2 Duncan v. McCalmont, 3 Beav. cial system it ordains, to suppose that this original jurisdiction can be enlarged by law. It is true, there is no express prohibition against it, but none was necessary." 68. We shall have occasion in another connection to consider the question, whether and how far foreign proceed. ings may be restrained by injunction. (a) (See Chap. VI., Suits.) It may be here remarked, that, if the circumstances of a case are such as would make it the duty of one court in England to restrain a party from instituting proceedings in another court in England, they will also warrant it in imposing on him a similar restraint with regard to proceedings in a foreign court. The fact of a foreigner having property in England enables the court to make effectual an injunction issued to him; but, especially in the case of a foreigner who seeks no assistance from the English courts, the issuing of such injunction ought clearly to be shown to be required as conducive to justice.' So equity may entertain a bill respecting land, though the land is not within its jurisdiction, where its decree can be enforced by acting on the person of 1 Per Thurman, J., Kent v. Mahaffy, 2 Carron, &c. v. Maclaren, 35 Eng. 2 Ohio St. 498. Law and Eq. 37. (a) In North Carolina, the court will not drive a party to seek redress in the courts of another State, when a less circuitous and better remedy can be given in the courts of North Carolina at less cost. Richardson v. Williams, 3 Jones, Eq. 116. A bill was filed by the plaintiffs, owners of a charter, from the State of South Carolina, of the Augusta Bridge over the Savannah River, which divides South Carolina from Georgia, against the City Council of Augusta, in Georgia, owners of a charter of bridge from the State of Georgia, for an account of tolls collected by the defendants, and for an injunction to restrain them from the same collecting more than one moiety of tolls, and also from collecting any tolls whatever at a new bridge which they had built in violation of the plaintiffs' charter. It was averred in the bill, that of so much of the Augusta Bridge as lay within the territorial limits of South Carolina, the plaintiffs were the some lots in Hamburgh, in South Carolina. A plea to the jurisdiction, because the defendants were non-residents of South Carolina, was sustained. McKinne v. Augusta, 5 Rich. Eq. 55. Owners, and it was incidentally stated that the defendants owned a party; and, in a proper case, the court will restrain the party from leaving the jurisdiction by a ne exeat.1 § 69. With reference to the pleadings in applications for injunction,(a) an injunction will not ordinarily be granted under a prayer for general relief, but must be expressly prayed. § 70. A complaint for an injunction need not disclose whether a bond is filed or not.3 § 71. An injunction can only be granted when it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded. 72. Where a bill is bad upon demurrer an injunction should not be granted, even if the defect is in point of form merely. But where an action was commenced by the service of a summons, without complaint, and the motion for an injunction founded upon an affidavit, which, although commencing in form as a deposition, contained all the requisites of a complaint as prescribed by the (New York) Code; it was held, that the form of the paper furnished no sufficient ground of objection." 1 Enos v. Hunter, 4 Gilm. 211. 2 Lefforge v. West, 2 Cart. 514. See Long v. Cross, 5 Jones, Eq. 323. 3 Smith v. Chandler, 13 Ind. 513. Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 76. 5 Rose v. Rose, 11 Paige, 166. 6 Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 76. (a) In New York, "the Code, Sec. 69, has expressly abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions; and it declares that there shall be but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs." Per Allen, P. J., Mallory v. Norton, 21 Barb. 436. In the same State, where a preliminary injunction is asked upon facts not alleged to be within the knowledge of the defendant, the bill must be sworn to positively, either by the plaintiff or by some person from whom information of the facts was derived. Paterson v. Bangs, 9 Paige, 73. Great strictness will be required, in proceedings for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver of a debtor's effects, under the Ohio act of February 25, 1848, amendatory of the act directing the mode of proceeding in chancery, especially in setting forth the matters required in the second section; and, if a bill be defective in this particular, it may be dismissed at any stage of the cause, unless particular circumstances take the case out of the general rule.' § 74. The mere allegation in a complaint, that the legal remedy is too tardy, or that irreparable mischief will ensue, is not sufficient; but the facts must be stated, to show that the apprehension of injury is well founded.2 § 75. Allegations in a bill, that "a firm, or some of the members of said firm," had done certain acts, that "some of the firm had obtained control of certain executions by purchase, or otherwise," that said firm bought "the same either for R. or after his death," and that they had not done certain acts as "to some of these executions;" are too inaccu rate, loose, and uncertain.3 § 76. The complainant must disclose all the facts of his case, or it will be presumed that those not disclosed would make against him if known. Thus the averments in a petition, which seeks to enjoin the execution of a judgment on mere technical grounds, and without disclosing merits, must be taken most strongly against the complainant. So, where one of two defendants, the other being dead, sought to enjoin, on technical grounds, an order of sale, and did not allege that the property, or any part of it, belonged to the petitioner; the court held that the injunction was properly dissolved.' So where the complainant relies upon his own oath, the charges in the bill, and the affidavit to verify them, should be direct |