the deed he was ignorant that C., the defendant, had a judgment in his favor against A. and B., or that he had a judg ment bond against them; that the object of A. and B. in selling the farm was to raise money to pay their creditors, of whom C. was one, and that the money was thus duly applied; that, during the negotiation, C. was acquainted with the whole matter, advised the sale, and knew that the plaintiff was buying, supposing there was no judgment in C.'s favor; but that C., after the agreement, and on the 19th of January, 1842, had a judgment entered upon a judgment bond against A. and B.; that A. and B. had ample real estate remaining after sale to satisfy the judgment, but that C. released the same or large portions thereof from the lien of the judgment; that C. before the sale held two judgments against A. and B., which had been assigned to him, and that, on the 7th of December, 1842, they transferred to him a draft for $6,000, drawn and accepted as collateral security for the payment of such judgments, amounting to about $5,000, C. agreeing under his hand and seal to apply what he should receive on the second draft, first to his two last-mentioned judgments, and to account for the surplus; that C. received on the draft $5,287.52, and did not so apply the same, but raised the amount of the judgment by sales on execution, and now insists on appropriating the money to the judgment entered since the deed to the complainant; and which C. holds against A. and B, leaving older judgments unpaid, and thereby charging the complainant's farm with the amount thereof; and that C. has caused an execution, issued on his said judgment of January 19, 1842, to be levied on the complainant's farm. The bill prayed relief, and an injunction restraining sale on the lastmentioned execution; and the injunction was allowed.1 So A., while a feme sole, became the owner of a bond and warrant of attorney, upon which judgment had been entered up, which the plaintiff, B., had given to secure £1,200, and she repeatedly Van Mater v. Holmes, 2 Halst. Ch. 575. promised not to enforce them, upon which promise B. contracted irrevocable engagements. A., after her marriage, jointly with her husband, took proceedings at law to enforce these securities. Upon a bill filed by him, the court granted a perpetual injunction, and directed satisfaction to be entered upon the judgment, with costs.' § 81. With reference to the pleadings in cases of this nature; chancery will not restrain a judgment upon a bill in which all the material facts are charged upon information and belief only, without any allegation as to whence the information was derived, or any affidavit connected with the bill. Nor will equity enjoin a judgment at law and grant a new trial, unless the complainant's bill sets forth distinctly his causes of grievance. The plaintiff must state the cause of his not defending at law, where he had a legal defence," more especially in a case which is, in general, exclusively cognizable at law. And a court of chancery will not grant relief so readily against a judgment in attachment to an absconding, as to an absent or non-resident debtor; a bill should therefore state in which of these characters the attachment was taken out against the defendant. So in a bill for relief against a judgment, on the ground that the defendant was prevented from defending at law by fraud or accident, the matter of fraud or accident must be set forth with certainty and precision, and it must also be alleged, that the fraud or accident is unmixed with any negligence on the part of the complainant.' And allegations, that a judgment was obtained through fraud and other ill practices, are too general to authorize the arrest of its execution. 82. An injunction cannot stand based on a written agreement alleged to be lost, where the bill does not allege that the party in whose custody it was placed has been asked to produce it, nor that its contents can be proved, and where it appears that the party who executed it is dead, and its existence and all transactions concerning it are fully denied by the answer.1 83. If a bill of injunction, to stay proceedings on a judgment, charge the plaintiff at law with having failed to do an act on which the equity of his claim depends, and in his answer he take no notice of that allegation; the court, on the hearing, will consider this an admission that he has not done the act in question, and will decree against him without any exception to the answer, or any interlocutory order, taking the bill for confessed in part.2 § 84. On a bill for injunction against a judgment on a bond given in payment for a mare, alleging the warranty to be false, and an agreement for delay, the answer contained a positive denial, and was disproved by but one witness. Held, that the complainant's remedy was properly at law, and that the bill must be dismissed.3 § 85. Where a bill for relief from a judgment at law alleged, as a reason for not making a defence, that the plaintiff was deceived by his attorney as to the time of trial; held, this fact must be proved, although not answered, or denied by the answer. § 86. All the parties to a decree, the execution of which is sought to be enjoined, must be made parties to the injunc tion bill. The plaintiff in the judgment enjoined is a neces 1 Kent v. De Baun, 1 Beasl. 