"Le Ministre de Russie a fait hier une communication de laquelle il résulte que son Gouvernement ne se considère plus comme lié par les stipulations des Traités de 1856."

Le même jour, 17 Novembre, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères répondait à M. de Chaudordy en lui ordonnant la plus stricte extrème réserve. Nous n'avons encore aucune communication officielle, et devions nous borner au rôle d'observateur, sans négliger toutefois de maintenir en toute occasion notre droit formel d'être associé à une résolution qui, sans notre participation, serait absolument dénuée de valeur.

L'Europe ne pouvait pas ne pas le comprendre, et dans les conversations et les notes échangées entre les différentes Puissances et nous, il a toujours été entendu que la France était partie nécessaire à la délibération, et qu'elle y serait appelée.

Je croirais commettre une indiscrétion inexcusable si je révélais aujourd'hui les pétails de ces pourparlers. Notre effort a été de profiter des dispositions bienveillantes qu'on nous y a montrées, et d'amener les Représentants des Puissances à reconnaître que, sans déserter ni diminuer en rien l'intérêt de premier ordre que soulève pour nous la discussion des Traités de 1856, nous avions le devoir, en entrant dans la Conférence, d'y introduire un débat d'une tout autre importance, et sur lequel on ne pouvait nous opposer aucune fin de non-recevoir. Cependant, il faut dire qu'en partageant complétement cet avis, la Délégation de Tours a toujours estimé que nous devions accepter l'invitation de "Europe si elle nous était faite.

Conservant cette opinion, M. de Chaudordy écrivait, dans sa dépêche du 10 Décembre: "La Délégation est d'avis, après avoir examiné toutes les dépêches avec moi, que nous devons aller à la Conférence, alors que nous n'aurions aucune promesse avant, ni un armistice." L'opinion des membres de la Délégation n'a du reste jamais varié. M. Gambetta l'exprime encore avec force dans sa dernière dépêche des 31 Décembre, 1870, et 3 Janvier, 1871. S'adressant au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères il lui écrit: "Vous devez être sur le point de quitter Paris pour vous rendre à la Conférence de Londres, si, comme on me l'affirme, l'Angleterre parvient à obtenir un sauf-conduit. Je me figure les déchirements que vous devez éprouver de quitter Paris et nos collègues.

"J'entends d'ici l'expression de vos douleurs et de vos premiers refus, et cependant, je dois à l'intérêt de notre cause de vous dire qu'il le faut."

Avant que M. Gambetta eut écrit ces lignes, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, suivant, autant que le lui permettaient l'imperfection et les retards des communications, les négociations engagées à Tours, continués depuis à Bordeaux, avait fait connaître à M. de Chaudordy que le Gouvernement avait décidé que si elle y était régulièrement appelée, la France se ferait représenter à la Conférence de Londres, en y mettant toutefois cette condition: que l'Angleterre, qui avait fait l'invitation verbale, voudrait bien se charger d'obtenir le sauf-conduit nécessaire à son Représentant, s'il était choisi à Paris.

Cet arrangement a été accepté par le Cabinet Anglais. M. de Chaudordy en avisait le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par une dépêche en date de Bordeaux, du 26 Décembre, 1870, reçue le 8 Janvier. Il l'informait en même temps que la Délégation du Gouvernement l'avait désigné comme devant représenter la France à la Conférence. Cet communication a été confirmée par la lettre suivante, écrite par Lord Granville le 29 Décembre, et remise le 10 de ce mois, par intermédiaire de M. le Ministre des Etats Unis:

Lord Granville à son Excellence le Ministre de Affaires Etrangères de Paris. "M. le Ministre, "Londres, le 29 Décembre, 1870. "M. de Chaudordy a informé Lord Lyons que votre Excellence était proposée pour représenter la France dans la Conférence qu'on est convenu de tenir à Londres, concernant la neutralité de la Mer Noire, et il m'a en même temps fait demander d'obtenir un saufconduit qui permette à votre Excellence de franchir les lignes Prussiennes. J'ai immédiatement prié le Comte de Bernstorff de réclamer ce sauf-conduit et de le faire remettre à votre Excellence par un officier Allemand, envoyé en parlementaire.

"M. de Vinetorf m'a fait savoir hier qu'un sauf-conduit serait mis à la disposition de votre Excellence aussitôt qu'il serait demandé par un officier envoyé de Paris au quartiergénéral Allemand. Il a ajouté toutefois qu'il ne pouvait être envoyé par un officier Allemand tant que satisfaction n'aurait pas été donnée par l'officier porteur du pavillon parlementaire sur lequel les Parisiens avaient tiré. Il a été informé par M. Tissot que beaucoup de temps s'écoulerait avant que cet avis puisse vous être transmis par la Délégation de Bordeaux, et j'ai, en conséquence, suggéré au Comte de Bernstorff un autre moyen de la faire parvenir, en profitant de l'occasion qui m'était offerte par le Chargé d'Affaires des Etats Unis pour vous informer de ce qui s'est passé.

