remove to the reservation. In fact, the case seems not unlike that of the recent difficulty with the Sioux, which resulted in the war of last year against those Indians.

It is, therefore, of paramount importance that none of the responsibility of any step which may lead to hostilities shall be initiated by the military authorities. You are to Occupy Wallowa Valley in the interest of peace. You are to comply with the request of the Department of the Interior, as set forth in the papers sent you, to the extent only of merely protecting and aiding them in the execution of their instructions.

I am further to state, by the order of the division commander, that if, in your judgment, in taking away the cavalry company from Fort Harney, it is not now prudent to leave the post in charge of the company of infantry, he will send there the company of cavalry from Camp Bidwell; but as this will make it necessary to send up another company to replace the latter, and this from a great distance, requiring time and involving expense, when the amount of the allotinent for Army transportation is low, he wishes to avoid doing so if it is possible.

He desires to hear from you on this point. As this question of the removal of Joseph's band is a very delicate and important one, the division commander directs that it be done under your personal direction, if practicable.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

To the DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,

Department of the Columbia, Portland, Oreg.

SAMUEL BRECK, Assistant Adjutant-General.

April 14, 1877, the Secretary of the Interior sent to the War Department a copy of a letter of March 9, 1877, from Agent Montieth, detailing an interview had by him with "Ollicut," Joseph's brother, pertaining to the removal of the Nez Percés from Wallowa Valley to the Nez Percés reservation. This was referred, through division headquarters, to Headquarters Department of the Columbia, indorsed as follows:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, April 26, 1877.

Official copy respectfully referred to the commanding general Department of the Columbia, through Headquarters Military Division of the Pacific. The General of the Army is of the opinion that the Indian Bureau should resolve to remove the Indians or not according to their interpretation of the treaty, and that the Army should only aid them to execute the resolve when made.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC,
AND DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA,
San Francisco, May 5, 1877.

Respectfully transmitted to the commanding officer of the Department of the
Columbia.
By command of Major-General McDowell.

J. C. KELTON,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENL. DIV. PACFIIC.

May 21st, General Howard telegraphed the following as the result, thus far, of the measures taken in compliance with the foregoing instructions:

PORTLAND, OREGON,

May 21, 1877.

Returned Portland, evening 19th. Non-treaty Nez Percés constrained compliance with order of government. Thirty days allowed to gather scattered people and stock. Location on reservation selected and agreed upon. Troops enough left in vicinity under commander Lapwai to enforce agreement case draw back. Some 500 wanderers from Umatillas and .Yakima agencies still roaming-would join hostiles case outbreak Told them at talk their own seeking government requirement they go upon reservation. Please ask Agent Wilbur be designated by telegram. Indian Bureau co-operate with me for these Indians, as Agent Montieth has well done for Nez Percés. Wish one head. Wilbur best man every way.

May 22, General Howard made a full report of his action in the mat

ter of Joseph's Nez Percés. This report was duly forwarded on its receipt to the headquarters of the Army, June 8, 1877.

June 15, General Howard reported the commencement of hostilities by these Indians.

I am since informed that the immediate cause of this outbreak was different from that reported, and that instead of being a retaliation for a murder of one of their number, it was a deliberate act on the part of some Indian outlaws who had nothing to gain and all to lose by going on the reservation, and who "fired" the Indian heart by deliberate murders, and thus forced the chiefs to go with them. The latter, feeling that they were irretrievably compromised in the eyes of the whites by the dreadful acts of their people, threw themselves into the conflict, the commencement of which they had not sanctioned.

I submit herewith, in addition to General Howard's report, copies of all the telegrams and orders given and received by me bearing on the subsequent operations, marked C.

After Joseph's defeat by General Howard on the 12th of July, there was no longer any question of other Indians joining the former; and the operations subsequently were the pursuit of a mere banditti, who certainly displayed great courage, energy, and enterprise, leading their pursuers many hundreds of miles over a most difficult country, but. who were finally compelled to surrender unconditionally to Colonel Miles, Fifth Infantry, after a sharp and sanguinary engagement, on the 30th of September, not far from the British possessions, after all those who had been engaged in the murders of citizens at the commencement of hostilities had been killed.

General Howard is now on his way back to his department, with the troops of his command which he had taken from it, with the exception of the cavalry, which had been sent back in advance.

