end thereof," "the end aforesaid " emphasized by this repetition, refer to the end mentioned in the preamble. The end of the school is the end, for which liberty is given to "erect" it. That is thus stated in the act: "To the intent therefore that all due incouragement be given to such pious resolutions [of the petitioners], and that so necessary and religious an undertaking may be set forward, supported, and well managed, Be it enacted." The undertaking was therefore a "religious" one in pursuance of "pious resolutions" previously stated.

The desire and design or resolution of the petitioners was to uphold and propagate "The Christian Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men," through the instrumentality of a collegiate school "wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences, who through the blessing of Almighty God may be fitted for public employment, both in Church and Civil State," that is by means of a Christian, Protestant College. In no other way could the object of the petitioners and founders, the object of the act be accomplished. If a part of the preamble be suppressed or treated as suppressed or omitted, the conclusion may be less obvious. Youth are to be instructed in a collegiate school, who through the blessing of God may be fitted for public employments in Church and State, but how fitted? By an education in such a Christian, Protestant institution as has been mentioned. Would a Roman Catholic college conform to the requirements of the charter? Why not? Would an agnostic or deistical college? Or a college in which there were no religious instruction or religious exercises? These questions have been already answered. The Christian character is written upon the structure of the college by the designation of ten ministers of the gospel solely to organize and manage it, and by the provision that their associates and successors shall also be ministers of the gospel, public teachers of Christianity. In all the changes of the corporation a majority of the successors of the original trustees has been carefully preserved and of course the power of ultimate control by them for the purposes of the charter, if it should ever become necessary to exercise it to preserve the college from being diverted from those purposes. Such character is also written upon the whole history of the college.

The usage is not to be answered by calling it tradition, as if it were a mist which would disappear before the rising sun. It is an usage based upon a construction of the charter and only traditional in the sense that it has been continued for one hun. dred and eighty-two years. Since the charter was granted, property has been given (and undoubtedly was before) in trust for the use of such Christian, Protestant college, a large part of which would not have been given if the college had not been of this description. It ought never to be necessary to inquire whether the trust can be legally enforced. It is binding in honor and conscience. Not only upon the members of the corporation but upon the graduates, who have had the use of such property and upon the legislature and people of Connecticut. Religious instruction is not less required, because there is now a school of theology, connected with the college, unless the intellect only should be educated and the heart and conscience neglected. That was not the view and intention of the founders. Our own opinion is, that in a complete education the whole nature, moral, mental, and physical, in due proportion, should be trained and educated, and that character, not in an indefinite sense, but, moral character, is more important than intellectual superiority, though we would not in the least depreciate that. It is not thought that the undergraduates should not be instructed in the principles of civil government and the elements of jurisprudence, because there is a school of law, however excellent it may be, connected with the college.

We assume that in our former article we have sufficiently shown that the charter was not repealed but amended by the act of 1745, and that the provisions, which make the college a Christian, Protestant college, and that relating to vacancies in the office of trustee, remain unrepealed and in full force; but our eyes are open to the light. If, however, on the subject of reconstruction any one cannot see the difference between that act and the act of the New Hampshire legislature, invading the rights of Dartmouth College, declared unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court of the United States, the difference of eye-sight cannot be remedied by reasoning. That there have been many cases of the reconstruction of corporations, and of

the incorporation of voluntary societies, which are not cases of reconstruction, has no tendency to prove that in this case "the spiritual body" of the trustees (Dr. Woolsey, Hist. Dis., p. 101), was, as alleged, entirely reconstructed.

