their right, if they have any. The plaintiffs are in possession of the water for the purpose of their canal, and the time during which they need it for the actual business, and the quantity which they need to keep in the canal during the winter season when business is suspended, are necessarily quite indefinite. It is impossible, therefore, that the defendants can be allowed to define for themselves the plaintiffs' right, and interfere with their possession. They insist on opening the weirs and helping themselves according to their own judgment; but this would be a lawless mode of vindicating their rights, and it cannot be allowed. If the defendants have any right to the water beyond what the plaintiff's are willing to concede to them, they must bring their bill or action to have those rights defined before they can be enforced."

22. And an injunction is sometimes refused upon the ground that it would cause great injury to the defendant.2

into

23. Where a party has a remedy at law, he cannot come equity, unless, from circumstances not within his control, he could not avail himself of his legal remedy; (a) nor for the assertion of a right, the existence or non-existence of which is properly determinable at law, and the exercise of which will do no injury to the party denying it; nor where it is not essential to secure the party's rights, and the object can be effected by filing a notice of lis pendens nor where there is a remedy at law, and it does not appear but that damages at law would be realized, and there is no

(a) That full compensation can be had at law, "is the great rule for withholding the strong arm of the Chancellor." Per Thompson, J., Pusey v. Wright, 31 Penn. 396.

danger of irreparable injury. More especially, where the matter of the bill itself shows that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, an injunction on the bill cannot be sustained. In such cases, an injunction will not at least be granted, until the petitioners have established their right to redress by an action at law. Thus the principle upon which an equity court interferes by injunction, in cases both of public and private nuisance, is the inadequacy of the remedy at common law; and it is on the ground of injury to property that this jurisdiction rests. So in case of devise to the widow of the testator, during her widowhood, or until their youngest child attained the age of twenty-one years, for the support of herself and their children, with remainder to the children, in fee, subject to dower; upon a bill filed by the widow and the children, charging against the defendant an unlawful and violent entry upon the land, taking the products thereof, and depriving the complainants of their means of support and maintenance, and praying that he might be compelled to surrender the land to them, and for an injunc tion and a receiver of the rents and profits, pendente lite, it was held, that the facts charged did not show that the defendant was committing irreparable damage to the property, to prevent which an injunction was necessary; that the remedy at law was ample and complete, either by action of trespass, ejectment, or, under the statutes, for a forcible entry.' So on a bill in equity, brought by the owner of a mill dam, to restrain a town from opening certain sluiceways therein, on the ground that the dam, by raising the water over certain highways, is a nuisance, a temporary injunction will not be granted, or, if granted on application ex parte, will be dissolved; when it appears that the refusal to grant, or the dissolution of the injunction, cannot lead to any injury or cause any loss to the plaintiff which cannot be repaired in damages,

1 Warne v. Morris, &c., 1 Halst. Ch. 410.

3 Arnold v. Klepper, 24 Mis. 273. Atty., &c. v. Sheffield, &c., 19

Mallett v. Weybossett, &c., 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 639. Barb. 217.

5 Pfeltz v. Pfeltz, 14 Md. 376.

or affect the merits of the controversy on a trial in due course. So, in general, a purchaser of land, who has a full and complete remedy at law on the covenants in his deed, cannot have an injunction against his vendor to restrain him from collecting the purchase-money;2 though a person who does not reside and has no property in the State may be restrained from collecting a note given for land to which he had no title, notwithstanding the remedy at law on a covenant of warranty. (See Title.) So, in Georgia, the remedy for the opening of an old road by the superior courts is by certiorari, not by injunction against the commissioners who seek to execute the order."