The General of the Army having recently passed through the department, and directed the establishment of a new post on the Spokane River and the strengthening of the garrison of Fort Colville, the two companies of the Second Infantry (I and H), herein before reported at camp near Spokane River Falls and the one at Fort Colville, were sent to these stations in compliance with his instructions.

On the return of the troops under General Howard, it is proposed to station four (4) cavalry companies at Fort Walla Walla, W. T., and six (6) companies of the Twenty-first Infantry, at Fort Vancouver. Forts Stevens, Canby, and Townsend are to be artillery posts; but one (1) company of the Twenty-first Infantry (C) will be stationed at Fort Townsend; Company E, (Miller's) Fourth Artillery, which has been a long time stationed at Fort Stevens, will be retained on its return from field-service in the Department of California, for assignment to a station in the harbor of San Francisco.

DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

I send herewith the report of the department commander of the Department of Arizona, with its accompanying papers.

Much, if not all, of the friction heretofore existing in this department between its commander and his officers and the United States civil and Territorial officers will, I think, cease with the changes that have been made since my last report.

I send herewith, as bearing on this subject, a copy of a correspondence with the present governor of the Territory, marked D.

I am obliged, at the risk of seeming importunate, to again say that I

think the interests of the service require that a post be established south of Tucson, as near the Mexican frontier as a good site can be ob tained.

After much correspondence and no little misunderstanding between the company and the military authorities, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company have, under the authority from the War Department, built their road across the United States military reservation at Fort Yuma, and over the Colorado River at that place, and are now running their trains into Arizona.

I send herewith some extracts from reports of various officers, not that I entirely concur in all the views therein expressed, but because the subjects treated upon are of interest, and I think the General of the Army may the better see them in this way, than to have to search for them through the reports from which they are taken. (Marked E. ) I send, also, the reports of the chief of the staffs departments at these headquarters.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, IRVIN MCDOWELL, Major General, Commanding Division and Department.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY,

Washington, D. C.

No. 10.

NOTE.-Report of Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard, commanding the Department of the Columbia, not received in time to be printed in its proper place.

No. 10. A.-Report of Brig. General O. O. Howard of operations against the Nez Percés Indians.

HEADQUARTERS Department oF THE COLUMBIA,

In the field, Camp Ebstein, Henry Lake, Idaho, August 27, 1877.

COLONEL: For the information of General McDowell, and to enable him to mention our operations in his annual report, I will furnish such brief account as I can during an active campaign. I would like the privilege of making a full and connected supplementary report embracing operations of other of my troops than those in this column after my return to my department. You already know the steps that were taken as required by orders to put renegade Nez Percés and other wandering bands of Indians upon their proper reservations.

My efforts in conjunction with Col. E. C. Watkins, the inspector of the Interior Department, and the Indian agents concerned were apparently completely successful on June 14th, the date of my arrival at Lapwai.

The Indians belonging to Joseph, from Wallowa, to White Bird, from Salmon River, and to Looking Glass, from the Clearwater, were then assembled near Cottonwood Creek, on the borders of the Lapwai Reserve. As they seemed to hesitate at the last moment to fulfill the promises made to me thirty days before, I directed Capt. David Perry, First Cavalry, to send small detachment of men thither to observe and bring back report; detachment to start early the 15th. Meanwhile, just at dark, a citizen, Mr. L. P. Brown, gets a letter to me from Mount Idaho, expressing suspicions of Indians keeping faith.

Friday, June 15. The detachment having proceeded part of the way, returns at 12 m., with two Indians, much excited. They report four citizens on John Day's Creek killed. Murderers, three or four in number, had rushed into Indians' camp, and talked excitedly. White Bird mounted his horse, rode around and avowed that the Indians would not go on the reservation. I then go at once with the reporting Indians to Colonel Watkins, and Indian Agent Monteith, at Nez Percés agency. After examination, it seems to have been a private quarrel, according to Indian story. Colonel Watkins sends the head chief and Joseph's father-in-law immediately toward Indian camp. At 4.30 p. m., these Indians, with Mr. West and Looking Glass's brother, returned with

letters from Mount Idaho, one letter dated 7, the other 8 a. m. the same morning. These letters give detailed accounts of massacres already begun. Captains Perry's (F) and Trimble's (H) companies of the First Cavalry, that were by my direction already being prepared from first report of outbreak-these being the only cavalry within reach for the emergency-were dispatched without delay to the scenes of disturbance. They numbered 99 men. As Captain Perry had no officer with his company, unless he took the post quartermaster, Lieutenant Bomus, Lieutenant Theller, Twenty-first Infantry, was detailed to his command. The troops marched all night, found the Indians gone from Cottonwood, so proceeded on to Grangeville, and thence, after an hour's rest, through the next night to the head of White Bird Cañon. Having made a forced march of upwards of 70 miles, with the loss of two nights' sleep, they came in sight of the Indian camp, a few miles below in the cañon.

