99 U. S. 686, the denial of the writ is held to be conclusive in a subsequent action as to the invalidity of the bonds, though the fact that the decision in mandamus was based on that ground is inferred from the pleadings, and not from the express language of the judgment, as in the present case. We are of opinion that the judgment of the supreme court of Ohio established the fact that the bonds and coupons were void in the hands of Hopple, and the judgment is conclusive of that fact against his vendee and privy in this action. The same result must follow in the case of Hipple v. Board of Trustees and Richard B. Hopple and others. It is argued, in avoidance of this conclusion, that the board of trustees and Hopple being both defendants to Hipple's bill, no adversary contention on the question of the validity of the bonds could have taken place between them. But this view of the case ignores entirely the facts that Hopple, in filing his cross-bill seeking to establish the bonds as valid, became plaintiff, and made the trustees defendants, and in this manner raised the issue of their validity between himself and the trustees directly, and it was in express terms decided against him. His assignee of those bonds, in the present action against the same trustees, is clearly bound by that decision. But if there had been no cross-bill, the fact that both Hopple and the trustees were placed as defendants in the suit of Hopple, does not impair the conclusive character of the decree in that case as between those parties. The present case is precisely analogous to that of Corcoran v. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. 94 U. S. 741, and we cannot better express our views of this case than by a quotation from the opinion in that: "It is said that Corcoran and his co-trustees, the canal company and the state of Maryland, were all defendants to that suit, and that as between them no issue was raised by the pleadings on this question, and no adversary proceedings were had. The answer is that in chancery suits, where parties are often made defendants because they will not join as plaintiffs, who are yet necessary parties, it has long been settled that adverse interests as between co-defendants may be passed upon and decided, and if the parties have had a hearing and an opportunity of asserting their rights, they are concluded by the decree as far as it affects rights presented to the court and passed upon by its decree. It is to be observed, also, that the very object of that suit was to determine the order of the distribution of the net revenues of the canal company, and that the Corcoran trustees were made defendants for no other purpose than that they might be bound by that decree; and, lastly, as the decree did undoubtedly dispose of that question, its conclusiveness cannot now be assailed collaterally, on a question of pleading, when it is clear that the issue was fairly made and was argued by Corcoran's counsel, as is shown by the third head of their brief, made a part of this record by stipulation." And in conclusion the court say: "It seems to us very clear that the question we are now called on to decide has been already decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, which had before it the parties to the present suit; that it was decided on an issue properly raised, to which issue both complainant and defendant here were parties, and in which the appellant here was actually heard by his own counsel; ani that *188 it therefore falls within the salutary rule of law which makes such a decision final and conclusiye between the parties, and that none of the exceptions to that rule exist in this case." We are of opinion that both demurrers wens properly overruled, and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Mr. Justice MATTHEWS did not sit in this case. (109 U. S. 139) ARTHUR, Collector, etc., v. PASTOR and others. (November 5, 1883.) CUSTOMS DUTIES-AD VALOREM DUTY ON WASHED WOOL. The act of congress (Rev. St. tit. 33, sched. L) imposing duties on imported wool, makes the appraised value of wool in its unwashed state the standard for determining the amount of ad valorem duty to be collected upon washed wool. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for plaintiff in error. error. Edward Hartley and W. H. Coleman, for defendants in error. MATTHEWS, J. This action was brought by the defendants in error to recover from the defendant below, now plaintiff in error, money alleged to have been illegally exacted and paid under protest as customs duties upon an importation of wool. Upon the facts set out in a bill of exceptions, and in respect to which there is no dispute, there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff below, upon a charge of the court to that effect, to review which this writ of error is prosecuted; the error alleged being that, upon the law of the case, the verdict and judgment should have been rendered for the plaintiff in The importation, which took place January 3, 1876, consisted of 3,294 pounds of washed wool, of class 1, tariff schedule L, the dutiable appraised value of which in its washed condition was $1,627, or 49.49 cents per pound. Had it been imported in an unwashed condition, the dutiable appraised value thereof would have been $813.50, or 24.69 cents per pound. There were three grades or descriptions of wool known to the trade, rated as to value according to the degree to which they had been freed from impurities, by processes of cleaning, known as unwashed, washed, and scoured wool; and their cost and value were determined in a corresponding proportion, washed wool being worth twice and scoured wool three times that of unwashed wool. The same distinction, for the purposes of the law, was made in the provisions of the tariff act then in force. By the terms of that act (Rev. St. tit. 33, sched. L) foreign wools were divided into three classes,—the first clothing wools, the second combing wools, the third carpet wools and other similar wools. It was provided that "the duty upon wool of the first class, which shall be imported washed, shall be twice the amount of the duty to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed; and the duty upon wool of all classes, which shall be imported scoured, shall be three times the duty to which it would be subject if imported unwashed." It was then provided that the duty to be levied should be as follows: "Wools of the first class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the United States, excluding charges in such port, shall be thirtytwo cents or less per pound, ten cents per pound, and in addition thereto eleven per centum ad valorem. Wools of the same class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the United States, excluding charges in such port, shall exceed thirty-two cents per pound, twelve cents per pound, and in addition thereto ten per centum ad valorem." The collector, in making his assessment upon the importation in question, exacted duty as follows: On 3,294 pounds, @ 20 cts. per pound, Total, $ 