1812. YARBOROUGH against ENGLAND. right to the corporation, and the trespass was alledged in the corporation. They then pleaded as bailiffs in aydant: but it was adjudged they could not be bailiffs aiding to a trespass, "nor could they give warrant with- The Bank of "out writing to commit a trespass;" which implies that by proper writing, namely, by deed under their common seal, they might. In the present case, which is after verdict, it must be presumed that a competent conversion was proved; and if it be essential to such conversion that there should have been an authority from the company under seal to detain the notes on their behalf, that such authority was proved. The fact, by reference to my notes, is that it was admitted that the bank detained the notes in question, under an indemnity; and as no objection was taken to the terms of the admission, a competent detention, i. e. through the means of servants properly authorized to detain on their behalf, was thereby admitted; and therefore the presumption of due proof, after verdict, is in effect warranted by the facts of the case, if it had been material, which it by no means is, to resort to them. In the case of The King v. John Biggs, 3 P. Will. 419., it was made a question upon a special verdict in a case of capital felony, for erasing an indorsement upon a bank note, whether a person intrusted and employed by the Governor and Company of the Bank of England to sign notes on their behalf, was competently authorized for that purpose, not having been, as the special verdict expressly found, so entrusted and employed under their common seal. There is a long and learned argument of the reporter, Mr. Peere Williams, in which the authorities, as to what acts a corporation may do by their servant without an authority under their common seal, are drawn together. The majority of the judges 1812. YARBOROUGH The Bank of judges who sustained the conviction must have been of opinion that an authority under their common seal was not essentially necessary for such a purpose; indeed according to the report in 1 Stra. 18. of the same case, the doubt of the judges must have turned upon another point, namely, upon the import of the word indorsement, (i. e. the writing alleged to be erased ;) and whether it could be satisfied by an erasure of what was written on the face of the note. As to which Sir John Strange in his report says, "That it was held by all the "judges that the defendant was guilty; for the writing 66 on the face of the note was of the same effect as an "indorsement, and being introduced by the Company "instead of writing on the back, and always accepted "and taken to be an indorsement, was within the "words of the indictment." The objection of the want of authority under the common seal is not even noticed in the report of this case by Sir John Strange. However, if there would have been any thing in the objection in this case, if made at the trial, there is nothing in it after verdict, when it must be presumed, as I have already stated, that all the competent proof which could be made in support of the action was made, and of course that an authority under seal for the detention of the notes was proved, if such proof were at all necessary. Rule discharged. GRAY GRAY against COOKSON and CLAYTON. THIS HIS was an action of trespass, in which the first count of the declaration charged that the defendants assaulted the plaintiff, and without reasonable or probable cause committed him to the house of correction, and kept him there until he sued out a writ of habeas corpus, by which he was removed from thence to and before the Court of K. B., and was afterwards by that Court discharged from the imprisonment; by means of which he was injured in his business of a woollen draper, and put to expense, &c. There were other counts, stating the assault and imprisonment more generally. The defendants (who were justices of the peace, acting as such in this transaction,) pleaded the general issue. 1812. Monday, June 1st. 20 G. 2. c. 19. The stat. s.4.empowering upon complaint justices of peace made on oath by any master against his apprentice for any misde meanor, miscarriage, or ill behaviour in his service, to hear and determine repealed by justices to prentice absenting himself from his master's service to serve out, after the expiration of the apprenticeship, such time of absence, or to make satisfaction for it; and in default of such satisfaction, to commit the apprentice: for the remedy given to the master by the latter statute is cumulative to the punishment inflicted on the apprentice by the former statute for his offence. The statute 5 Eliz. c. 4. avoiding all indentures of apprenticeship other than for seven years, is to be construed as rendering indentures made for a less time voidable only, and not void. But such indenture cannot be avoided by the mere act of an apprentice absenting himself from his master's service, which is an offence under the stat. 20 Geo. 2. c. 19. And generally it seems that no act