we be strenuous advocates for that religion? why should we depend on those graces? which we may possess, and yet after all, if we attain ng better temper, no higher character, we must be forever wretched.

To prove, that, what have been generally called the natural graces, ought to be elevated to the rank of moral virtues, though of somewhat lower order than holy love to God-to enemies, it has been argued that we feel very differently towards the man who possesses the lower graces, and the man who is destitute of them. You see a man, it has been said, from whose general conduct and conversation you have reason to believe, is no lover and worshipper of God, no sincere humble disciple of Jesus; yet he is moral and amiable, sympathetic, kind, and courteous-a dutiful child, a tender husband, and an affectionate parent. You behold another man, who is immoral, and almost destitute of all the amiable feelings of humanity; you view these two men in contrast, and you cannot help feeling differently towards them. You approve of the one and disapprove of the other; while you cannot but love the one, you cannot but hate the other. This is all very true; but what then? Does it hence follow that lower graces of the amiable man are moral virtues? that you esteem them with a moral approbation, that approbation which arises in view of love to God and man-love to enemies? No; this difference of feeling in view of the two men is no proof of any essential difference in their hearts and religious characters. You behold the innocent, harmless lamb, sporting among the herd; you also view the furious tiger seizing on his inoffensive prey; and let me ask, are you not conscious of different feelings towards these animals?-of emotions of approbation of the one and disapprobation of the other? of delight in the lamb, and disgust at the tiger? But every one knows, that this difference of feeling is no proof of moral difference in these animals. Neither is the difference of our feelings in view of the moral, amiable man, and of the

immoral, inhumane man a proof of strictly moral goodness in the one, more than in the other, or any essential moral difference in their hearts; their moral emotions, using the term moral in its primary and strict religious sense, may be substantially the same; though they widely differ in outward demeanor, and in many of the principles of human nature.

It may be further urged in proof of the moral virtue of what I choose to term the natural graces, that the man destitute of them is more criminal than he who possesses and cultivates them. In reply I observe, that though this argument be granted it will not prove the point for which it is intended, namely, the moral virtue of the natural graces.

The immoral, unkind man may be a greater sinner than the moral, compassionate, amiable man, still there may be no strictly moral goodness in either. Paul in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, where he is delineating the true charact er of the heathen world, to express their extreme guilt, says they are " without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful." So long had they practiced gross unnatural immoralities, they had blunted and almost extirpated the tender emotions common to human beings. That there are many such monsters of vice in the present refined age, even in gospel lands, none will call in question. But what do these shocking instances prove? that every kind, well-bred man possesses some degree of moral goodness-r some true scriptural religion—that religion which qualifies him for, and will finally bring him to heaven? No; as well might you argue the moral virtue of lambs and doves, from the ferocity of lions and eagles.

Should it be said, that as the amiable principles, still belonging to human nature in its fallen state, are in men who are rational beings, on this account they are to be considered of a different nature from similar emotions in animals, I reply, that belonging to rational, accountable agents does not necessarily render them

moral virtues. Hunger and thirst are precisely of the same nature in men as in animals.

It is farther argued in favor of the virtuous nature of the common, amiable properties of humanity, that they are highly useful in society and ought to be esteemed and cultivated. This I am far from being disposed to deny. Highly do I appreciate the natural good feelings, which still remain in human nature, as eminently useful in society, and when cultivated rendering it pleasant and happy. But never have I learnt, that utility is virtue. I am aware that Paul has forewarned us, that in the last days heretical instructers should arise, teaching that, "gain is Godliness."

Many properties belonging to human nature may be highly beneficial in the present life-substitutes for perfect holinessdesigned for the good of society, and indeed without which our race could not exist on earth; which still do not amount to that Godliness which both the law and the gospel require; and therefore are not worth contending for as any kind of moral virtue.

I will now exhibit evidence that the feelings and graces, which are under review, are not moral virtues, do not form the Godly man-the disciple of Jesus, and do not qualify men for heaven.

1. I appeal to conscience, that faculty by which we judge of all moral feelings and actions. It is true, when we view the man of tender, delicate sensibilities, the man of good breeding and refinement, we cannot but esteem him; just so we cannot but venerate the man of native genius, cultivated by education; and here I maintain the emotion of approbation or esteem is similar. But it is altogether different from the approbation or esteem, which spontaneously and unavoidably arises in view of one who loves his Maker supremely, and every fellow creature, even his bitterest enemies, as himself. Here is an emotion, a strict morel approbation, widely diverse from an emotion, arising in view of any temper, not implying this universal, disinterested, holy

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love. I appeal to every man's conscience. Let him make the trial-let him view this God-like love in all its branches, and also the natural feelings and graces so highly esteemed by men of education and refinement; and then let him carefully examine the emotions of conscience, and he will instantly perceive as great a difference of feelings towards the two objects in view, as in his veneration of genius and moral approbation of holiness. Let him, for instance, view the Redeemer of the world, on the cross offering up to his Father that inimitable prayer for his cruel murderers, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do;" and then let him look to the merely moral, amiable polite man ; and let him honestly say, whether he is not intuitively sensible of as great difference in his approbation of the two characters as between light and darkness.

2. The affections under consideration do not amount to conformity to the moral law of God. It is to be feared that, those who plead for the moral goodness of such qualities of human nature compare them with incorrect fallible standards of moral goodness, such as the rules of politeness, the fashionable customs of society, and the opinions of erring men. But to the law and to the testimony of God I appeal. By this infallible standard we must try every disposition and action, if we would form a correct judgment of its moral nature. The moral law, the only measure of moral right and wrong, requires holiness, and nothing but holiness, supreme love to God, and love to our neighbors as to ourselves, and the genuine fruits of this impartial benevolence. Our Saviour has put the question to rest. When he was asked which is the first and great commandment in the law, he replied, "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it; thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." But manifestly there is no holiness,

none of this universal love, which in our Saviour's view is the sum total of what God requires of men, in the humane affections, under examination. Those who have almost extirpated these tender emotions are indeed desperately wicked, not merely because they are destitute of them, but because they have so long indulged selfishness, and committed such gross vices, that they have eradicated from their bosoms all the amiable feelings. The want of these kind emotions, and a moral character, is a sure proof of extreme wickedness; but the possession of them is no proof of moral goodness, holiness, conformity to the moral

law.

3. The natural amiable passions and graces are often found in those who evidently have no true benevolent love to God, to their fellow creatures, especially none to their enemies. The young ruler was moral in his demeanor, and amiable in his natural dispositions; and yet obviously he had no true love for God and Jesus. His heart was fastened to the world; it was his idol. Christ told him that he lacked one thing; and what was this one thing wanting? manifestly it was a heart to love God and the enjoyment of him supremely, that is to say, more than all earthly good. This our Saviour knew, for he had a perfect knowledge of his heart; therefore he directed him to sell all that he possessed and distribute it to the poor. And had this agreeable youth loved God and Jesus supremely, and his fellow servants as himself, would he not have cheerfully obeyed this reasonable command? especially when, if he did obey, he was sure, by the Saviour's promise, of a treasure in heaven? The young ruler was brought to just this dilemma, to give up the world as his god, his chief good, or a treasure in heaven; he could not possibly enjoy both as his supreme portion; he must renounce his idol or he must perish forever. Now in such a trying alternative, had he loved his God and his Saviour, and a