CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.

See REBELLION, 3.

CASES AFFIRMED.

1. As the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence,
and as no request was made for a finding of fact as to the actual fact
of the killing of the seals and the seizure of the vessel, the rulings in
Ex parte Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, are decisive of this case, and it is
followed. The Sylvia Handy, 513.

2. The case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, reviewed and adhered to, and
its application in cases decided in the state courts considered.
v. New York, 517.

Budd

3. Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, cited and followed. Hoyt v.
Latham, 553.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2;
MAILS, TRANSPORTATION OF;
STATUTE, B, 1.

CASES DISTINGUISHED OR EXPLAINED.

1. Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad, 1 Wall. 69, distinguished from
this case. Smale v. Mitchell, 99.

2. The decision in Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418
explained. Budd v. New York, 517.

3. United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389, distinguished from this case.
Dunwoody v. United States, 578.

CHARGE TO THE JURY.

When the trial court has, in its general charge, given the substance of in-
structions requested, there is no error in refusing to give them in the
language requested. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

See JURISDICTION, B, 3.

CITIZEN.

See NATURALIZATION.

COMMON CARRIER.

1. Passengers on railroad trains are not presumed or required to know the
rules and regulations of the company, made for the guidance of its
conductors and employés, as to its own internal affairs. Erie Railroad
Co. v. Winter, 60.

2. Plaintiff bought a ticket in Boston entitling him to a passage over de-
fendant's road. At the time he informed the ticket agent of his wish

to stop off at the Olean station, and was then told by the agent that
he would have to speak to the conductor about that. Between Bing-
hamton and Olean the plaintiff informed the conductor that he wished
to stop over at Olean and the conductor, instead of giving him a stop-
over ticket, punched his ticket and told him that was sufficient to give
him the right to stop over at Olean, and afterwards to use the punched
ticket between Olean and Salamanca. He made the stop, and taking
another train to Salamanca, presented the punched ticket, informing
the conductor of what had taken place. The conductor refused to
take it and demanded full fare. The payment of this being refused
the conductor stopped the train at the next station and ejected him
from it, using such force as was necessary. Held, (1) That he was
rightfully on the train at the time of his expulsion; (2) That the con-
ductor had no right to put him off for not paying his fare; (3) That
the company was liable for the act of the conductor; (4) That the
passenger had a right to refuse to be ejected from the train, and to
make a sufficient resistance to being put off to denote that he was be-
ing removed against his will by compulsion; (5) That the fact that
under such circumstances he was put off the train was, of itself, a good
cause of action against the company, irrespective of any physical in-
jury he might have then received, or which was caused thereby. Erie
Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.

See EVIDENCE, 3.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A. OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. Section 3894 of Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September
19, 1890, 26 Stat. 465, c. 908, which provides that "no letter, postal
card or circular concerning any lottery ... and no list of the
drawings at any lottery
and no lottery ticket or part thereof
. . shall be carried in the mail, or delivered at or through any
post-office, or branch thereof, or by any letter-carrier"; and that no
newspaper "containing any advertisement of any lottery" "shall be
carried in the mail, or delivered by any postmaster or letter-carrier”;
and that "any person who shall knowingly deposit or cause to be
deposited .. anything to be conveyed or delivered by mail in
violation of this section. shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year," is a constitutional exercise of the power conferred upon Congress
by Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution, to establish post-offices and
post-roads, and does not abridge "the freedom of speech or of the

press," within the meaning of Amendment I to the Constitution. In
re Rapier, 110.

2. An ordinance of a city, imposing, pursuant to a Statute of the State, a
license tax, for the business of running any horse or steam railroad for
the transportation of passengers, does not impair the obligation of a
contract, made before the passage of the statute, by which the city sold
to a railroad company for a large price the right of way and franchise
for twenty-five years to run a railroad over certain streets and accord-
ing to certain regulations, and the company agreed to pay to the city
annually a real estate tax, and the city bound itself not to grant, dur-
ing the same period, a right of way to any other railroad company over
the same streets. New Orleans City & Lake Railroad Co. v. New
Orleans, 192.

3. Sec. 3894, Rev. Stat. as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, 26
Stat. 465, c. 908, is constitutional, under the decision in Ex parte
Rapier, 143 U. S. 110. Horner v. United States, No. 1, 207.

