general and ordinary business of the corporation; and therefore, under Code § 132, may be granted by the court commissioner.' 14. Unless there has been tardiness in the organization of an incorporated company, it may have relief by injunc tion, against wrongs done and threatened between the act of incorporation and the issuing of letters patent.2 § 15. Where there is a mortgage upon the capital stock of a corporation, and the treasurer is one of the mortgagees, an injunction will be granted to stay a sale under a power in the mortgage, until the treasurer shall furnish to the mortgagor any information relative to the condition of the corporation, and affecting the value of the stock, which the treasurer may have obtained by virtue of his office, beyond what appears from the books of the corporation.3 § 16. Cities and towns constitute a class of corporations or quasi corporations, with reference to which the process of injunction is often invoked. (a) Thus, in Massachusetts, a 1 Reed v. Jones, 6 Wis. 680. 2 Packer v. The Sunbury, &c., 19 Penn. 211. 3 Frieze v. Chapin, 2 R. I. 429. (a) As to the remedy of injunction in the case of a county, see County, &c., v. Hunt, 5 Ohio, N. S. 488. It is laid down, as the general rule, that only the people can prosecute for violations of public trust. Municipal corporators and tax payers, unless individually injured, cannot enjoin a public wrong. Ketchum v. Buffalo, 4 Kern. 356; Davis v. Mayor, &c., ib. 506. Equity will not interfere in behalf of a monopoly. Thus the amendment of a city charter provided, that a right given by the city to lay gas-pipes through the streets and public grounds should be exclusive, except as against any persons or corporations that might receive similar authority from the legislature. The plaintiffs were purchasers of the gas-works and business. After such amendment, the defendants, organized under the statute relating to joint stock corporations, commenced opening the streets to lay their pipes. Upon a bill praying an injunction, held, such amendment, so far as it restricted the free manufacture town voted to loan its portion of the surplus revenue, received under St. 1837, c. 85, " to the inhabitants of the town, as the population of the town was, on the head and the heads of families, to give their securities for themselves and minor children, guardians for children they are guardians for, and the selectmen for town paupers, and that the trus tees of the surplus revenue in behalf of the town accept the securities of minor children, who have no parents or guardians." At a subsequent meeting the town voted that "the trustees of the surplus revenue loan the same in equal sums to each and every inhabitant of the town, and that each inhabitant give two sureties which should be acceptable to the trustees; that the loan be made according to a census to be taken, and that the trustees need not require one of the sureties to be a freeholder." Held, such votes were in violation of the act concerning the deposit of the surplus revenue passed March 24, 1837, and were illegal and void; and that compliance with such votes on the part of the trustees should be prohibited by injunction.' So where the city of New London appropriated money for the celebration of the anniversary of independence; a bill was sustained on behalf of certain tax-payers to restrain the payment of such appropriation. The court remarked: "The city corporation was in the nature of a trustee of the money in its treasury, for the corporators, the inhabitants of the city, for the purposes for which they were incorporated, and here was a meditated misappropriation of the trust fund; and, secondly, it is extremely doubtful, whether the plaintiffs could have any other remedy. The amount appropriated by this vote, was in the city treasury, and, if abstracted, must, when wanted for other and legitimate purposes, be 1 Pope v. Halifax, 12 Cush. 410. See Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103. and sale of gas, was a monopoly, unconstitutional and void, and the injunction was refused. Norwich, &c. v. Norwich, &c., 25 Conn. 19, (containing a learned and elaborate discussion of the law of franchises and monopolies). supplied, by a tax on the inhabitants. It is suggested that the plaintiffs should bring an action against the city, for a misappropriation of its funds, or that, when such a tax is laid, they should, by a proper action, resist its collection. We are, by no means, prepared to say, that an action could be maintained, on either of these grounds, and are strongly inclined to think it could not. But, however this may be, we are clearly of opinion, that the plaintiffs are not bound to wait until the money is misspent, nor until such tax shall be levied, and attempted to be collected, but that they may call on a court of equity to interpose, by way of preventing the injury." But where an action was commenced against the selectmen of a town for illegally refusing a vote, and the town voted to pay the expenses already incurred in defending the suit, and that it would be