[19 S. D. Opinion of the Court-CORSON, P. J. Co. v. Foss, 16 S. D. 162, 91 N. W. 584, in which this court said: "Section 23 of the act relates exclusively to the granting of a license to sell intoxicating liquors at retail within the corpor ate limits of the various cities, towns, and townships of the. state, and requires in each case, as a positive condition prece dent, that the question, 'Shall intoxicating liquors be sold at retail?' be annually submitted to the voters of such municipal corporation, and unless the majority is in favor of such sale, no license can be granted." It is contended by the appellants that the construction of section 23 was not required in that case, and that, therefore, that part of the opinion must be considered as dicta and not binding upon the court. Possibly the case might have been decided without giving a construction to this section, but, upon a review of the question, we are of the opinion that the construction given to the section in that case was clearly correct. It is further contended by the appellants that the construction of the section contended for by the respondents has the effect of making the law of 1897 a prohibition law instead of a license law, and that the term "prohibition" is not used in the title to the act, and the act is therefore unconstitutional; but this contention is not tenable, for the reason that all license laws are in effect prohibitive, in that parties are required to comply with the conditions imposed by the law, and pay the license fee, before they can legally acquire a permit to engage in the business to be licensed, and all parties who fail to comply with these conditions are in effect prohibited from engaging in the same. And such, in fact, is the effect of our present license law. Until the officers are authorized to grant the permits by an affirmative vote of the electors at their annual election, and Dec., 1904] Opinion of the Court-CORSON, P. J. the applicant procures the requisite number of signatures of electors to a petition requesting that such permits be granted, executes and files the prescribed bond, and the applicant is found to be a suitable person to engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquors, he is not authorized to engage in the business. All these requirements constitute. conditions precedent, and must be complied with to authorize the party to obtain a permit. Certain other conditions are required to be complied with in the conduct of the business, not now necessary to be noticed. It is further contended by appellants that, under the construction of the act contended for by the respondents, it is unconstitutional, in that it delegates the power to local communities to prohibit or authorize the sale of intoxicating liquors. But this contention is not tenable, for the reason that the law in controversy is uniform in its operation throughout the state, applies to all persons, and does not leave the question of prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to the towns and cities, as the law itself does prohibit the sale unless the required conditions are complied with. Laws licensing and restricting the sale of intoxicating liquors are quite generally held to be within the police powers of the state, and the Legislature is authorized to exercise the power in such manner, and permit the sale upon such terms aud conditions, as it may deem proper. Mr. Black, in his work on Intoxicating Liquors, in speaking on this subject says: "A local option' law is a law framed for the purpose of prohibiting, or severely restricting, the sale of intoxicating liquors, under penalties, and containing a provision that the several counties, townships, or other divisions of the state may hold elections to determine by popular vote 1 Opinion of the Court--CORSON, P. J. [19 S. D. whether they desire the law to be in force in their limits, and with a further provision that in each case where such election results in favor of the adoption of the law it shall take effect in the district so voting, but that each district rejecting it shall continue to be governed in this respect by the existing laws. But the overwhelming preponderance of authority is to the effect that such a statute, if it is a complete enactment in itself, requiring nothing further to give it validity, and depending upon the popular vote for nothing but a determination of the territorial limits of its operation, is a valid and constitutional exertion of the legislative power." Black on Intoxicating Liquors, § 45. In section 46, that learned author further says: "In the exercise of its undoubted power to regu late the traffic in intoxicating liquors, the Legislature of a state may lawfully provide a system for the granting of licenses to sell at retail, and may impose such restrictions and conditions upon the granting of such licenses, and as to the. qualifications necessary to secure them, and may provide such causes for the forfeiture and revocation of licenses, as it may deem necessary and proper 'If the state has power to prohibit, it certainly has the power to regulate the traffic by determining who and what character of persons shall be licensed to deal in the article. Having full and complete control over the subject, as an article of internal commerce, the state can prescribe what conditions it may think proper upon which licenses can be obtained. It becomes simply a question of degree of prohibition.'" The author cites a very large number of authorities in support of the text, including the following: Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620; People v. Meyers, 95 N. Y. 223; Com. v. Dean, * ་་ 110 Mass. 357; State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364, 19 Am. Rep. 536; Paul v. Gloucester County, 50 N. J. Law 585, 15 Atl. 272, 1 L. R. A. 86; Anderson v. Com., 13 Bush. 485; Feek v. Blooming, dale, 82 Mich. 393, 47 N. W. 37, 10 L. R. A. 69; Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 397, 41 N. W. 746, 3 L. R. A. 355; Ex parte Lynn, 19 Tex. App. 293; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 3574 py. These conclusions lead to the affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court granting the writ of prohibition and the same is affirmed. 1. The provisions of Laws 1897, pp. 210, 211, c. 72, §§ 11, 16, declaring it unlawful for dealers in intoxicating liquors to sell to persons intoxicated, ror in the habit of getting intoxicated, and giving a right of action to a married woman for damages from the sale of intoxicating liquors," are restrictions and regulations of the sale, and therefore within the title "An act to provide for the licensing, restriction and regulation of the * * sale of * business of the * * * intoxicating liquors," and so not violative of Const. art. 3, § 21, providing that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. 2. Evidence in an action for loss of support for plaintiff from liquor sold her husband by defendant held sufficient to sustain a finding of actual damages. 3. Evidence in an action for loss of support for plaintiff from liquor sold her husband by defendant held sufficient to sustain a finding that the liquor was the cause of the husband's suicide. 4. Evidence, in an action for loss of support from intoxicating liquor sold by defendant to plaintiff's husband, that she had a child dependent on her for support, is competent. 5. Evidence, in an action for loss of a husband's support from intoxicating liquors sold him, that he had a shop of his own, was a competent barber, and when sober furnished proper support for his wife and child, is competent. 6. Where sale of intoxicating liquors to plaintiff's husband resulted in and was the proximate cause of his death, plaintiff may recover damages sustained by loss of support caused by his death. 7. It is immaterial that plaintiff's husband was sober when he committed suicide, if the suicide was the result of his previous intoxication from liquor sold him by defendant. 8. In the absence of request for such an instruction, defendant in an action for loss of support from intoxicating liquor sold by him to plaintiff's husband cannot complain of failure to instruct that plaintiff could not recover damages by reason of her husband's death unless the jury were satisfied his death was caused by intoxicating liquors furnished him by defendant. 9. Defendant's requested instruction, in an action for loss of support from intoxicating liquors sold plaintiff's husband, that if the jury find the husband took his own life at a certain time plaintiff may not recover for loss of support thereafter, does not suggest or call for an instruction that she cannot recover damages by reason of his death unless the death was caused by the intoxicating liquors. (Opinion filed December 21, 1904.) Appeal from circuit court, Minnehaha county; Hon. JosEPH W. JONES, Judge. Action by Mary Garrigan against Samuel Kennedy and others. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. ed. Affirm Robertson & Dougherty and Kittredge, Winans & Scott, for appellants. Chapter 72 of the Session Laws of 1897, entitled: "An act to provide for the licensing, restriction and regulation of the business of the manufacture and sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors," is unconstitutional and void because in con |