"Il a été convenu que la Conférence se réunirait cette semaine, mais pour donner au

Plénipotentiaire Français le temps d'arriver, le jour de la réunion a été fixée au 3 Janvier. J'espère que votre Excellence autorisera M. Tissot à la représenter à la première séance, dans laquelle je ne mettrai à l'ordre du jour que la question de forme, et si votre Excellence est en mesure de m'annoncer son arrivée je proposerai d'ajourner la Conférence d'une semaine, afin d'obtenir le précieux concours de votre expérience.

"J'espère que votre Excellence me permettra de saisir cette occasion de lui exprimer toute ma satisfaction d'entrer en relations personnelles avec elle, et le plaisir que j'éprouverai de la voir à Londres.

Mis en demeure par cette dépêche, le Gouvernement n'aurait pu, sans abdication des droits de la France, repousser l'invitation qu'il recevait en son nom. Sans doute, on peut objecter que, pour elle, l'heure est peu propice à une discussion sur la neutralisation de la Mer Noire. Mais c'est précisément parce qu'à ce moment suprême elle lutte seule pour son honneur et son existence, que la démarche officielle fait auprès de la République Française par les Cabinets Européens acquiert une gravité exceptionnelle.

Elle est un commencement tardif de justice, un engagement qui ne pourra plus être rétracté. Elle consacre avec l'autorité du droit public le changement du règne et fait apparaître sur la scène où se jouent les destinés du monde, la nation libre, malgré ses blessures, à la face du chef qui l'a menée à sa perte, ou des prétendants qui voudraient disposer d'elle. D'ailleurs, qui ne sent qu'admise en face des Représentants de l'Europe, la France a le droit incontestable d'y élever la voix? Qui pourra l'arrêter lorsque, s'appuyant sur les règles éternelles de la justice, elle défendra les principes qui garantissent son indépendance et sa dignité? Elle n'abandonnera aucun de ceux que nous avons soutenus. Notre programme n'a pas changé, et l'Europe, qui convie celui qui l'a tracé, sait fort bien qu'il a le devoir et la volonté de le maintenir. Il n'y avait donc point à hésiter, et ce Gouvernement eût commis une faute grave en repoussant l'ouverture qui lui était faite.

Il n'y a donc plus aucune nécessité à ce qu'un officier Français se rende au quartiergénéral Prussien, et je vais entrer en communication avec M. le Ministre des Etats Unis pour me faire remettre le sauf-conduit que vous avez bien voulu obtenir. Dès que j'aurai cette pièce entre les mains, et que la situation de Paris me le permettra, je prendrai la route de Londres, sûr à l'avance de ne pas invoquer en vain, au nom de nion Gouvernement, le principe de droit et de morale que l'Europe a un si grand intérêt à faire respecter.

Paris, le 10 Janvier, 1871.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé)

JULES FAVRE.

Je vous prie, Monsieur, de vouloir bien donner connaissance à cette dépêche au Représentant du Gouvernement près duquel vous êtes accrédité. Il importe que l'Europe soit éclairée sur nos intentions et sur nos actes; c'est à son équité que nous les sou

THE Government has hitherto deemed it to be its duty to maintain a strict reserve in respect of the negotiations which have been set on foot for a revision of the Treaties of 1856. That such revision, should it be necessary, belongs exclusively to the Powers which were signataries of those Treaties is a truth so evident that it is needless to dwell upon it. There can be no doubt upon the point. Also, when one of those Powers demanded a modification of the Conventions which were equally binding upon all the signataries, the idea of a Conference, at which the question could be discussed, was adopted without difficulty. The place of France in that Conference was marked out. But could she think of occupying it at a moment when she was entirely absorbed by the defence of her territory? Such was the grave question which the Government has had to consider under the circumstances which I am about briefly to recount.

It was by a despatch, dated Tours, 11th November, received in Paris on the 17th, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed, by M. de Chaudordy, of Prince Gortchakoff's Circular. This intelligence was communicated to him by a telegram from our Minister at Vienna in the following terms:

"The Russian Minister yesterday made a communication from which it appears that his Government considers itself as no longer bound by the stipulations of the Treaties

of 1856."

On the same day, November 17, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to M. de Chaudordy by enjoining the strictest reserve. We had up to that time received no official communication, and we were bound to confine ourselves to a policy of observation, at the same time without omitting to maintain on all occasions our formal right to take part in a resolution which, without our participation, would be absolutely devoid of value.