Assisted by eleven volunteers from Mount Idaho, Captain Perry proceeds at once to assault the Indians, that everybody expects are hastening with all speed to cross the Salmon. Unexpectedly the assault is not successful. The Indians turn the left flank of the command, and with more than double Perry's numbers force him to retire from his position and to return fighting all the way to Grangeville. His losses are 33 enlisted men and one commissioned officer, Lieutenant Theller, killed. This battle occurred, as I have indicated, the 17th of June. I refer to Captain Perry's report for a detailed account of the engagement. More than twenty people on Camas Prairie, White Bird Creek, and vicinity, had been reported as murdered, accompanied in several cases with horrible outrage, so that the terror and excitement in the whole community were extreme. This precipitated the encounter, and I have only high commendation for the conduct of Captain Perry and his officers for an effort that deserved better results. He remained with his remnant at Grangeville till re-enforced and resupplied. Meantime at 5 p. m., June 15, I start my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant M. C. Wilkinson, to telegraph orders from Walla Walla, W. T., and to send dispatches to Wallowa by messenger, so as to concentrate at Lewiston a sufficient force to make the effort successful beyond doubt against the treacherous bands now combined.

Friday, June 22d, having assembled at Lapwai Whipple's (L) and Winters's (E) companies of cavalry, that had marched over 200 miles in 6 days, Pollock's (D), Eltonhead's (I), Miles' (E), Jocelyn's (B), Haughey's (H) companies of Twenty-first Infantry, and Miller's Company E, of Fourth Artillery, armed as infantry, making au effective force for the field of 227 men, I deemed it best to take the field at once in person, so as to operate carefully till the remainder of my troops could be concentrated and brought up.

From the direction the Indians were taking, and from information, I saw the necessity of interposing some force at once between the renegade Nez Percés and the Weiser Indians. This was to be done by organizing a force at Boise City under Major Green, First Cavalry, and moving it to Weiser River. He was to draw his forces from Boise and Harney and looked to General McDowell for re-enforcement from the military division. Bendire's company, First Cavalry, was sent direct from Harney to the Weiser country and was in position on the 29th of June, in season to effect the object desired. The other troops, of which I shall hereafter speak, three companies of cavalry and three of infantry, were more slowly brought together from great distances, so that Green did not commence his northward march from Boise until the 10th of July. My immediate command arrives at Norton's ranch, 43 miles, the 23d of June. The 24th I send Trimble's small company to re-enforce a few citizen families that were protecting themselves on State Creek by a temporary barricade. I hoped that this post at State Creek would check the Indians in that direction, serve to occupy their attention, preventing further outrages there and beyond, while I was moving on them more directly. The 25th I moved my command by two routes to Johnson's ranch, some 4 miles from the head of White Bird Cañon. The 26th with my whole force I make a reconnaissance into the cañon and beyond Captain Perry's battle-field.

Captain Page, with some twenty volunteers from Walla Walla, that had joined me at Lapwai, moved along the crest of the mountain-ridge on the right of White Bird Cañon, till he came in sight of the country beyond the Salmon. He discovered and reported the enemy in force. After burying the dead found on the battle-field (Perry's) and in the ravines leading to the rear, we returned to camp.

June 27th and 28th marched to the crossing of the Salmon, about a mile and a half above the mouth of White Bird. The second force, Throckmorton's M, Rodney's D, Bancroft's A, and Morris's G, companies of Fourth Artillery, and Burton's C, company Twenty-first Infantry, collected at Lapwai, here joined the advance, making in all an effective force of 400 men. In the afternoon Indians charged to the river, a brisk skirmish ensued, after which they left the valley for the heights beyond.

The 29th Lieutenant Miller, First Cavalry, is sent with trains to Lapwai for supplies, and is escorted by Captain Perry's company and Page's volunteers returning home. The Salmon River is at this time high and the current very swift, so that it takes all day of July 1st to cross the command. Captain Trimble gets over opposite his position on State Creek. The evening of the 29th positive information is obtained

that Looking Glass, who, with his people, had stood aloof from the hostiles, had been furnishing re-enforcements to them of at least twenty warriors, and that he proposed to join them in person with all of his people, the first favorable opportunity.

