Opinion of the Court. providing the passenger with a stop-over check when the latter stated to him that he desired to stop off at Olean, (as he had the right to do,) if such check was necessary to enable the passenger to complete his journey to Salamanca. If the jury believed the evidence of the plaintiff in this matter, they were justified in finding negligence on the part of the first conductor. And, upon the case as made by the defendant itself, with reference to what took place between the plaintiff and the conductor who ejected him from the train, leaving out of sight the disputed facts in that matter, it is very clear to our minds that the action of that conductor was unwarranted under the law; and that the charge of the court thereon was as favorable to the defendant as it had the right to demand. The authorities above cited abundantly sustain this view. The reason of such rule is to be found in the principle that where a party does all that he is required to do, under the terms of a contract into which he has entered, and is only prevented from reaping the benefit of such contract by the fault or wrongful act of the other party to it, the law gives him a remedy against the other party for such breach of contract. These observations dispose of the questions raised touching the conversation between the plaintiff and the ticket agent, the rules and regulations of the company in the matter of stop-over checks, the acts of the several conductors in charge of the trains upon which the plaintiff travelled between Binghamton and Salamanca, and the conduct of the plaintiff himself in those transactions. If he was rightfully on the train as a passenger, he had the right to refuse to be ejected from it, and to make a sufficient resistance to being put off to denote that he was being removed by compulsion and against his will; and the fact that, under such circumstances, he was put off the train, was of itself a good cause of action against the company, irrespective of any physical injury he may have received at that time, or which was caused thereby. English v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 66 N. Y., 454; Brown v. Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 51; Philadelphia, Wilmington & Balt. Railroad v. Rice, 64 Maryland, 63. Opinion of the Court. It follows from what we have said that there was no error in the action of the court in refusing to direct the jury, in effect, to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. Neither was there any error prejudicial to the defendant in any part of the charge, above quoted, which the court gave to the jury upon the questions we have been considering. With respect to the instructions requested by the defendant upon these points, which the court declined to give, except as embodied in the general charge, very little need be said. They are as follows: (1) "The regulation of the defendant corporation, that the several conductors of its trains shall require of each passenger a valid ticket or pay the established fare, is a necessary and proper regulation, and if the plaintiff in this case having, as he says, taken defendant's train at Olean for Salamanca, did not, when thereto requested, present to the conductor a valid ticket but only a ticket that had been cancelled, and refused to pay his fare, then the conductor had the lawful right to stop the train at an intermediate station or near to a dwelling house, and put the plaintiff off the train, using only such force as was necessary for that purpose. (2) "The regulation of the defendant that a passenger who desires to stop over at an intermediate station, and resume his passage by a later train, must, before leaving the first train, require of the conductor a stop-over check, is a reasonable regulation; and since in this case it appears by the plaintiff's own testimony that his ticket from Binghamton to Salamanca was cancelled before he left the train, and he did stop over at Olean, an intermediate place, and resumed his passage the next day and presented no stop-over check, but only the cancelled ticket, and refused to pay his fare when requested, and persisted in that refusal, the conductor had the lawful right to stop the train at the intermediate station, as he did, and put the plaintiff off the train." What we have said above virtually disposes of these requests. In so far as they are correct, the substance of them had been given by the court in its general charge, and there was no error, therefore, in refusing to give them in the language Opinion of the Court. requested. Washington & Georgetown Railroad v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554; Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76. In fact, it is much the better practice to refuse to give instructions to the jury, the substance of which has already been stated in the general charge, than to repeat the same charge in different language, although the charge requested may be technically correct as an abstract proposition of law; for a multitude of instructions, all stated in different language and meaning the same thing, tends rather to confuse than to enlighten the minds of the jury. Whether the verdict was excessive, is not our province to determine on this writ of error. The correction of that error, if there were any, lay with the court below upon a motion for a new trial, the granting or refusal of which is not assignable for error here. As stated by us in Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward: "It may be that if we were to usurp the functions of the jury and determine the weight to be given to the evidence, we might arrive at a different conclusion. But that is not our province on a writ of error. In such a case we are confined to the consideration of exceptions, taken at the trial, to the admission or rejection of evidence and to the charge of the court and its refusals to charge. We have no concern with questions of fact, or the weight to be given to the evidence which was properly admitted." 140 U. S. 91, citing numerous cases. It would subserve no useful purpose to go more into detail as to the assignments of error presented. What we have already said virtually disposes of all of them. We think the evidence objected to was properly admitted; that the charge of the court as given was correct, and embodied the entire law of the case; that its refusal to give the instructions requested, under the circumstances, was not error; and that in no other respect, so far as this record discloses, was any error committed to the injury of the railroad company. Judgment affirmed. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. WITTEN. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA. No. 151. Argued January 8, 1892. — Decided February 1, 1892. The stealing of distilled spirits from a distillery warehouse by reason of the omission of the internal revenue officers to provide sufficient locks on the doors affords no defence to an action on the distiller's bond to pay the tax due on the spirits before their removal and within three years from the date of entry. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action brought in May, 1887, on a bond dated January 31, 1884, given to the United States by the defendant Witten as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, in the sum of $261.90, with condition that the principal should pay, or cause to be paid, to the collector of internal revenue for the fourth collection district of Virginia the amount of taxes due and owing on certain distilled spirits (described) "which were deposited during the month ended January 31st, 1884, and entered for deposit in the distillery warehouse No. 3, of A. S. Witten, at Plumb Creek, in the fourth collection district of Virginia, on the 31st of January, 1884, before such spirits shall be removed from such warehouse, and within three years from the date of such entry." One breach alleged in the declaration, and denied in the plea, was that at the date of the bond Witten had on deposit in his distillery warehouse ninety-three gallons of distilled spirits in two barrels, deposited January 30, 1884, and had failed to pay within three years from the date of entry the taxes due thereon. Opinion of the Court. At the trial the deposit of the spirits in the warehouse and the non-payment of the tax were admitted. The defendants offered evidence tending to show that the locks placed on the doors of the warehouse by the revenue officers were at times not such as required by law, and at other times were insufficient and insecure, and the warehouse itself was not a secure building; and that during such times the warehouse was broken open and the spirits stolen. The district attorney requested the court to instruct the jury that if these facts were proved, yet the United States were entitled to recover the amount of the taxes on these spirits. But the court refused so to instruct the jury, and instructed them that the United States were entitled to recover that amount, "unless the jury shall believe from the evidence that through the negligence and default of the officers of the government the defendant lost a portion of the whiskey deposited in the bonded warehouse, then as to the number of gallons so lost by the default or negligence of the agents of the government the defendants are entitled to a reduction of the government's demand at the rate of ninety cents on the gallon." The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the United States excepted to the refusal to instruct and to the instruction given, and sued out this writ of error. By section 3271 of the Revised Statutes, it is enacted that every distiller shall provide at his own expense a warehouse to be situated upon and to constitute a part of his distillery premises, and to be used only for the storage of distilled spirits of his own manufacture until the tax thereon shall be paid, and not to open into the distillery or into any other building; and such warehouse, when approved by the commissioner of internal revenue, on report of the collector, is declared to be a bonded warehouse of the United States, and is to be under the direction and control of the collector of the district and in charge of an internal revenue storekeeper. By section 3274, "every distillery warehouse shall be in the joint custody of the storekeeper and the proprietor thereof;" and shall be securely locked, and shall be opened only in the presence of the storekeeper. And by section 3275, no fence or wall more |