A curious and amusing argument in favor of the repeal of the provision as to the supply of vacancies is drawn from an erasure. It appears that the draught of the bill presented by the petitioners to the General Assembly, is on file among the archives of the State, and that in this draught after the words "elect and appoint a president or fellows in the room and place of," were first written, "him or them yt. shall remove out of the colony," but that these latter words had been struck out. Now it is said that this draught appears to be in the handwriting of Gov. Fitch, that he probably copied it from President Clap's draught as far as he approved of it, and that copying these words he wrote them down, but as soon (why as soon?) as he had done it he struck them out by drawing his pen through them. Had he not read and considered the draught which he revised? What evidence is there that the words were in the original draught, which he revised? Experts even under oath make great mistakes as to handwriting, but the handwriting of an erasure, by drawing the pen through words, must be peculiarly difficult. It is entirely uncertain by whom the erasure was made. The draught, as revised, must have been returned for approval. It is agreed, and this only seems certain, that the erasure was made before the draught was adopted by the trustees or presented to the legislature. The supposition that Governor Fitch, not then but in 1753 governor, at first saw no objection, and so wrote down the words, which implied that the provision in the charter was not repealed, and that he afterwards thought it would be repealed by the act and struck them out, is a pure piece of imagination. If Governor Fitch or some one else struck them out, he (or the trustees) may have concluded that a fellow who removed out of the colony, would of course resign, having no longer one of the qualifications required by the charter, or that the office would be ipso facto vacated by the removal, or that having removed to another province or abroad, and formed new connections, and the journey to the college being long and expensive, he

would soon not desire to continue in office, or become subject to removal for "unfaithfulness, default or incapacity," or that when ministerial settlements were for life with a legal support, the contingency of removal and a refusal to resign, was too remote to require a provision, for which experience had shown no necessity, as it has shown none since, or there may have been some other reason.

But who ever heard of a rule of law, that the construction of a statute can in any degree be determined by the changes made during the preparation of a bill by petitioners to be presented to a legislature, or by what occurred in the consultations between them and their counsel? So remarkable a proposition requires authorities for its support. Even in contracts where the parties remain the same, all prior negotiations are merged in the contract. What certainty would there be in the law, if it rested at all upon facts of which the only knowledge might lie in the breast of the petitioners or, under the seal of confidence, of his counsel, to be disclosed at pleasure? An erasure in a bill presented to the legislature, is not read to it, known to it, acted upon by it, and forms no indication of its intention.

The controversies between the Old Lights and the New Lights in the Congregational and Presbyterian denominations, as to certain forms and phases of Christian doctrine, did not affect their fidelity to the common Christianity, or render either school disposed to make the college other than a Christian, Protestant college, or desirous to remove any security therefor, so that it should no longer be under the control of ministers of the gospel. The argument seems to be that through fear of opposition to the bill, if the provision on the subject in the charter were inserted, the petitioners not only did not insert it but drew their bill, so as to repeal it, or may have acted from this reason. If the provision had been inserted, a successful opposition could only have resulted in an amendment striking it out. No evidence is adduced of any opposition or fear of opposition. No opposition to the bill in its progress appears to have been made, although eleven ministers of the gospel, then trustees, were named in it as president and fellows, with the right of perpetuation, and the only amendment to it made was to make it as to taxation more favorable to the college and its officers.

Where the words of a statute are plain and precise, we are told, resort cannot be had to the title and preamble. This is a fair argument, entitled to consideration. Ordinarily, for sometimes the intention overcomes the letter, where the words of a statute and their meaning are plain and precise, they declare the law and there is no room for construction. So far as the sixth section declares the occasions on which the President and Fellows may elect and appoint to vacancies in their number and the right of removal, the section is clear and precise. . But it is inferred, because in this particular section no class is stated, from which the choice is to be made, that the right of choice is unlimited. This inference is not expressed in words, plain and precise, or at all. If in a previous or subsequent section, the class from which the choice must be made were stated, there would be no inconsistency in this with the sixth section, whereas, if that had said in clear and precise terms that the right of choice was to be without any limitation, there would be a direct contradiction. There is no more inconsistency or contradiction, when the designation of the class is contained in another statute, the charter. It is also inferred that the provision in the charter is repealed, because it is not repeated in this section and a limitation to any class is omitted. But this inference is not expressed plainly and precisely, or otherwise in this section or in the statute. These inferences open the whole subject of construction and resort may be had to the title and preamble and other evidences of instruction, as to the intention of the Legislature, according to the ordinary rules of construction.

The very recent case of People ex rel. Rosenkranz vs. Carr, 86 N. Y. R., 512, in the New York Court of Appeals, gives an useful illustration. The act of 1847 provided for the election of a recorder and surrogate, "who shall hold their respective offices for three years." It is also provided that in case of a vacancy occurring during such term, it should be filled by election for the unexpired part of the term. The act of 1869 provided that "the term of office of the persons who shall hereafter be elected to the office of recorder, city judge, and surrogate, respectively, for the city and county of New York, shall be six years." The terms are absolute and unqualified. No