658 80 357 94 $1,016 74 The importers protested that they should be charged, as an ad valorem duty, only $178.97, or one-half the amount charged and collected, being 22 per cent. on the reduced value of the wool, as if unwashed, making a difference of $178.97, which is the amount in controversy. It was proven on the trial that the value of that number of pounds of such wool, unwashed, would have been $813.50. The construction of the statute, and the rule of computation adopted by the collector, proceeds upon the supposition that the rate of duty to be charged and collected upon washed wool is to be double that charged and collected upon the same weight and value of unwashed wool. Hence, because 3,294 pounds of unwashed wool would be chargeable with a duty of 10 cents per pound, and 11 per cent. of its appraised value as unwashed wool, it is found that the same weight of washed wool would be chargeable with 20 cents per pound, and 22 per cent. of its appraised value as washed wool. The error in this calculation clearly is in assuming that the same number of pounds of unwashed wool would be worth as much as washed wool; a supposition which is inconsistent with the fact, as admitted, and with the evident meaning of the law. The language of the act of congress is too plain to admit of doubt. It declares that the duty upon a given quantity of washed wool shall be twice the amount of duty "to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed." By the terms of the comparison the weight is supposed to be the same in both cases in the case, as actually presented, a quantity of wool weighing 3,294 pounds. Hence the duty, so far as determined by weight, is calculated upon the same number of pounds, being 11 cents per pound for the unwashed wool and 22 cents per pound for the 143 washed wool. But when the ad valorem duty is to be determined, the relative values necessarily determine its amount; and as 3,294 pounds of unwashed wool is to be appraised at $813.50, while the same weight of washed wool would be twice that sum, or $1,627, it follows that the duty on the latter is to be double that which the law imposes upon the former, namely, 22 per cent. of $813.50, which is equal to $178.97, and not 22 per cent. on $1,627, equal to $357.94, as charged by the collector. If the rule adopted by him should prevail, the amount of the ad valorem duty collected upon equal weights of unwashed and of washed wool would be four times as great upon the latter as upon the former, for not only is the rate of duty doubled, but it is assessed upon double the value of the unwashed wool. But the statute expressly limits the duty in the case of washed wool to double the amount to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed. It is admitted in argument that the letter of the law justifies, if it does not require, this conclusion; but it is urged that the meaning of the statute requires the construction which would impose rates of duty upon washed wool double those imposed upon unwashed, calculated upon the weight and value of each, separately considered. And this contention is maintained upon the argument that the contrary reading of the statute implies that congress has made the appraised value of wool in its unwashed state the standard for determining the amount of ad valorem duty to be collected upon washed wool, which, it is insisted upon the argument, ab inconvenienti, is not admissible. But this is not by implication merely, but expressly what the act declares; and any fancied or real objections to such a standard cannot affect the obvious meaning of the law. It is obvious, however, that the natural division of wools into the grades of unwashed, washed, and scoured, carried into the act as the ground of difference in the amount of duties to be assessed accordingly, fully explains the intention of congress to tax the wool itself uniformly by varying the amount of duty according to the degree to which a given quantity has been freed, by processes of cleansing, from the dirt and foreign matter with which, in its unwashed state, it is usually found. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed. (109 U. S. 121) MANHATTAN LIFE INS. Co. v. BROUGHTON, Trustee. (November 5, 1883.) JUDGMENT OF NONSUIT-EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT ACTION-LIFE INSURANCESUICIDE BY INSANE PERSON. A judgment of nonsuit is no bar to a new action, and of no weight as evidence at the trial of that action. Pending an action in a court of the state of New York against a corporation established in that state, by a widow, a citizen of New Jersey, upon a policy of insurance on the life of her husband, the plaintiff assigned the policy to a citizen of New York in trust for her benefit, and was afterwards nonsuited by order of the court. Upon a subsequent petition by the trustee to another court of the state to be relieved of his trust, a citizen of New Jersey was at her request appointed trustee in his stead. One object of this appointment was to enable a suit on the policy to be brought in the circuit court of the United States, which was afterwards brought accordingly. Held, that the suit should not be dismissed under the act of the third of March, 1875, c. 137, §§ 1, 5. A self-killing by an insane person, understanding the physical nature and consequences of his act, but not its moral aspect, is not a death by suicide, within the meaning of a condition in a policy of insurance upon his life, that the policy shall be void in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. James Otis Hoyt, for plaintiff in error. Erastus F. Brown, for defendant in error. GRAY, J. This is an action brought on the ninth of June, 1879, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, by John G. Broughton, a citizen of Bloomfield, in the state of New Jersey, against a corporation established in the city and state of New York, upon a policy of insurance in the sum of $10,000, on the life of Israel Ferguson, of New York, dated the fifteenth of June, 1864, made and payable to his wife, and containing a condition that it should be null and void "in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law of these states, or of the United States," or of any other country which he might be permitted by this policy to visit or reside in. Ata the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence that Ferguson died in the city of New York on the fourteenth of August, 1876, and that presently afterwards his widow and family removed to Redbank, in the state of New Jersey, and had since had their home there. He also introduced a deed dated the tenth of February, 1877, by which Mrs. Ferguson assigned the policy to John G. Nestell, of New York, in trust, to pay a claim for $2,000, and the necessary expenses of collecting the amount of the policy, and to invest the surplus for her benefit; and a record of the supreme court of New York, showing that in May, 1879, in a suit brought by Nestell against Mrs. Ferguson to be relieved of his trust, Broughton, the plaintiff, was, upon her |