effect, or to remove any bar which might stand in the way of any claimant receiving money on account of pension under the act of June 27, 1890.

In the case of United States v. Teller (107 U. S., 64-68), the

court say:

Pensions are bounties of the Government, which Congress has the right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall at its discretion.

What more has Congress done by the joint resolution under consideration than to remove the bar to receiving money on account of pension under the act of June 27, 1890, which was raised by section 4716, Revised Statutes? It can not be gained from the language used that Congress intended that the prohibition of section 4716, Revised Statutes, should stand until July 1, 1902, and then be removed. The only conclusion that is warranted from the language used is, that in claims under the act of June 27, 1890, section 4716, Revised Statutes, shall not apply, just as was held by the Bureau in cases arising under the acts of 1877 and 1892, above referred to.

The question of the effect of the acts of March 3, 1877, and August 1, 1892, on claims filed before their passage, has never, so far as has been ascertained, been before the Department for decision on that issue. It is true that in the case of Andrew J. Passons (8 P. D., 416), it was stated that the act of August 1, 1892, was not retroactive, but an examination of the issue raised on appeal clearly discloses that such issue was whether a widow could revive a claim which had been rejected before the death of her husband, he having no ground of appeal during his lifetime. The right of a widow under the law is to complete a pending claim, and as the claim of her husband had been rejected on then tenable grounds, and relief was not granted by act of Congress until four years after his death, his claim was not pending within the meaning of the statute which gives her the right to appear before the Pension Bureau to complete it. That was all that should have been said in the opinion, the issue being satisfied at that point. It follows, then, that all that was said in the opinion about the retroactive effect of the act of August 1, 1892, was the merest dictum, and not to be given any controlling weight in future cases that might arise under said act.

The resolution in itself makes no provision for pension, nor does it provide any means by which a pension may be procured. It does declare that the act of June 27, 1890, "is held and construed to include all persons and the widows and minor children of all deceased persons, subject to the limitations of said act," which could mean no other than the act of June 27, 1890. One of the limitations of said act is that pension shall commence from the date of filing the application in the Pension Office after its passage. If a new declaration is required after the passage of the joint resolution from the date of filing of which

pension shall be made to commence, what shall such declaration contain? The resolution expresses no terms in which it may be couched, and as the resolution refers only to the act and is subject to its limitations, it is manifest that a declaration could contain only the essentials required by the act of June 27, 1890. This claimant has a declaration on file under said act. Where in the resolution or the act is there a requirement, expressed or implied, that a claimant should file two declarations making the same allegations?

Did Congress intend by the resolution to change conditions of title to pension under the act of June 27, 1890? No such intention can be gained from the language used. Counsel in their appeal have discussed at some length the question of the retroactive effect of the joint resolution. In a certain sense it may have a retroactive aspect, and while Congress clearly has the power to pass a statute regarding pensions having a retroactive effect (Sedgwick on Stat. Constr., par. 202; Black's Const. Law, chap. 22; United States v. Teller, 107 U. S., 64), yet if the resolution simply removes a bar to the payment of money on account of pension, the effect is to place this claimant in the same position, as régards his title to pension, that he was in at the date he was dropped from the rolls, with the prohibition or bar removed.

This point may be illustrated by a reference to the acts of Congress with regard to desertion. (See acts of August 7, 1882, July 5, 1884, May 17, 1886, and March 2, 1889.) At the dates of the passage of the above acts certain soldiers had filed claims for pension under the provisions of the general law, which claims were rejected by the Bureau on the showing from the records of the War Department that they stood marked as deserters. Not having been discharged from the service they had no title to pension. After the passage of the abovementioned acts the claimants went to the War Department with their proof, and in many cases the charges of desertion were removed as of certain dates, and thereupon they prosecuted in the Pension Bureau their original claims, filed long before the passage of said acts, to a successful issue.

The analogy between a claimant who was barred from pension under the general law because of desertion, and one who was barred under the act of June 27, 1890, because of disloyalty, is striking. It could not be held that a statute removing the bar of desertion was a retroactive pension statute, any more than the joint resolution could be considered as making pensionable title under the act of June 27, 1890, retroactive. This claimant's title was complete so far as the act of June 27, 1890, was concerned, when he was dropped from the rolls on the grounds of disloyalty. When his disloyalty was no longer a bar to the payment of money on account of his pension, his title was the same as before, except that he had a legal right to receive the money on account of such pension.

Suppose that the joint resolution in question had repealed section 4716, Revised Statutes, outright. The section being a general prohibition against the payment of money on account of pension to any person who voluntarily engaged in or aided or abetted the rebellion. against the authority of the United States, could there be any doubt that on its repeal all claimants, no matter under what law they had filed their claims and without regard to the date of filing the same, if the only bar to the admission of their claim was said section, would be entitled to pension from the date of filing, provided, of course, that the law under which they filed contained such a provision? Is there any essential difference between a repealing statute and one which declares that the bar shall no longer apply to claimants under a certain act? So far as that act is concerned the law raising the bar is to all intents and purposes repealed. At all events, it no longer stands as a bar, and if a claimant's title was complete in all other respects, the removal of the bar clearly has the effect of restoring him to his original status under the act of June 27, 1890, if his claim was under said act that of a claimant entitled to pension from the date of filing his claim under that act.

In 1836 a similar question to the one under consideration in this case was before the Attorney-General of the United States for his opinion.

On January 25, 1828, an act was approved containing the following provision:

That no money hereafter appropriated shall be paid to any person, for his compensation, who is in arrears to the United States until such person shall have accounted for and paid into the Treasury all sums for which he may be liable.