220. Cowan v. Price, 1 Bibb, 173. 5 Hendrick v. Robinson, 7 Dana, 165. sary party. (a) So, to a bill by a purchaser of land from a judgment debtor, to enjoin the judgment creditor from subjecting the land to his judgment, the debtor is a necessary party. So, to a bill for relief, from a judgment on a note against the maker, in favor of an assignee of the note, the payee is a necessary party. So the assignee of a judgment is a necessary party to a bill, to perpetually stay proceedings thereon for equities existing between the parties previous to the assignment. But a surety need not be made party to a bill by the principal, for an injunction against a judgment.” Nor a sheriff, to a bill brought to enjoin the execution of legal process. The clerk and sheriff are not proper parties to a bill for an injunction to stay execution." 87. The distinction is made, that no person can enjoin a judgment at law, to which he is not a party; but, if he is aggrieved by the proceedings thereon, he should pray for an injunction to the execution. Thus A. bought railroad ties of B., and sold them to C., who mixed them with other ties used on the track. B. gave notice to C. that the ties were his, and then C. refused to pay A. for them. A. brought a suit against C., and recovered judgment for the value of the ties. B. then brought a suit in chancery, and alleged fraud in A., and the court enjoined C. from paying the judgment in favor of A., and ordered the sheriff to collect it for the Daniel v. Hannegan, 5 J. J. Marsh. 48. 2 Scott v. Bennett, 1 Gilm, 646. 3 Elston v. Blanchard, 2 Scam. 420. Bentley v. Gregory, 7 Monr. 368. 6 Olin v. Hungerford, 10 Ohio, 268. 7 Edney v. King, 4 Ired. Eq. 465. 4 Mumford v. Sprague, 11 Paige, 501. 438. (a) A. offers for probate a paper as the will of B., in which he is made executor and a legatee. Verdict against the will. A bill in equity is filed by C., to set aside this verdict, and to be allowed to prove, as the will of B., all that part of the paper in which A. has no interest, alleging that the verdict was fraudulent and void. A. was not made a party. Held, there was no equity in the bill. Barksdale v. Brown, 16 Geo. 95. benefit of B. Held, that it is not a proper exercise of chancery powers, to interfere with the collection of a judgment, fairly obtained as between the parties to it.' § 88. It is held that, where property of one is levied on to satisfy the debt of another, a bill of injunction may be maintained by him to restrain the sale, notwithstanding he has also remedies at law, and although the sheriff, by reason of his doubts as to the title to the property, takes an indemnifying bond. But it is also held, that a sale of personal property will not be enjoined at the suit of a third person, claiming the property, but he will be left to his legal remedy.3 Thus where slaves are levied on, and are claimed by a third person, under a prior sale from the debtor, equity will not restrain the sale, unless the slaves seem to possess some peculiar value, which cannot be recompensed in damages. So (in Louisiana) the vendor cannot enjoin the seizure and sale of the property of his vendee, when it is seized under execution as the property of a third person, on the ground that his obligation in warranty may attach. In such a suit the question of title to property is involved, and it therefore partakes of the nature of a petitory action, which can only be maintained by the party in whom the legal title is vested.' 4 89. An execution in ejectment will not be restrained at the instance of a stranger holding a paramount title; for if his title is good, the judgment does not affect him. It makes no difference, that after judgment the defendant attorned to that title and received possession under it." § 90. Where, in a suit between A. and B., judgment was rendered that A. recover against B. a certain sum, and that certain land be sold to satisfy the judgment; another claimant Scott v. Whitlow, 20 Ill. 310. 2 Wilson v. Butler, 3 Munf. 559. 3 Poage v. Bell, 3 Rand. 586. See Bowyer v. Creigh, 3 Rand. 25. Allen v. Freeland, 3 Rand. 170. 5 Kelly v. Wiseman, 14 La. An. 661. 6 Harper v. Hill, 35 Miss. 63. |