can be relied on as such an avoidance, in an action of trespass against the convicting magistrates, except it appears on the face of the conviction. So a refusal of the apprentice to return into the service of his master, when urged to it by the magistrates themselves in the course of the inquiry upon the complaint of the master, on a prior absenting himself by the apprentice from the service, is not available in support of such action against the conviction. But where the master had agreed by indorsement (unstamped) on the indenture to cancel it, " provided the apprentice made no engagement or entered into any person's service in the town of N.;" it was held that the apprentice setting up a trade for himself in N. was a breach of the condition, which entitled the master to recal him back into his service. It seems also that if a conviction be good upon the face of it, the production and proof of It at the trial will justify the convicting magistrates under the general issue in an action of trespass, as well in respect of such facts therein stated as are necessary to give them jurisdiction, as upon the merits of the conviction. But the stat. 43 Geo. 3. c. 141., extends to protect magistrates against actions of trespass only in the case of a conviction quashed; giving to the party grieved a remedy by action on the case. At 1812. GRAY against COOKSON, and Another. At the trial before Chambre, J. at Newcastle, the plaintiff, a woollen draper, at Newcastle, after proving the regular notice to the defendants of the process, and the service of it within the time limited by law, proved the habeas corpus writ directed to the keeper of the house of correction, tested the 23d of January 1810, by virtue of which he was brought up before this Court, with the original warrant of his commitment for one calendar month, as an apprentice, for having absented himself without his master's consent. This warrant had been issued by the defendants, whose signatures to it were admitted; and on the production of it, this court had before discharged the plaintiff. But it also appeared that after the first warrant of commitment had been delivered with the plaintiff to the keeper of the house of correction, on the 17th of January 1810, he had received another warrant of commitment on the 20th, and that he had both those warrants at the time of his bringing the plaintiff before this Court in obedience to the habeas corpus; but that in consequence of advice by the plaintiff's attorney, he had only produced to the Court the first warrant. It was also proved that when the parties were before the magistrates on the 17th of January, previous to the commitment, Spencer, the master of the apprentice Gray, insisted upon his return into his service for the remainder of his term; and that on the plaintiff's part it was insisted, that the indenture which had been laid before the defendants was at an end. That Mr. Cookson, the mayor of Newcastle, then asked the plaintiff if he would return into Spencer's service; and he refusing, the first warrant of commitment was filled up and executed, and the plaintiff was sent away in custody. At the close of this evidence it was objected, on the part of the defendants, that 1812. GRAY against COOKSON, that an action of trespass was not maintainable since the st. 43 G. 3. c. 41. (a) which protects magistrates from actions in this form for mistakes committed by them in the execution of their duty: but the learned Judge, and Another. doubting whether the statute extended to this case, where there had been no conviction quashed, but the party had been discharged on the ground of the illegality of the warrant of commitment, issued without any information on oath in the presence of the party so committed, directed the cause to proceed; with liberty to the defendants to move the Court to enter a nonsuit. Thereupon the defendants called a witness, who produced the conviction (hereafter stated), which he also proved to have been drawn up and signed on the 10th of August 1810, after the commencement of this action, which was on the 16th of July preceding. It was also proved that Spencer, the master, was sworn to the truth of his information, upon his application to the magistrates, before the plaintiff was apprehended upon the warrant then granted. That when the plaintiff was brought before the magistrates, he was informed of the nature of the charge made by Spencer against him, of absenting himself from his master's service; but neither of the witnesses would swear that any oath was administered to Spencer in the presence of the plaintiff, though one of them believed that it had, and spoke with certainty to the fact that the former information was read over to the plaintiff, and the indenture was then produced by Spencer, and the indorsement on it was pointed out. And it was also in proof that the plaintiff, at the time of the complaint made, had a shop in New(a) See the case of Massay v. Johnson, 12 East, 67, where a similar question arose upon this act. castle, |