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Persons addressed.-An indictment alleged that the defendant willfully stated to diverse persons: "This is a rich man's war, and it is all a damn graft and swindle. If you do not believe it, just look at the cost of wheat." Held, it does not allege a crime under this act, making it an offense willfully to make or convey false reports or statements with intent to interfere with the success of the military or naval forces, to cause insubordination in the Army and Navy, or obstruct recruiting; since it does not show that the words were communicated to persons whose hearing it was likely to produce the results sought to be avoided. The court said that since the prosecution could draw a new indictment which would not be open to any doubt, it seemed best not to proceed to trial on the one under consideration. United States v. Schutte, 252 Fed. 212.

A laborer, in the presence of other laborers at a construction camp, abused the United States and the President in grossly indecent language. Some of the laborers present were within draft age, but no part of the military or naval forces of the United States was present. No recruiting or enlistment was in process near the camp. Held, the facts presented are not sufficient to establish a willful attempt to obstruct recruiting or enlistment under sec. 3 of this act. United States v. Mayer (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 868.

In the presence of a school-teacher who was in class IV of the selective draft, the president of a district school board refused to display the flag on a schoolhouse, and said that he would just as soon see a pair of old trousers hanging over the schoolhouse as the national flag. It could not be legitimately inferred that the language would cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces, within the meaning of this section. Von Bank v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1918), 253 Fed. 641.

For language constituting an offense, when used to a man subject to military or naval service, see White v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 263 Fed. 17; certiorari denied, 253 U. S. 496.

In a prosecution under sec. 3 of the espionage act for obstructing the enlistment and recruiting service and for causing or attempting to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces, it appeared that in the presence of two forest officers the defendant gave utterance to an indecent outburst because of a fancied grievance against the Government. The forest officers were at the time engaged in recruiting for the Engineer military service. This fact was unknown to the defendant, and the language

used by him was wholly unrelated to such recruiting service. A verdict of acquittal should have been directed. Where words only are relied on, they must be considered in connection with all the circumstances. Doll v. United States (C. C. A. 1918), 253 Fed. 646.

To constitute the offense of attempting to incite disloyalty and refusal of duty in the military service, within the above section, it is not necessary that the persons against whom the defendant's activities were directed should have been mustered into the military service, but it is sufficient if such persons were within the conscription act. Howenstine v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 263 Fed. 1, 4, and cases cited.

That statements made by defendant having a tendency to cause disloyalty on the part of a man subject to call for military service did not have that effect, and that he afterwards attempted to enlist, held immaterial. White v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 263 Fed. 17; certiorari denied (1920), 253 U. S. 496.

The language of this section, making it an offense wilfully to attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States, or wilfully to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service, is broad enough to include statements calculated to produce such results when made in presence of persons not in the military or naval forces, provided they are wilfully made and with the intent specified. Coldwell v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 256 Fed. 805; certiorari denied, 250 U. S. 601.

It is not necessary that the false reports and statements should be made in the presence of persons who are, or are liable to be, selected for military or naval service. Kirchner v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1918), 255 Fed. 301; certiorari dismissed, 250 U. S. 678; Hickson v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 258 Fed 867.

It is not necessary to show any particular person was prevented from enlisting. O'Hare v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1918), 253 Fed. 538; Heynacher v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 257 Fed. 61; certiorari denied, 250 U. S. 674.

While an indictment charging an attempt to cause insubordination in the military service must allege that the words were uttered under such circumstances that they were in the course of events likely to reach members of the military forces, an indictment alleging publication of magazines calculated to cause insubordination and their distribution throughout New York and the rest of the United States is sufficient. U. S. v. Eastman (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 232.

Giving reasons, which at most are but matters of opinion, apparently honestly held. for not subscribing to the Liberty loan bonds and thrift stamps and contributing to the Red Cross fund, when requested for the same in the privacy of one's home and in the presence of nobody but a duly authorized committee, held not a violation of this section. U. S. v. Pape (D. C. 1918), 253 Fed. 270.

Statements made by defendant, in cach case to a single person in the course of a private conversation relating to the World War, held merely expressions of opinion, not in violation of this section. Sandberg v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 257 Fed. 643.

O Military or naval forces."-An instruction that, for the purposes of the statute. the persons designated by the selective service act of May 18, 1917, registered and enrolled under it, and thus subject to be called into the active service, were a part of the military forces of the United States, beld correct. U. S. r. Debs (1919). 249 U. S. 211.

It is not necessary that the persons against whom the defendant's activities were directed should have been mustered into the military service of the United States. It is sufficient if they were within the draft provisions and subject to call. Fairchild r. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 265 Fed. 584; Howenstine v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 263 Fed. 1; Anderson v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 264 Fed. 75: certiorari denied, 253 U. S. 495: Goldstein r. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919). 258 Fed. 908; Coldwell c. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 256 Fed. 805; certiorari denied, 250 U. S. 661; compare U. S. r. Hall (D. C. 1918), 248 Fed. 150. A man within the ages subject to call was a part of the "military forces," though outside the ages then required to register, and though he had tried to enlist and been rejected. White v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 263 Fed. 17; certiorari denied, 253 U. S. 496; compare U. S. v. Mayer (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 868.

It is a violation of this section to make false statements or reports to recruits for the Canadian forces. Such statements tend to interfere with the successful operations of the Canadian recruiting offices authorized in the United States by 2914, 2915, post. Mead v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 257 Fed. 639.

The phrase construed as including the American Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A.

U. S. v. Nagler (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 217; reversed, 254 U. S. -; compare Granzow v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 261 Fed. 172.

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"Recruiting or enlistments service."Recruiting," as used in this section, means the gaining of fresh supplies for the forces, as well by draft as otherwise. Schenck v. U. S. (1919), 249 U. S. 47; U. S. v. Prieth (D. C. 1918), 251 Fed. 946.

The phrase, as here employed, siguifies more than the mere induction into service of identified persons. It means the particu lar governmental function or establishment as a whole, and comprises the means, agencies, and instrumentalities which t adopts, or upon which it relies, to accom plish its object. O'Hare v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1918), 253 Fed. 538; certiorari denied, 249 U. S. 598; Fairchild v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1920), 265 Fed. 584.

State offenses.-Disloyal slanders or libels causing. ог tending to cause, offenses against the State, can be prosecuted only in the State courts. U. S. v. Hall (D. C. 1918), 248 Fed. 150.

A State can make it an offense, inter alia, to utter contemptuous and slurring language about the flag and language calculated to bring the flag into contempt and disrenute, held constitutional and valid, as to offenses committed prior to the amendment of this section by the act of May 16. 1918. Ex parte Starr (D. C. 1920), 263 Fed. 145.

Motion pictures.-A moving picture calculated to sow discord between the United States and Great Britain during the World War held a violation of this section. Goldstein r. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 258 Fed. 908; U. S. r. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of '76" (D. C. 1917), 252 Fed. 946.

Corporations. A corporation is within this section which declares a punishment for "whoever" in time of war wilfully obstructs the recruiting or enlistment service. U. S. v. American Socialist Society (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 223; (1913) 260 Fed. 885; affirmed (C. C. A. 1920), 266 Fed. 212.

Armistice.-The United States did not cease to be at war, on the signing of the armistice with Germany, as respects commission of the offenses under this section. U. S. v. Steene (D. C. 1920), 263 Fed. 130. The war status at the time of the commission of the acts is a material consideration in determining charges of violation of the espionage act. U. S. v. Strong, (D. C. 1920), 263 Fed. 789.

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