His grounds for cultivation lay near the mouth of the south fork of the Clearwater, supposed to be about 40 miles from our present position. With a view of preventing the completion of this treachery, I sent Captain Whipple, commanding his own and Winter's companies, and the Gatling guns, with instructions to make a forced march, surprise and capture this chief and all that belonged to him.

Captain Whipple made the march, finding it at least 10 miles longer than anticipated, and did not make his attack until next morning. With a short parley and a brisk skirmish the Indians escaped. Between six and seven hundred ponies were captured and the Indian lodges destroyed. The loss of the ponies and the attack unfortunately had the effect to give prompt re-enforcement to those who were fighting, and caused me some disappointment.

Whipple's command the evening of the 1st of July reached Grangeville, where he received an order from me to march to Norton's ranch, on the Cottonwood, where Captain Perry's company, returning with supplies, was to join him the 3d.

The object of this movement was to meet the enemy and hold him in check should be anywhere attempt to recross the Salmon and turn upon my communications, which he would probably do as soon as I crossed and pursued him, since the report of Bendire's position kept him from going south, while my troops and those at State Creek hindered a return on the front and left.

The 2d of July we ascended the mountain after forming junction with Captain Trimble's command, now consisting of his own company and McConville's twenty volunteers. Another small company of mounted volunteers under Captain Hunter had joined me from the vicinity of Dayton, W. T. The ascent was by a blind trail, exceedingly steep and difficult, and rendering a march of not more than 10 miles equivalent to three times as much on an ordinary road.

A heavy rain followed by thick clouds so impeded the command that several packmules were killed by rolling down the mountain, and the greater part of two days spent in completing the ascent. Several caches of Indian supplies were found about half way up and destroyed. Abundant Indian trails showed which way the enemy had gone, viz, toward our right. The first destination, whether by Canoe Encampment to Snake country, or to one of the lower crossings of the Salmon, is yet uncertain. Beside finishing the march the 3d of July, a reconnaissance is made by Lieutenant Fletcher, my aid-de-camp, for 10 miles.

The 4th we reached the vicinity of Rocky Cañon. Here news is brought me that the enemy, probably part of his force joining Looking Glass, had recrossed the Salmon and turned back, crossing my communication beyond Norton's; that Captain Whipple had sent out Lieutenant Rains and ten men in advance of his own reconnaissance on thed; that Rains, with the ten brave men, had been ambushed and all killed; that there was also fighting on this day when the couriers left.

I sent Hunter's and McConville's volunteers immediately by the way of Rocky Cañon to re-enforce Whipple's, now Perry's, command; the latter having reached Cottonwood one day later than expected.

Captain Whipple had made a prompt and gallant movement toward Lapwai, succeeding in bringing in the supplies with Perry's escort in safety, though surrounded by 300 Indians. It was the next day after the arrival of Captain Perry that 17 citizens (volunteers), having started of their own accord from Mount Idaho to re-enforce the cavalry, were attacked by the Indians en route, losing their captain and several men killed and wounded, not far from Norton's. Complaint has been made that our troops were slow in going to their rescue. Captain Perry, whose gallantry at the White Bird battle is undenied, has demanded a court of inquiry. I shall receive the official reports and the investigation of the court, and will forward them as the best record and judgment. I may say, however, that reasonable caution under the circumstances, in the presence of a superior force of the enemy, was to be expected.

The reason I did not cross my whole force immediately at Rocky Cañon was that I believed from the reports that the enemy was making only a raid, and that his main camp, with women, children, and plunder, was yet on or near the Snake River. Therefore I deemed it best, with my foot-men and Trimble's company, to pursue his main trail.

The 5th of July brought us to Craig's Ferry, where it became evident that all the Indians had passed back and taken the trail toward the Cottonwood, 16 miles distant. At first I hoped by a prompt crossing to join Perry and throw my whole force upon the enemy before he could reach the Clearwater or pass my front to Wallowa, if such were his intention; but having no boats, a raft had been constructed from the timber of a cabin near the ferry.

Our first attempt the morning of the 6th to cross the river, here a perfect torrent, lost us our raft, which tumbled down the rapids at a swift rate, with all on board, for three or four miles.