4. The statute of New York of May 26, 1881, (Laws of 1881, c. 361,)
imposing a tax upon the corporate franchise or business of every cor-
poration, joint-stock company or association incorporated or organized
under any law of the State or of any other State or country, to be com-
puted by a percentage upon its whole capital stock, and to be ascer-
tained in the manner provided by the act, when applied to a manufactur-
ing corporation organized under the laws of Utah, and doing the greater
part of its business out of the State of New York, and paying taxes in
Illinois and Utah, but doing a small part of its business in the State of
New York, does not tax persons or property not within the State; nor
regulate interstate commerce; nor take private property without just
compensation; nor deny to the corporation the equal protection of
the laws; nor impose a tax beyond the constitutional power of the
State and the remedy of the corporation against hardship and injus-
tice, if any has been suffered, must be sought in the legislature of the
State. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 305.

:

5. The cases respecting state taxation of foreign corporations reviewed. Ib.
6. The act of the legislature of Michigan of June 28, 1889, (Public Laws of
1889, pp. 282, 283,) fixing the amount per mile to be charged by rail-
ways for the transportation of a passenger, violates no provision in the
Constitution of the United States, so far as disclosed by the record in
this case.
Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman, 339.
7. A legislature has power to fix rates for the transportation of passengers
by railways, and the extent of judicial interference is protection against
unreasonable rates. Ib.

8. Courts should be careful not to declare legislative acts unconstitutional
upon agreed and general statements, and without the fullest disclosure
of all material facts. Ib.

9. Whenever, in the pursuance of an honest antagonistic assertion of rights
there is presented a question involving the validity of any act of any

legislature, State or Federal, and the decision necessarily rests on the
competency of the legislature to so enact, the court must determine
whether the act be constitutional or not; but it never was the thought
that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the leg-
islative act. lb.

10. An act of the legislature of New York (Laws of 1888, chap. 581) pro-
vided that the maximum charge for elevating, receiving, weighing and
discharging grain should not exceed five-eighths of one cent a bushel;
and that, in the process of handling grain by means of floating and
stationary elevators, the lake vessels or propellers, the ocean vessels or
steamships, and canal boats, should only be required to pay the actual
cost of trimming or shovelling to the leg of the elevator when unload-
ing, and trimming cargo when loading; Held, that the act was a legit
imate exercise of the police power of the State over a business affected
with a public interest, and did not violate the Constitution of the
United States, and was valid. Budd v. New York, 517.

11. Although the act of New York did not apply to places having less than
130,000 population, it did not deprive persons owning elevators in
places of 130,000 population or more, of the equal protection of the
laws. Ib.

12. Although it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without his consent, that principle has no
application to a suit by one government against another government.
United States v. Texas, 621.

13. The exercise by this court of original jurisdiction in a suit brought by
one State against another to determine the boundary line between
them, or in a suit brought by the United States against a State to
determine the boundary between a Territory of the United States and
that State, so far from infringing, in either case, upon the sovereignty,
is with the consent of the State sued. Ib.

14. The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by
the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an
official attestation by the two Houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress; and when the bill thus attested receives the approval of the
President, and is deposited in the Department of State according to
law, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is complete
and unimpeachable. Field v. Clark, 649.

15. It is not competent to show from the journals of either House of
Congress, that an act so authenticated, approved and deposited, did
not pass in the precise form in which it was signed by the presiding
officers of the two Houses and approved by the President. 1b.
16. Congress cannot, under the Constitution, delegate its legislative power
to the President. lb.

17. The authority conferred upon the President by section 3 of the act of
October 1, 1890, to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports,

and for other purposes, 26 Stat. c. 1244, pp. 567, 612, to suspend by
proclamation the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and
hides, when he is satisfied that any country producing such articles
imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other prod
ucts of the United States, which he may deem to be reciprocally
unequal or unreasonable, is not open to the objection that it unconsti
tutionally transfers legislative power to the President, (FULLER, C. J.,
and LAMAR, J., dissenting ;) but even if it were it does not follow that
other parts of the act imposing duties upon imported articles, are
inoperative. 1b.

18. The court does not decide whether the provision in that act respecting
bounties upon sugar (schedule E, Sugar, 26 Stat. 583) is or is not con-
stitutional, because it is plain from the act that these bounties do not
constitute a part of the system of customs duties imposed by the act,
and it is clear that the parts of the act imposing such duties would
remain in force even if these bounties were held to be unconstitution-
ally imposed. Ib.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, ;

JURISDICTION, B, 6;

TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

CONTRACT.

In the interpretation of any particular clause of a contract, the court is not
only at liberty, but required, to examine the entire contract, and may
also consider the relations of the parties, their connection with the
subject matter of the contract, and the circumstances under which it
was made. Chicago, Rock Island &c. Railway v. Denver & Rio Grande
Railroad, 596.

1. Under § 3894 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
tember 19, 1890, c. 908, (26 Stat. 465,) in regard to the carriage of
lottery matter in the mail, it is an offence to cause a lottery circular,