Defense (Administration) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other assigned activities, and the Directors of Defense Agencies, except the National Security Agency, shall implement this part and apply the policies and procedures set forth in this part.

[31 F.R. 13642, Oct. 22, 1966] § 156.5 Definitions.

(a) National security. As used in this part, the term "national security" refers to those activities which are directly related to the protection of the military, economic, and productive strength of the United States, including the protection of the Government in domestic and foreign affairs, against espionage, sabotage, subversion, and any other illegal acts which adversely affect the national defense.

(b) Head of DoD Component. As used herein, the term, "Head of DoD Component" means the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and assigned activities, and the Directors of Defense Agencies.

(c) Sensitive position. A "sensitive position" is any position within the Department of Defense the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security. Sensitive positions are of the following two categories:

sensitive position.

(1) Noncritical Positions so designated by authority of the Head of a DoD Component, involving the following:

(1) Any position, the duties or responsibilities of which require access to SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL defense information or material.

(ii) Any position involving education and orientation of DoD personnel.

(ii) Any other position so designated by authority of the Head of a DoD Component.

(2) Critical sensitive position. Positions so designated by authority of the Head of a DoD Component, involving the following:

(1) Access to TOP SECRET defense information or material.

(ii) Development or approval of war pians, plans, or particulars of future major or special operations of war, or

critical and extremely important items of

war.

(iii) Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs which affect the overall operations of the Department of Defense or of a DoD Component, i.e., policy-making or policy determining positions.

(iv) Investigative duties, the issuance of personnel security clearances, or duty on personnel security boards.

(v) Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust.

(vi) Any other position so designated by authority of the Head of a DoD Component.

[31 F.R. 13642, Oct. 22, 1966]

§ 156.6 Policy.

(a) No civilian will be employed or retained in employment in a sensitive position of the Department of Defense unless his employment or retention in employment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

(b) The use of the suspension and removal procedures authorized by the provisions of section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, shall be limited to cases in which the interests of the national security are involved. Maximum use shall be made of normal Civil Service removal procedures where such procedures are adequate and appropriate.

(c) No U.S. citizen permanent or indefinite employee of the Department of Defense who has been appointed to a sensitive position shall be suspended, reassigned, or detailed to a nonsensitive position in the interests of national security without being granted the procedural benefits set forth in § 156.10.

(d) No classified defense information, nor any information which might compromise investigative sources or methods or the identity of confidential informants, shall be disclosed to any employee, his counsel, or representatives, or to any other person not clearly authorized to have access to such information.

[31 F.R. 13642, Oct. 22, 1966, as amended at 32 F.R. 5420, Mar. 31, 1967; 34 F.R. 11544, July 12, 1969]

§ 156.7 Standard and criteria.

(a) Standard. The standard for employment and retention in employment is that, based on all the available information, the employment or retention in employment of an individual is clearly

consistent with the interests of national security.

(b) Criteria for the application of standard. In the application of the above standard, consideration will be given to, but not limited to, the following activities and associations, whether current or past. As the following activities and associations are of varying degrees of seriousness, the ultimate determination must be made on the basis of an overall commonsense evaluation of all the information in a particular case.

(1) Depending on the relation of the employment to the national security:

(1) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.

(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.

(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.

(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.

(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.

(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or conspiring, aiding, or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.

(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(5) Membership in, affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. (These include, but are not limited to, those organizations, movements, or groups officially designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.)

(6) Intentional, unauthorized dismation, or of other information, disclosure to any person of classified inforclosure of which is prohibited by law.

(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

(8) Participation in the activities of an organization established as a front for an organization referred to in subparagraph (5) of this paragraph, when his personal views were sympathetic to the subversive purposes of such organization. (See Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S. Code 781 et seq., for a definition of Communistfront organization.)

(9) Participation in the activities of an organization with knowledge that it had been infiltrated by members of subversive groups under circumstances indicating that the individual was part of, or sympathetic to, the infiltrating element or sympathetic to its purposes.

(10) Participation in the activities of an organization, referred to in subparagraph (5) of this paragraph, in a capacity where he would reasonably have had knowledge of the subversive aims or purposes of the organization.