Europe could not misunderstand it, and in the conversations and notes which have been interchanged between the various Powers and ourselves it has always been understood that France was a necessary party to the deliberation, and that she would be invited to join in it.

I should hold myself guilty of an unpardonable indiscretion if I were now to reveal the details of these pourparlers. Our effort has been to take advantage of the friendly dispositions which have been manifested towards us, and to bring the Representatives of the Powers to acknowledge that, without deserting or in any way detracting from the extreme importance which the discussion of the Treaties of 1856 would have for us, yet we were bound upon entering the Conference to introduce yet another discussion of a totally different import which should not be met by a plea of incompetency. However, it must be admitted that, while fully sharing this view, the Delegation at Tours has always been of opinion that we should accept the invitation of Europe if it should be addressed

to us.

Retaining this opinion, M. de Chaudordy wrote, in his despatch of the 10th of December,-"The Delegation is of opinion, after having examined with me all the despatches, that we should join the Conference, even without a previous promise or an armistice." The opinion of the members of the Delegation has never changed. M. Gambetta forcibly expresses it in his last despatches of the 31st of December, 1870, and the 3rd of January, 1871. Addressing the Minister of Foreign Affairs he writes, “You must be on the point of quitting Paris to repair to the Conference at London, if, as I am assured, England has succeeded in obtaining a safe-conduct for you. I can imagine the pangs which you will experience in leaving Paris and our colleagues.

"I can hear the expression of your grief and your early refusals, and yet I owe it to the interests of our cause to tell you it must be so."

Before M. Gambetta had written these lines the Minister of Foreign Affairs, following as well as the imperfection and the delays in communication allowed him to do, the negotiations entered upon at Tours and continued afterwards at Bordeaux, had intimated to M. de Chaudordy that the Government had decided that if regularly invited France would send a Representative to the Conference at London, but with the condition that England, which had sent it a verbal invitation, would undertake to obtain the necessary safe-conduct for its Representative if he were selected in Paris.

This arrangement was accepted by the English Cabinet. M. de Chaudordy informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of it in a despatch, dated Bordeaux, December 26, 1870, received on the 8th of January. He informed him at the same time that the Delegation of the Government had appointed him to represent France at the Conference. This communication was confirmed by the following letter written by Lord Granville on the 29th of December, and transmitted to us on the 10th of the present month through the medium of the United States' Minister :

"Lord Granville to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Paris. "M. le Ministre, "Foreign Office, December 29, 1870. "M. Chaudordy having informed Lord Lyons that your Excellency proposed to represent France in the Conference agreed to be held in London respecting the neutralization of the Black Sea, and having asked me to obtain a safe-conduct for your Excellency through the Prussian lines, I lost no time in requesting Count Bernstorff to apply for one, and to send it to your Excellency by a German officer with a flag of truce.

"M. de Bernstorff answered me the next day, saying that a safe-conduct would be at your Excellency's disposal as soon as it was asked for by an officer sent from Paris to the German Head-quarters, but that it could not be sent by a German officer until satisfaction was given for the officer bearing a flag of truce who had been fired upon by the French.

"I have been informed by M. Tissot that great delay may occur before your Excellency obtains the information from the Delegation at Bordeaux, and although I

have suggested to Count Bernstorff another means of conveying it, I think it well to avail myself of the opportunity which the American Chargé d'Affaires has been good enough to consent to in order to tell you what has passed.

"It was intended to hold the Conference this week, but, in order to give time to the French Plenipotentiary to arrive, the day of meeting was settled for the 3rd of January. I hope your Excellency will authorize M. Tissot to represent you at the first sitting, when I shall propose that nothing but the question of form be considered, and if, much desire, your Excellency is able to announce your arrival, I will propose to adjourn the Conference for a week in order to obtain the great advantage of your Excellency's presence.

"I trust that your Excellency will allow me to take this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction at entering into personal communication with you, and the pleasure shall feel in seeing you in London.

"I am,

(Signed)

&c.

"GRANVILLE."

Being called upon by the despatch, the Government could not, without abdicating the rights of France, reject the invitation which it received in her name. Undoubtedly it might be objected that, for France, the moment is not favourable for a discussion respecting the neutrality of the Black Sea. But it is precisely because at this supreme moment France is fighting for her honour and her existence that the official proposition made to the French Republic by the European Cabinets acquires an exceptional importance.