may

§ 23 a. The question has arisen, whether the remedy of injunction would lie in case of an agreed penalty or forfeiture. It has been held that the breach of a restrictive covenant in a lease be enjoined, though secured by forfeiture of the lease and a penalty. But where the plaintiff agreed with the defendants, a railroad company, that they might enter upon his land and build, and have the damages settled by award within a year, and that they should be paid within sixty days; if not, the license to cease, and all rights of the company, and its interest in the fixtures, to be as if it had entered in its own wrong: held, a case of forfeiture, not to be enforced by injunction against an entry upon the lands. So in an early case the plaintiff let a farm to the defendant, at an annual rent, part of it pasture, the defendant covenanting not to break up or plough any part of it, and, if he did, to pay at the rate of twenty shillings per acre per annum. Injunction refused, because the parties had agreed the damage price for ploughing. The court remarked that if

and set a

the defendant was plaintiff against paying the twenty shil

Wing v. Fairhaven, 8 Cush. 363.

479.

5 Barret v. Blagrave, 5 Ves. 555.

Wilkins v. Hogue, 2 Jones Eq. See Aylet v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 239; Ben

son v. Gibson, 3 ib. 396.

6 Coe . Columbus, &c., 10 Ohio N. S. 372.

lings, they would not relieve him.' And the general distinction is laid down, that breach of condition forfeits the estate. Breach of covenant is ground either of injunction or an action for damages.

§ 24. A demand growing out of an illegal transaction, which cannot be recovered or enforced directly, cannot be made the foundation of a proceeding in chancery for an injunction against a legal demand.3

§ 25. The interference of a court of equity by injunction sometimes depends upon statutory provisions either for this or other remedies. Upon this point it is said: "The remedy by injunction is, notwithstanding the (statutory) provision for its exercise, only such in the absence of an adequate legal remedy."

§ 26 Where a statute provided a specific remedy against a plank-road for neglect to repair, it was held that equity would not enjoin the collection of tolls till the repairs were made. So a bill for injunction was filed, alleging that the complainant made a contract with the defendants, a railroad company, by which he was to convey to them a right of way over his land, and a tract for a depôt; and that they had purchased other grounds and intended to use them for a depôt; and abandon those of the complainant. The defendants denied such abandonment. Held, the remedy of the complainant was by an action at common law, or under the railroad act."

27. The remedy by injunction does not preclude other remedies for the same injury. Thus, in California, a mort

1 Woodward v. Gyles, 2 Vern. 116. See Rolfe v. Peterson, 6 Bro. Parl. 470.

2 Woodruff. Water, &c., 2 Stockt. 489.

3 Pond v. Smith, 4 Conn. 297.

4 Per Thompson, J., Scheetz's, &c., 35 Penn. 95. 5 Com. v. Wellsboro', &c., 35 Penn 152.

6 Gallagher v. Fayette, &c., 38 Penn. 102.

gagee may maintain replevin for fixtures, although the Prac tice Act, s. 261, authorizes an injunction against their re

moval.1

$28. In Langton v. Horton, a judge of the Court of Queen's Bench had ordered an issue to try the title to property in the hands of a sheriff, by virtue of the Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 58, and 1 & 2 Vict. c. 45. The plaintiffs, claiming the property, apply for an injunction against these proceedings. It appeared that the case involved the validity assignment of a prospective cargo. Held, as this was a matter peculiarly of equitable jurisdiction, an injunction should be granted, the acts applying only to cases of strictly legal rights.

of an

3

29. In the case of Baldwin v. Buffalo, the distinction is taken, that, where the proceedings in a street case are illegal, and therefore inoperative and void, certiorari is the proper remedy, unless the proceedings in the subordinate tribunal, or the official acts of public officers, affecting the title to real estate, lead, in their execution, to the commission of irreparable injury to the freehold, or to a multiplicity of suits; or unless the adverse claim to the land is valid upon the face of the instrument or the proceedings complained of, and extrinsic facts require to be proved to establish the invalidity or illegality.

$30. Courts of equity have no controlling, supervising, or superintending power over courts of law, and will neither arrest nor interfere with their proceedings on the ground that their decisions were erroneous; much less stay or interfere with them, in anticipation of such erroneous decisions.* (See § 60.) Thus, if a city ordinance be in conflict with any commercial regulation of Congress, a party prosecuted under