(11) Sympathetic interest in totalltarian, Fascist, Communist, or similar subversive movements.

(12) Sympathetic association with a member or members of an organization referred to in subparagraph (5) of this paragraph. (Ordinarily, this will not include chance or occasional meetings, nor contacts limited to normal business or official relations.)

(13) Currently maintaining a close, continuing association with a person who has engaged in activities or associations of the type referred to in subparagraphs (2) through (11) of this paragraph. A close continuing association may be deemed to exist if the individual lives with, frequently visits, or frequently communicates with, such person.

(14) Close continuing association of the type described in subparagraph (13) of this paragraph, even though later separated by distance, if the circumstances indicate that renewal of the association is probable.

(15) The presence of a spouse, parent, brother, sister, offspring, or any person with whom a close bond of affection exists in a nation whose interests may be inimical to the interest of the United States or in satellites or occupied areas of such a nation, under circumstances permitting coercion or pressure to be brought on the individual through such persons.

(16) Willful violation or disregard of security regulations.

(17) Acts of reckless, irresponsible, or wanton nature which indicate such poor judgment and instability as to suggest that the individual might disclose classifiled defense information to unauthorized persons, or otherwise assist such persons, whether deliberately or inadvertently, in activities inimical to the security of the United States.

(18) Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a congressional committee or Federal or State Court, regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct relevant to his security eligibility.

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(19) Any excessive indebtedness, redifficulties, curring financial plained affluence, or repetitive absences without leave, which furnish reason to believe that the individual may act contrary to the best interests of national security.

(20) Refusal by the individual on constitutional or other grounds, or inten

tional failure to complete required security forms or personal history statements, or otherwise failing or refusing, in the course of investigation, interrogation, or hearing, to answer any pertinent question regarding the matters described in subparagraphs (1) through (19) of this paragraph.

(c) Certification. Prior to employment, the applicant shall be required to certify in writing that he has seen, read, understood, and correctly answered the questions relating to the list of organizations designated by the Attorney General under Executive Order 10450, "Security Requirements for Government Employment."

[31 F.R. 13642, Oct. 22, 1966, as amended at 32 F.R. 5420, Mar. 31, 1967]

§ 156.8 Personnel security investigations.

(a) Investigative requirements—(1) General. (i) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in a sensitive position in the Department of Defense shall be made subject to investigation. The scope of the investigation shall be determined, in the first instance, according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the investigation include less than a National Agency Check (including a check of the fingerprint and subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law enforcement agencies, former employers, and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation; Provided, That to the extent authorized by the Civil Service Commission, a lesser investigation may suffice with respect to per diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed outside the United States.

(ii) Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, the investigation will be extended as necessary to enable the Head of the DoD Component concerned, or his designee, to determine whether the employment or retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national

security, or whether further actions are necessary under the provisions of section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, as implemented herein.

(iii) Investigative reports shall be forwarded by the investigative agency to employing activities, under procedures established by the Head of the DoD Component concerned.

(iv) The employing activity will review the investigative reports to determine whether they contain derogatory information, and, if so, if the information is of a suitability nature as defined in Chapter 731, Federal Personnel Manual, or of a security nature, as defined in Chapter 732 or both. The employing activity will, if possible, make a decision as to employing or retaining in employment on the basis of the suitability information. If it cannot make a decision on the basis of suitability information alone and the decision requires resolution of the security information, the employing activity will refer the case to the Central Clearance Group for appropriate action, as provided in paragraph (e) of this section.

(2) Noncritical sensitive positions. Civilian applicants or appointees to noncritical sensitive positions shall be subject to the investigative requirements as prescribed in DoD Directive 5210.8, "Policy on Investigation and Clearance of DoD Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information," February 15, 1962, but in no event shall these requirements include less than the investigation prescribed in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph: Provided, That as a minimum, a National Agency Check with satisfactory results shall be completed prior to appointment, although in case of an emergency, such position may be filled for a limited period by an individual with respect to whom such investigation, including the National Agency Check, has not been completed; Provided, The request for a National Agency Check has been made and the Head of the DoD Component concerned, or his designee, finds that the delay in appointment pending completion of the investigation would be harmful to the national interest, which finding shall be reduced to writing and be made a part of the records of the DoD Component concerned.