the duty of the town. to refund any sum which the selectmen should be compelled to pay, and a minority of the legal voters, who were liable to pay more than half the taxes of the town, filed a bill against the selectmen and treasurer, praying for an injunction to restrain them from carrying such vote into effect; held, before the passage of (Massachusetts) stat. 1847, c. 37, the court had no jurisdiction in the case." § 17. Chancery has power by injunction to restrain the trustees of a village from transcending their powers under the act of incorporation, where the act complained of would injuriously affect the value of property in the village.3 18. To authorize a preliminary injunction to stay the proceedings of the corporation of a city, in the alteration of streets, on the ground of fraud, the plaintiff should be able to point out some particular act of fraud, or primâ facie evidence of corruption, on the part of the members of the corporation who voted for the ordinance." 1 New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn 552-6. 2 Hall v. Cushman, 6 Met. 425. 3 Oakley v. Trustees, &c., 6 Paige, 262. Champlin v. Corporation, &c., 3 Paige, 573. § 19. It is held, that equity will enjoin the use of a district school-house for religious meetings and Sunday-schools by vote of the district, on the application of any tax-payer, however slightly injured.1 20. The court will not restrain the mere act of voting on a resolution or ordinance, proposed in either board of the common council of a city, unless, on the mere voting or formal passage thereof, such ordinance or resolution would instantly, and without any action or attempt to enforce any right or privilege under it, effect an irremediable injury. And a legislative act cannot be enjoined; as, for instance, an order of a city common council to a department, to give an individual a particular contract. But the execution of such order by the city, after its passage, may be enjoined.3 And the like distinction is made, that although, generally, equity will not interfere with the ordinances of a municipal corporation, yet, where questions arose, as to the effect of a dedication of lands under water, and of letting the land lie unreclaimed fifty years by the public, and where the ordinance, based upon one view of the above questions, was about to do irreparable injury to the complainants, and the defendants did not object to the jurisdiction in their answer, an injunction was granted.' § 21. Where an injunction issues against a city, and all its members, officers, and agents, restraining them from making a certain grant; a member of the city council, who votes for the grant, violates the injunction, though the resolve, in favor of the grant, is conditioned on the grantee's acceptance of its terms." 22. The question of property and right of possession, 1 Schofield v. Eighth, &c., 27 Conn. 499. See Sheldon v. Centre, &c., 25 Conn. 224. 2 Whitney v. Mayor, &c., 28 Barb. 3 People v. New York, 32 Barb. 35. Morris, &c. v. Jersey, &c., 1 Beasl. 252. 6 People v. Sturtevant, 5 Seld. 263. between two bodies, each claiming to be the trustees of an incorporated religious society, is a question to be determined at law. Thus a part of a religious society, which owned a house of public worship and burial-ground, built a new house, in another place, and elected a board of trustees. A part continued to worship in the old building. The trustees of those who worshipped at the old house refused to permit the new party to enter and use the burying-ground; and the latter, on several occasions, broke open the gates for the purpose of burying therein. On bill filed, injunction was granted, restraining such forcible entry. On answer and argument, the court held that a forcible entry for such a purpose was not such an injury as called for injunction.' So an injunction will not be granted, at the suit of a pewholder, to prevent the trustees of a church from pulling down the old church, where it has become dilapidated, for the purpose of erecting a new one, but will leave the pewholders to their remedies at law. So on a bill filed by pew-holders in a church, an injunction was granted, restraining the authorities of the church from pulling it down, as they were proposing to use the materials in the erection of a new church on a different site. On answer, the injunction was dissolved, on the ground that, if the complainants had rights which would be violated, there was a remedy at law, and that the nature and extent of the injury were not such as called for an injunction.3 § 23. The process of injunction is very frequently applied in connection with banking corporations; which, from the peculiar nature of their relations with the community at large, and the unforeseen fluctuations incident to them, often call for judicial interference more prompt and summary than could otherwise be afforded. In reference to a statutory 1 Miller v. English, 2 Halst. Ch. 304. See Scott v. Stipe, 12 Ind. 74. 2 Heeney v. St. Peter's Church, 2 Edw. Ch. 608. Van Horn v. Tallmadge, 4 Halst. Ch. 108. |