* * *

Under the above act it was held that a pensioner who was in arrears to the United States should not receive his pension money until such arrears were fully accounted for.

On May 20, 1836, Congress passed the following act:

That the act entitled “An act to prevent defalcation on the part of the disbursing agents of the Government, and for other purposes," approved the 25th of January, 1828, shall not be construed to authorize the pension of any pensioner of the United States to be withheld.

Some doubt as to the effect of this law upon moneys that had been withheld from pensioners from the date of the approval of the act in 1828 up to the passage of the above act-that is, whether moneys that had been withheld during said period should now be repaid to the pensioners, or if they should receive their pension commencing from the date of the passage of the last-named act-arose in the adjudication of claims in the Pension Bureau, and the matter was referred to the Attorney-General, who on June 27, 1836, rendered the following opinion (Op. Atty. Gen., vol. 3, 135):

It appears from the communication of the Commissioner of Pensions, inclosed in your letter of the 25th instant, that doubts have arisen as to the meaning of the act

P. D.-VOL. 13-02-17

of the 20th of May, 1836, explanatory of the act entitled "An act to prevent defalcations on the part of the disbursing agents of the Government, and for other purposes," and that my opinion is therefore desired on the following questions: "Shall the amount heretofore withheld from a pensioner under the act of the 25th of January, 1828, be refunded? And if not, at what time shall the explanatory act take effect?"

In answer to these inquiries I have the honor to state that in my opinion the intention of Congress in enacting the explanatory law of the 20th of May, 1836, was to place the claims and rights of pensioners on precisely the same footing as if the act "to prevent defalcation, etc.," had never been passed, and consequently that all moneys due to pensioners which have been and yet are withheld under the construction heretofore given under that law, and for that reason only, ought to be refunded to them. The explanatory law takes effect from its date; but its operation, in respect above mentioned, is in some sense retrospective.

No comment is necessary on the above case, as its application to the question raised by the appeal in this case is clear. The joint resolution approved July 1, 1902, takes effect from its date, but its operation is in some sense retrospective. The said resolution places those who have been claimants or pensioners under the provisions of the act of June 27, 1890, on precisely the same footing as if section 4716, Revised Statutes, had never been passed.

It is true Congress has used the words "and section forty-seven hundred and sixteen, Revised Statutes United States, is amended accordingly." Certainly the act of June 27, 1890, was not amended by that language, and if it were to be held that the effect was to amend section 4716, Revised Statutes, it would only be so amended that it should no longer stand as a bar to the payment of pension to "all persons" who come within the terms of the act. In any view that may be taken of the language used the intent is found to be ever the same-the removal of the bar raised by section 4716, Revised Statutes. The language of the resolution in question, read in the light of statutes in pari materia and in view of the object to be attained by it, as disclosed by the history of the act of June 27, 1890, and its relation to section 4716, Revised Statutes, clearly means that the removal of the bar of said section was intended by Congress to apply to all claimants coming within the limitations of the act of June 27, 1890, and the latter act must now be read and treated as though the resolution had been enacted at the date of its passage. Since the passage of the act of June 27, 1890, no vested rights could have intervened, and the joint resolution is in its nature remedial, and standing by itself, could be given no effect as a statute granting pensions.

The joint resolution in question is not a granting act, and by its terms is limited to the act of June 27, 1890, and Congress having removed the bar to the payment of money on account of pension, which bar was heretofore applicable to claims under said act, by the passage of said joint resolution, nothing remains but to carry into effect the results that flow from such a removal.

The question as to whether claimants who come now and seek to secure the benefits of the said resolution should file some sort of a paper, claim, or declaration, as a means of identification, or for other purposes, is one of practice and administration, and purely within the province of the Pension Bureau to determine, but the date of commencement of pension under the said resolution is another matter. The action of the Bureau in commencing this claimant's pension from the date of a declaration filed after the passage of the joint resolution approved July 1, 1902, was error. This claimant has title to pension, if at all, under the act of June 27, 1890, and his right to restoration to the rolls must be determined in accordance with the provisions of that act, now read as though section 4716, Revised Statutes, had never applied to it.

The question of continuance of disability, or other questions that may arise in the readjudication of the claim, are to be determined in accordance with such rules as the Commissioner of Pensions may prescribe.

The action of the Bureau in this case, from which the appeal was filed, is reversed, and the papers are returned herewith for a readjudi cation of the claim in conformity with this opinion.

DISLOYALTY-JOINT RESOLUTION OF JULY 1, 1902–SECTION 4716, R. S.CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-RETROSPECTIVE LAWS.

MARY W. CRAIG (WIDOW).

The first section of the joint resolution of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, considered in its relation to the second and third sections of the act of June 27, 1890, and section 4716, Revised Statutes.

Held: That the first section of said joint resolution has no effect, either retrospectively or prospectively, to change, alter, or modify the conditions of pensionable title prescribed by the second and third sections of said act; it removed only the prohibition of payment contained in section 4716, Revised Statutes, title being still based on and determinable under said sections. The act of June 27, 1890, provided for the date of commencement of pension thereunder; the joint resolution did not alter such provision in any particular, and a claimant for pension under said act, if entitled, should be paid from the date provided by the act of June 27, 1890.

Assistant Secretary F. L. Campbell to the Commissioner of Pensions, March 16, 1903.

Mary W. Craig filed in the Pension Bureau on March 20, 1895, an application for pension under the provisions of the third section of the act of June 27, 1890, as widow of Zebulon Craig, late a private in Company L. Second Arkansas Volunteer Cavalry, alleging that said soldier had served for more than 90 days in the above-named organization during the war of the rebellion, had been honorably discharged from said service, and had died on January 9, 1895, leav