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(3) Critical sensitive positions. civilian shall be appointed to a critical sensitive position prior to the completion with satisfactory results of a background (full field) investigation as defined in DoD Directive 5210.8, "Policy on Investigation and Clearance of DoD Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information," February 15, 1962; Provided, That in case of emergency, such positions may be filled for a limited period by an individual with respect to whom a background (full field) investigation has not been completed if a National Agency Check with satisfactory results has first been completed, and the request for a background investigation has been made and the Head of the DoD Component concerned, or his designee, finds that the delay which may be caused by completion of the investigation would be harmful to the national interest, which finding shall be reduced to writing and be made a part of the records of the DoD Component concerned.

(4) Reinvestigation of incumbents of critical sensitive positions. The incumbent of each critical sensitive position shall, 5 years after his appointment, and at least once each succeeding 5 years, be required to submit an updated personnel security questionnaire to the appropriate security officer of his component, and the Head of the DoD Component concerned shall provide for a review of the personnel security questionnaire, together with the personnel file of the incumbent, previous reports of investigation concerning him, and other appropriate information. A determination then shall be made regarding what further action, if any, is appropriate; for example, whether a check of local police and credit records, a National Agency Check or an updated background investigation may be required.

(b) Referral to Federal Bureau of Investigation. Investigations which develop information indicating that an individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters described in § 156.7(b) (2) through (14), (16), and (18) shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full field investigation.

(c) Security investigation index. This index is maintained by the Civil Service Commission under section 9(a) of Executive Order 10450. In order to comply with section 9(b) of the said Executive order, the investigative agencies which conduct personnel security investigations under this part, shall prepare and submit in triplicate, Standard Form 79 (Notice of Security Investigation) to the Bureau of Personnel Investigations, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C. 20415, on the same day the investigation is initiated. Addition

ally appropriate information concerning each person who has been suspended or terminated under the provisions of section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, will be furnished to the Civil Service Commission.

(d) Custody of investigative information. The reports and other investigative material and information developed by investigations conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, Executive Order 10450, or any other security or loyalty program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall remain the property of the investigative agency conducting the investigations. Such reports and other investigative material and information shall be maintained in confidence, and access to them may be given to other departments, agencies, and components conducting security programs in accordance with the provisions of section 7532 of Title 5, United States Code, under appropriate safeguards established by the Head of the DoD Component concerned.

(e) Central Clearance Group. A Central Clearance Group shall be established by the Head of each DoD Component. The Group shall be composed of personnel who have been selected on the basis of maturity and demonstrated good judgment. The Central Clearance Group shall review all investigative files referred to it under this part and shall make determinations in such cases whether employment or retention in employment in a sensitive position is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. The Group may, in accordance with the policy of § 156.6(b), recommend to employing activities the

§ 156.9

Application of suspension and removal authority to Department of Defense employees.

(a) Suspension from employment. (1) The authority to suspend an employee under the provisions of section 7532 of title 5, United States Code, is based upon a determination that such action is deemed necessary in the interests of national security. This determination is to be made solely by the Head of the DoD Component concerned, or, in the case of the Military Departments, by a statutory official designated by the Secretary concerned.

(2) Normally, suspension action will be accompanied by a letter of charges. However, in exceptional cases in which there is significant evidence of espionage, sabotage, sedition, treason, or subversion, and where the individual's continued employment would pose an immediate threat to the national security, emergency suspension action may be effected without issuing concurrently a letter of charges: Provided, That a letter of charges is issued to the employee within 30 days of the effective date of suspension, which shall be subject to amendment within 30 days thereafter. In such cases, emergency suspension action may also be exercised by subordinate commands. A copy of the suspension action by subordinate commands shall be forwarded directly and promptly to the Head of DoD Component concerned and a copy sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration).

(3) Before issuing a letter of charges, the Head of the DoD Component concerned will forward the proposed action, together with all supporting informa

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