Statement of the Case. George W. as that owned by the estate. The advertisement bears date the 20th of April, 1864, and advertises the sale at public auction for the 10th of May following. This advertisement has already been set forth, and under it squares 95 and 96, known as "Hopkins' brick yard," were with the outfit advertised to be sold as a whole, as was also square 111 with the dwelling-house and other improvements. At the sale the trustees purchased the squares 95 and 96 at 4 cents per square foot; lot No. 1 in square 94 at 10 cents per square foot; and lots 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 39 in square 110 at 8 cents per square foot. George W. bought square 111 at 9 cents per square foot. These purchases were made through one James Chapman, who acted on behalf of the purchasers. Lot 6 in square 94 was sold to August Miller at 13 cents per square foot; lots 2, 3, and 4, at 10 cents; and lot 5 at 14 cents. Lots 8 and 9 in square 110 were sold to James L. Roche at 11 cents per square foot; lots 10 and 24 to Joseph Gawler at 10 cents; lots 36 and 37, with improvements, at $290 apiece; lots 41, 42, 43, and 44 to W. C. Longstreth at 63 cents per square foot. On May 20, 1864, the property in question was conveyed by the trustees to James Chapman, and he on the same day conveyed to George W. and John S. Hopkins the squares and lots purchased by them jointly, and to George W. the square purchased by him alone. The deeds were recorded November 16, 1864. The consideration in the conveyance to Chapman was merely nominal, one dollar, while the considerations in the deeds from him recite as paid by the grantees the price for which the property was purchased at the sale. On August 23, 1864, the orphans' court passed an order appointing September 13, 1864, as the time for the final settlement and distribution of the personal estate of the testator, and notifying his devisees and heirs to attend the court on that day. The copy of the order was published in accordance with the direction of the court in the National Intelligencer nine times, commencing August 24 and ending September 12, 1864. It appears by the minutes of the court that on March 28, 1865, the register of wills reported to the court the first and final account of the executors, and the same was approved and Statement of the Case. passed by the court, and it was ordered that "the executors aforesaid make distribution of the assets in hand to the heirs in accordance with the provisions of the will of the deceased." This account treated the moiety of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate, including the sale of May, 1864, as partnership property to be accounted for in the orphans' court as personalty. In the account the executors charged themselves with the amount of the inventory, a policy of insurance, certain sums paid for slaves emancipated in the District, and some items of interest, etc. The debit account amounted to $24,155.59, and contained this item: "And with this amount, being one-half the earnings of firm of J. & G. W. Hopkins in conducting the brick kiln, owned in part by deceased, from the day of his death to date of rendering this account, first deducting the expenses of the family of deceased and other expenses, directed by the will of said deceased to be defrayed out of said earnings, and also the value of deceased's interest in said firm, as per affidavit filed with vouchers, $14,952.66." The credits amounted to $2024.13. No commissions were charged, and the balance shown was $22,131.46. This was followed by a distribution account, which, after deducting $8 fees from the balance $22,131.46, and $782.60 paid out on specific legacies, there was left $21,340.86, which was distributed among the eight surviving children of the decedent, namely: Isaac H. Hopkins, John S. Hopkins, Elizabeth A. Early, George W. Hopkins, William M. S. Hopkins, Emeline V. Lilburn, Mary V. Hopkins, and George W. and John S. Hopkins in trust for Alice C. Hopkins, being the sum of $2667.60 each. This account was filed and recorded March 28, 1865, and passed by order of court. The affidavit and vouchers mentioned do not appear in the record, and it is said that after diligent search they cannot be found. Within a few days after the passage of the order distribution was made, and the receipts of the different parties entitled were delivered by the executors to the register and by him recorded. The share of William M. S. was receipted for by John S.; the share of Alice, receipted for by the executors, was by them held in trust until she attained the age of twenty Statement of the Case. one, and was afterwards paid to her and her husband. After the sale of May 10, 1864, George W. and John S. Hopkins carried on the brick-making business on squares Nos. 95 and 96, and lot 1, square 94, until as late as 1873, and probably as 1875, when George W. died. After his death John S. filed a bill for the partition of the property owned in common, the other lots purchased in common having been sold, and by the decree of the court below of February 27, 1877, lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, in square 95, and lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and 11 in square 96 were allotted to him in severalty. Lot 1 in square 94, and lot 5 in square 95, and lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 in square 96, were allotted to the heirs of George W. Hopkins. Thereafterwards the children and heirs-at-law of George W. filed a bill for the payment of his debts and for a partition of the property allotted to them in the first suit, and also of square 111, where he resided until his death, and a decree was rendered in which a