It is a tardy commencement of justice, an engagement which cannot be retracted. It sanctions, with the authority of public law, the change of reign, and brings upon the scene where the destinies of the world are being contested the free nation-free despite her wounds in place of the chief who led her to her danger or of the pretenders who sought to dispose of her. Besides, who does not feel that, admitted to face the Representatives of Europe, France has an incontestable right to lift up her voice? Who can arrest her when, relying upon the eternal rules of justice, she will defend the principles which guarantee her independence and her dignity? She will abandon none which we have maintained. Our programme is unchanged; and Europe, who invites those who framed it, knows well that they are bound and are prepared to maintain it. There was no room, therefore, for hesitation, and the Government would have committed a grave fault in rejecting the overture which was made to it.

There is therefore no longer any necessity for a French officer to proceed to the Prussian head-quarters; and I will enter into communication with the United States' Minister with a view to receiving the safe-conduct which you have been good enough to obtain. As soon as I have that document in my possession and the situation of Paris allows of it, I shall proceed to London, confident that I shall not in vain invoke, in the name of my Government, the principle of right and morality which Europe has so great an interest in causing to be respected.

Paris, January 10, 1871.

I beg, &c.

(Signed)

JULES FAVRE.

I request you, Sir, to communicate this despatch to the Representative of the Government to which you are accredited. It is important that Europe should be enlightened as to our intentions and our actions; we submit them to her equity.

No. 197.

Receive, &c. (Signed)

JULES FAVRE.

My Lord,

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 29.)

Bordeaux, January 24, 1871.

I LEARNT this morning by a telegram from your Lordship that Count Bismarck now altogether refuses to give M. Jules Favre a safe-conduct. I thought it right to lose no time in making this intelligence known to the Comte de Chaudordy, in order that the Delegation here might consider what steps they should take respecting the Conference in consequence of this refusal.

M. de Chaudordy observed that he received the information with great regret, but with little or no surprise. For his own part he had, he said, for some time suspected that

Count Bismarck had no intention whatever of allowing M. Favre to go to London. Count Bismarck had not complied with your Lordship's request to him to send a safe-conduct to M. Favre, alleging in excuse the futile and worn-out pretext that Prussian flags of truce had been fired upon. He had then informed your Lordship that a letter had been sent from Versailles to inform M. Favre that he might obtain a safe-conduct on applying to the General of the Third Army. M. de Chaudordy doubted whether any such letter had reached M. Favre. I was quite certain that no allusion whatever to anything of the kind appeared in M. Favre's correspondence with Bordeaux. The letter which your Lordship had written on the 29th of December to M. Jules Favre had certainly not been forwarded with any unusual speed by the Prussian authorities, for it did not reach its destination till late on the evening of the 10th of January. Last of all, M. de Bismarck, having ascertained that the Conference was going on without M. Favre, had distinctly refused the safe-conduct. M. de Chaudordy said, in conclusion, that he would, without delay, write to the French Chargé d'Affaires in London on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

LYONS.

No. 198.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1871.

Sir, I SHOULD wish to hear from you, as soon as possible, whether it is the intention of M. Jules Favre to come to London to attend the Conference. If he does not propose to do so, you should urge him at once to name a substitute, who should be prepared to take his seat without delay as French Plenipotentiary.

No. 199.

I am, &c.

VILI

My Lord,

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.-(Received January 31.)

Bordeaux, January 26, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant, stating the reasons which had made it impossible for your Lordship, considering the urgency of the questions to be discussed, and the uncertainty about M. Jules Favre's leaving Paris, to postpone the Conference any longer.

I spoke to M. de Chaudordy yesterday afternoon in the sense of this despatch, and I said to him in particular that your Lordship would take care to enable the French Chargé d'Affaires to keep his Government fully informed of all that passed in the Conference, in the hope that France, even if no one should go to London to represent her during the sittings, would eventually concur in the conclusions which would be come to by the Plenipotentiaries.

M. de Chaudordy did not enter into a discussion with me upon your Lordship's views. He verv naturally spoke rather of the intelligence which had been received since your Lordship's despatch was written, that Count Bismarck distinctly refused to give M. Jules Favre a safe-conduct. He told me that he was informed by M. Tissot that your Lordship had sent a remonstrance against this refusal to Versailles, and he appeared to be disposed to await the result of this remonstrance before taking any further step.

He said further that a letter which had just arrived from M. Jules Favre stated that a request which he had send to Count Bismarck for a safe-conduct had reached Versailles on the 14th, but that he had received no answer to it, although a reply had been made by General Moltke to a communication from General Trochu sent at the same time.

M. de Chaudordy went on to say that General Trochu's communication informed General Moltke that the Prussian balls had struck an ambulance; and he added that it appeared that, in reply, General Moltke had said that he fired in a fog and could not tell where his balls fell, and that in fact the conduct of the French Government since the 4th of September made it impossible for him to observe the ordinary rules of war.

(Signed)

I have, &c.

LYONS.