Argument for Appellee.

198 U.S.

act, State v. Bixman, 162 Missouri, 38, but that decision cannot be sustained by the cases cited. See Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445, 455; Brewing Co. v. Terre Haute, 98 Fed. Rep. 330; Ex parte Jervey, 66 Fed. Rep. 957; Re Bergen, 115 Fed. Rep. 339; Brewing Co. v. McGilivray, 104 Fed. Rep. 258.

Mr. Edward C. Crow, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, and Mr. William M. Williams for appellee:

The Supreme Court of the State has held the law to be constitutional, and it is not open to appellant to question its validity upon the ground of any supposed conflict with the state constitution. State v. Bixman, 162 Missouri, 1.

This court will follow the highest court of the State in questions involving the construction of the state constitution.

The only question here is whether the act violates the Federal Constitution; in determining that, the Federal courts will adopt the construction given to the statute by the Supreme Court of the State. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452.

The "Wilson Bill" puts intoxicating liquors shipped into a State within the police power of such State immediately upon their arrival. Such liquors do not stand upon the same footing as other articles of interstate commerce, and authorities touching the latter are inapplicable, since the passage of said bill, to the former. The State may prescribe the terms and conditions upon which such liquors may be sold, even in original packages, and, in the absence of discrimination against the products of other States, such regulations are valid. Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438; Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445.

The act is a police measure, is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, and comes within the express terms of the "Wilson Bill." 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., 592; Black on Intox. Liq. §55; Kurth v. State, 86 Tennessee, 134; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662; State v. Hudson, 78 Missouri, 365.

It cannot be that this is not a tax upon the privilege or business on the ground that the right to engage in the business

is given by another statute. It was still within the power of the legislature to impose additional conditions and burdens upon the privilege of carrying on the business. It is not necessary that all the regulations of the liquor traffic should be contained in one statute. State v. Luddington, 33 Wisconsin, 107; Kurth v. State, 86 Tennessee, 134.

Complainant, after the passage of this act, was not authorized to sell beer by virtue of a license granted to it under other statutes, unless it also complied with the requirements of this law.

The right to manufacture and sell intoxicating liquors is not a natural right and may be granted or withheld by the legislature. Cases cited supra; Black, §39; Austin v. State, 10 Missouri, 591; State v. Bixman, 162 Missouri, 1. The legislature may impose what conditions it sees fit. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Danville v. Hatcher, 44 S. E. Rep. 723; Tragresser v. Gray, 9 L. R. A. 780; Ex parte Sikes, 24 L. R. A. 774; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 587.

If appellant's contention, that under the guise of an inspection law, the state statute simply imposes a specific tax upon beer for general revenue purposes, was correct, still there is nothing in the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution to prevent such tax. Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; Am. Steel Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500; Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. 10.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The Pabst Brewing Company, a Wisconsin corporation, filed its bill in the court below to enjoin the beer inspector of the State of Missouri and his assistant from collecting or attempting to collect an inspection charge, fee, license or burden, which it was alleged the law of Missouri imposed upon beer or other malt liquors when shipped from other States into Missouri, after its delivery within that State to the consignee, and when held for sale for consumption in Missouri or for shipment to other States. The general ground upon which the law was

assailed was that the exactions complained of were regulations of commerce repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. It was in addition specially averred that so far as the law imposed a charge on beer shipped from Wisconsin into Missouri, and held there by the consignee for sale and shipment for consumption in other States, the Missouri law was repugnant to the commerce clause, because in this particular it discriminated in favor of beer manufactured in Missouri and held for sale or shipment for consumption in other States.

The bill was amended and demurred to. Whilst the court considered the law not to be in conflict with the commerce clause on the general grounds alleged, it nevertheless concluded, because of the averment concerning discrimination as to beer shipped into Missouri for reshipment to other States, that the demurrer could not be sustained. 120 Fed. Rep. 144. An answer was thereupon filed, as also a replication, and subsequently the cause was submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts.

The Supreme Court of Missouri having decided that the law in question did not provide for any charge or burden upon beer or other malt liquors shipped into Missouri and held there for reshipment to points outside of the State, the court below, adhering to its previous opinion as to the general averments of the bill, and applying the construction given by the Supreme Court of the State to the statute, held that it did not discriminate, and dismissed the suit.

The law of Missouri in question is entitled "An act creating the office of inspector of beer and malt liquors of the State, and providing for the inspection of beer and malt liquors manufactured and sold in this State." The provisions of the act essential to be considered may be summarized as follows:

It creates the office of beer inspector, to be appointed by the Governor, who shall be an expert beer brewer, and who is required to furnish a bond, and is given power to appoint the necessary deputies to execute the provisions of the act. The act forbids every person or corporation engaged in brewing

within the State from using any material or chemical in the manufacture of beer or other malt liquors other than pure hops or pure extract of hops, or barley, malt, or wholesome yeast or rice. It is provided that the inspector or his deputies shall keep a record of those engaged in the manufacture, brewing and sale of malt liquors within the State and of the quantity manufactured or sold, and shall make a full report to the Governor concerning the same, and imposes upon the officials named the duty of inspecting all beer or other malt liquors manufactured or sold within the State, to see that they conform to the standard of purity which the law requires. The act further imposes an inspection fee, charge or license, accompanied with provisions for a label or stamp to be affixed upon the packages containing the beer or other malt liquors so manufactured or offered for sale within the State.

Concerning beer or other malt liquors manufactured outside of the State of Missouri and shipped into that State for sale and consumption within the State, after delivery and receipt under the shipment, the act provides as follows:

"SEC. 5. Every person, persons or corporation who shall receive for sale or offer for sale any beer or other malt liquors other than those manufactured in this State shall, upon receipt of same, and before offering for sale, notify the inspector, who shall be furnished with a sworn affidavit, subscribed by an officer authorized to administer oaths, from the manufacturer thereof, or other reputable person having actual knowledge of the composition of said beer or other malt liquors, that no material other than pure hops or the extract of hops, or pure barley, malt or wholesome yeast, or rice, was used in the manufacture of same; upon the receipt of said affidavit the inspector shall inspect and label the packages containing said beer or malt liquors, for which services he shall receive like fees as those imposed upon the manufacturers of beer and malt liquors in this State."

In the printed and oral argument at bar all the contentions concerning discrimination are waived, and the sole ground

relied upon is the assertion that the statute constitutes a regulation of commerce and is hence repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.

Brevity and clearness in the consideration of the propositions relied upon to sustain the contentions made will be subserved by fixing at the outset exactly what the statute does and by stating the legal principles which are controlling.

The subject with which the statute deals is beer and other malt liquors. Plainly, it operates upon such liquors only when manufactured in the State or if shipped from other States, after their arrival in the State and when they are held there for sale and consumption therein.

It is provided by the act of Congress, commonly styled the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313, c. 728, as follows:

"That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise."

The scope of this act and the power of Congress to adopt it were passed upon in In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545. The scope of the act was thus stated (p. 560):

"Congress has now spoken and declared that imported liquors or liquids shall, upon arrival in a State, fall within the category of domestic articles of a similar nature."

It was decided that although the act had the effect thus stated it was not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the court saying (p. 562):

'No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at