Blazinski vs. Perkins. he should have to take it out, and that the scaffold was all right without it. There was also testimony that a fellowworkman, on the scaffold with the plaintiff, knocked off with a hammer a stay-brace at some other part of the scaffold, and that these defects caused the scaffold to fall, and that it fell soon after the said stay was removed. There was some evidence tending to show that the scaffold was overloaded with brick. After working on this platform three or four hours, it fell and carried with it the plaintiff, his fellow-workman, and an attendant, and injured the plaintiff very seriously. The jury found a verdict for the defendant. On this appeal from the judgment the learned counsel of the appellant assigns several errors of law, which will be disposed of in their order. 1. It seems that the foreman of the carpenters who put up the scaffold made a model of it, and such model was used by the witnesses of the defendant to illustrate to the jury how it was constructed. There was testimony that it was a correct model of the scaffold, but this was disputed by the plaintiff. It was not formally introduced in evidence, but the jury were allowed to take it to their room. This is assigned as error. The model became a necessary part of the witnesses' testimony, to go to the jury as such. It was not used as independent testimony of the real construction of the scaffold, but only to explain the testimony of the witnesses. This court very recently decided that an unrecorded plat of lots might be used in the same way, and might be formally introduced in evidence, and used by counsel on the argument. Meinzer v. Racine, 74 Wis. 166. The model so used and taken by the jury was only to show what the witness testified to, and would not corroborate the testimony in the least. It would be like a pencil drawing made by a witness on the stand, in the presence of the jury, to illustrate or explain his oral evidence. The use of the Blazinski vs. Perkins. model in this way seems to have been proper. See the authorities cited in the above case. 2. The witness Horde, the foreman, testified that when they were about to put in that brace the plaintiff said: "No use putting in that, because, if he put it in, they would take it out; no need of it; was in their way." The witness added: "My men told me he [plaintiff] said so." The plaintiff's counsel moved that the above testimony of the witness be stricken out as hearsay, and the court denied the motion. This testimony was explained as follows: The witness Horde did not understand English, and, when the plaintiff said this to them,— that is, to the witness and two other persons who were making the scaffold,- he asked one of the others what he said, and he translated it to him as above, in the presence of the plaintiff. It follows, then, that the plaintiff said this to Horde through an interpreter. When so translated, the plaintiff tacitly assented to its correctness. It was no more hearsay than any evidence given through an interpreter. 3. The court instructed the jury, in effect, that if any of those working on the scaffold with the plaintiff, negligently overloaded the scaffold with brick, which caused it to fall, it would be the negligence of a fellow-employee, for which the plaintiff could not recover of the defendant. This is claimed to Le erroneous, and the learned counsel of the appellant cites authorities which show that the fact that some one else besides the defendant contributed to produce the injury would not be a defense. But in all such cases the person who thus contributes is a stranger, not connected with the plaintiff as a fellow-servant or co-employee, as in Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co. 60 Wis. 141. The persons working on the scaffold were the plaintiff, another brickmason, a carrier of brick, and a carrier of mortar, engaged in the same work and employed by the same person. There can be no question but that they were co-employees, and, if the plaintiff was injured through their negligence, the de Blazinski vs. Perkins. fendant is not responsible to the plaintiff for it. This has been too often decided by this court to require authorities. The court stated hypothetically the facts which would make them co-employees, and then stated the law applicable to such facts correctly. 4. The court, in instructing the jury, said: "The testimony tended to show that there were two hundred bricks or upwards on the scaffold." This was not erroneous, as claimed by the counsel. There was testimony that there were from 200 to 250 bricks on the scaffold when it fell, and that such a number was not necessary. 5. The learned counsel asked the court to instruct the jury that “a mere suggestion of the plaintiff that he thought the middle brace was not needed would not excuse the defendant for not putting the same in its place, if it was necessary to make the scaffold safe." This instruction was refused, and very properly, for it was not applicable to the case made by the evidence. The plaintiff did not make a mere suggestion that it was not needed, but he told the carpenters not to put it in, and that if they did he would take it out, and that it would be in his way, etc. There are some other exceptions to the instructions on the ground that the court misstated the evidence to the jury. The court in every instance stated only that the defendant claimed the evidence to be so, or that it tended to prove certain facts, or if they should so find,- the common form of instructions. They do not seem to be liable to the criticisms made on them. The verdict seems to be sustained by the evidence, and it does not appear that the court committed any errors of law on the trial. By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Sherman vs. The Menominee River Lumber Co. SHERMAN, Respondent, vs. THE MENOMINEE RIVER LUMBER COMPANY, Appellant. April 30-May 20, 1890. Master and servant: Injuries from defective machinery: Special verdict: Court and jury. 1. In an action for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defects in an edger through which the plaintiff was engaged in running lumber, the jury found that the edger was out of repair, but to the question, "Was the want of repair of the edger a cracked or broken roller or rollers, or rollers that were worn out of proper form by use?" they merely answered "Yes." The complaint alleged that one of the rollers was cracked and broken, but did not allege that they were worn out of proper form by use, and there was no evidence that such was the case. Held, that such indefinite and uncertain answer could not aid in supporting the judgment. 2. To the question whether the defendant's agents knew that the edger was liable on occasions to throw back with great force planks and boards that were passing through it, the jury answered that there was no proof upon which they could base an answer to that question. Held, that this was equivalent to a negative answer and should have been received as such, and that it was error to send the jury back, after causing to be read to them portions of the testimony of one witness, but omitting other material portions and other testimony on the same subject. 3. In the absence of evidence as to whether the defendant's agents knew of plaintiff's inexperience and ignorance of the dangers connected with the machinery, the jury cannot be permitted, in deciding the question, to rely upon mere inference, conjecture, and their own personal experience. 4. A question as to whether, if the plaintiff had known that under certain circumstances boards were likely to be thrown back from the edger, he could have avoided the injury, being based entirely upon a hypothetical state of facts which the plaintiff insists did not exist, should not have been submitted to the jury. 5. A special verdict which does not determine all the material and controverted facts in issue, is defective, and if it is unaccompanied by a general verdict, such defect is not waived by a failure to object to the questions submitted or to request the submission of others. Sherman vs. The Menominee River Lumber Co. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Marinette County. The following statement of the case was prepared by Mr. Justice CASSODAY: This action is brought to recover damages by reason of personal injury sustained by the plaintiff, October 9, 1883, while in the employ of the defendant, in its saw-mill in Marinette, and while engaged in handing boards to another servant of the defendant, who was then engaged in feeding the edger in said saw-mill, by being suddenly struck by a board on his right thigh with such force as to crush and break the same, and make it necessary to amputate his right leg, which was done on that day. The complaint alleges two causes of action, and the first is to the effect that the defendant and its managing agents negligently provided and used an unsafe, defective, and insecure edger, and which defect consisted, among other things, in not being properly set up and held together,— that is to say, that the roller above the board, and which propelled the board against the saw, was so carelessly and negligently attached that it often became raised or thrown up by a small piece of bark or splinter coming from the board, so as to loosen its hold thereon and allow it to be thrown back when it struck the saw; that the lower roller was cracked and broken so that a heavy board would bend it down, and thus allow the board to be thrown back violently when struck by the saw. The second cause of action, as therein alleged, is to the effect that the defendant, well knowing of the plaintiff's youth and inexperience in all matters relating to saw-mills and the dangers therewith connected, negligently and carelessly set him at said work, which at all times and under all circumstances was extra hazardous and dangerous, without notifying or cautioning him of such danger, or showing him how to avoid the same. The answer admits the corporate existence of the defend |