part of the property was sold for the payment of debts, and the remainder allotted to the heirs-at-law in severalty. Nearly all of the lots thus allotted had been sold when the bill in this case was filed. John S. Hopkins, the other trustee, died intestate May 7, 1883. He left a widow, Esther E. Hopkins, and an only child and heir-at-law, Bertha Hopkins, who was at that time 25 years of age. After the partition between John S. and the heirs-at-law of George W., John S. built a row of houses on the lots in square 96 at a considerable cost. None of the property allotted to him in the partition suit was sold by him prior to his death, except the east part of square 95. As already stated, George W. and John Hopkins in 1846 carried on their business on square 67, and in 1869, after the death of John Hopkins, a deed was made by Charles E. Mix to George W. Hopkins and John S., as executors and trustees, for lots 3, 4 and 5 in said square. These lots were sold and conveyed by the executors and trustees, June 18, 1872, for $6784, and of these proceeds George W. received one-half as copartner, or $3392, and the other half was paid over to the beneficiaries entitled, who duly receipted for their respective shares in full of all demands to date. The share of George Argument for Appellees. Washington Hopkins was receipted for by Mary A. Hopkins, his administratrix. June 20, 1860, William M. S. conveyed in fee simple all his interest in his father's estate to his brother John S. for the consideration, as expressed in the deed, of $3000. This deed was also signed by Sarah E. Hopkins, the wife of the grantor, and was acknowledged on the day of its date by the grantor and his wife before two justices of the peace, and recorded July 7, 1860. By deed dated January 28, and acknowledged and recorded January 29, 1864, William M. S. conveyed the same share, with all his property, to Christopher Ingle, in trust for his wife for life, and then over to his children and himself. Mr. Walter D. Davidge, and Mr. George F. Edmunds for appellants. Mr. Sidney T. Thomas and Mr. Henry Wise Garnett were with them on the brief. Mr. Samuel L. Phillips and Mr. Samuel Shellabarger (with whom were Mr. John J. Johnson and Mr. J. M. Wilson on the brief) for appellees. The case was argued mainly on the facts. The following points of law were made in appellees' brief. Long acquiescence and laches by parties out of possession are productive of much hardship and injustice to others, and cannot be excused except by showing some actual hindrance or impediment caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession, which will appeal to the conscience of the chancellor. Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391. Without reference to any statute of limitations the courts have adopted the principle that the delay which will defeat a recovery must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Harwood v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 78. The party who makes such appeal should set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim, how he came to be so long ignorant of his rights, and the means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance, and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill. Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87. Argument for Appellees. It is a principle of law, as well as of natural justice, that greater consideration and care are due to persons known to be unable to take care of themselves, than to those who are fully able to do so. Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180. The office of trustee is important to the community at large, and frequently most so to those least able to take care of themselves. It is one of confidence. The law regards the incumbent with jealous scrutiny, and frowns sternly at the slightest attempt to pervert his powers and duties for his own benefit. Railroad Company v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576. These trustees knew the value of subdivision in securing good prices at the sale, and nevertheless sold square 111 as a whole. Such conduct between trustee and cestui que trust reaches far beyond what was necessary to be proved in this case in order to set the sales aside. When this relation subsists, the slightest obliquity, the slightest indirection is adequate, on grounds of public policy. Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 323; Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 605. Reasonable certainty is all that is necessary in case of fraud. Kempner v. Churchill, 8 Wall. 362; Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1; Rea v. Missouri, 17 Wall. 532; Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180. It was the duty of the trustees in making the sale to exercise that diligence and caution which a careful and prudent owner would observe in the sale of his own property. If the sale be made under circumstances of haste and imprudence, or if the trustees fail in reasonable diligence in inviting competition, or adopt an injudicious and disadvantageous mode of selling the property, a court of equity ought not to ratify the sale. Gould v. Chappell, 42 Maryland, 466; Ord v. Noel, 5 Madd. 438; Harper v. Hayes, 2 Gif. 210; Turner v. Harvey, 1 Jacob, 169; Bridger v. Rice, 1 Jac. & Walk. 73; Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292; White v. Cuddon, 8 Cl. & Fin. 766. Although the rule of law, as now firmly settled, is that a trustee may buy of his cestui que trust, provided there is a distinct and clear contract to that effect, made under such circumstances as indicate that the cestui que trust was aware of the correct value of the property, that the trustee had no |