impotent to coördinate themselves in relation to a precise effect; why should the material condition in the organism be endued with so marvelous a privilege? To say that, given the elements, it is a thing of course, that they form into tissues, and that, given the tissues, it is a thing of course that they form into organs, is to say that, given silk threads, they will arrange themselves into pieces of silk stuff, and that when one has a piece of cloth, it is as if one had a coat. Now, although cloth is fit to form coat, and the threads of the silkworm to form silk stuff, this fitness for a determinate act is not equivalent to the production of the act, and something more is needed. In human industry this motive cause is in us; in the industry of nature we do not see it, but it is as necessary in this case as in the other." (p. 144.)

M. Janet argues that mechanical causation, when applied in the realm of organic nature, is absurd, leading us to deny intelligence to our fellow men. There is no denial of physical causation at this point, but its insufficiency is shown in that it ignores the designing power by which the particular lines of of mechanical causation are alone made possible. The theory of physical causation points out the continuous line of means, and shows their sufficiency for the immediate result, but it cannot tell why and how such a particular chain of second causes arose, how mechanical causation became circumscribed so as to effect that one of an indefinite number of effects which might be effected, how, in short, there is cosmos and not chaos. Physicists can tell us what is, but how that which is becomes possible they can say nothing. At the most they can simply say, that which is, rather than anything else whatsoever, is, by virtue of a blind necessity, and this is really the theory of occult qualities which is now discarded as unscientific. Phys. ical causation cannot account for laws of gravity and form; it does not explain regularities. The discovery of physical antecedents, as for instance, the theory of natural selection, does not explain law of action of antecedents.

We have quoted a passage from M. Janet in which he brought forth the illustration of silk cloth as showing necessity of final causes, and this point might be illustrated by numberless other examples, but let us consider for a moment the case

of a printing press. A person might set forth a very clear theory of mechanical causation for the action of a steam printing press, showing the continuous series of second causes from point to point. This would be an explanation of the mode of action of the press as it is, but it does not tell why there should have been this particular line of second causes known as a printing press. The physical scientist might point out its adaptation to its function of printing through a coördination of second causes, and that this order was gradually evolved; still this does not account for why or how there should come about this particular coördination. The only intelligible way of accounting for it is to suppose that the final function either. ideally or otherwise had determined the line of physical events. Man's works become intelligible only so far as intelligence, design, is put into them. A painting by Turner is an infinitely higher work of design, than a painted sign-board over a shoeshop, because it contains infinitely more thought, and so becomes capable of revealing infinitely more thought to the intelligent student. The intelligibility likewise of nature's works results from their being works of design. We cannot see how a work of man has any intelligibility without design, and undesigned nature would by analogy be a chaos. Human design employs means, is dependent upon mechanical causation, but it directs and manipulates physical causation. In the order of nature definite ends are effected through a concatenation of means which cannot come about by chance, but is intelligible only as we understand a designing intelligence behind all. The progress from "an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity " is a thought progress.

"God geometrizes," and man, being a geometrizer, can fol low God's thoughts. That which occupies our thinking power in the intensest measure must have had its origin in a thinking Power.

There is a disposition now-a-days to admit final cause, if indeed there be final cause at all, only as equally exemplified in both organic and inorganic nature. Even some teleologists are constrained to allow that final causation is no more strikingly exemplified in one department of nature than in another. This tendency is due to the progress of science which has shown by

Mechanics that animal and vegetable bodies are subject to the same mechanical laws as other bodies, in Chemistry the division between Organic and Inorganic Chemistry is being done away with, and in Biology theories of evolution are propounded which apply equally well to animate and inanimate nature. To acknowledge universal finality is not, however, it seems to us, to acknowledge universal equality of finality. Finality per se may be derived equally from any concatenation; but this is not to affirm that there is as much finality in the stone as in the eye. We see in the eye a more complex concatenation than in the stone, a circumscription and constraining of a greater number of efficient causes to the given function, and a greater particularity and speciality in the func tion itself. M. Janet throughout his work insists that finality is peculiarly noticeable in organisms, and one reason for this, different from the ones we have just mentioned, he puts very strongly as follows:

"The reason why final causes will always be sought by preference in the sphere of living beings is, that there alone a fact is met with which may be considered as having a veritable interest, and which may consequently be an end-namely, sensibility. There only, where the possession, the preservation of being is felt, can existence be considered as a good, and conse quently as an end to which a system of means is subordinated. What does it really matter to a crystal to be or not to be? What does it matter to it whether it have eight angles in place of twelve, or be organized geometrically rather than in any other way? Existence having no value for it, why should nature have taken means to secure it? Why should it have been at the expense of a plan and a system of combinations to produce a result without value for any one, at least in the absence of living beings? So, again, however beautiful the planetary and sidereal order may be, what matters this beauty, this order, to the stars themselves that know nothing of it? And if you say that this fair order was constructed to be admired by men, or that God might therein contemplate His glory, it is evident that an end can only be given to these ob jects by going out of themselves, by passing them by, and rising above their proper system, to doubt it is the same as re

gards living beings, if one would rise to the absolute end, the final and last end, but in themselves and for themselves they have already a sufficient though relative end, namely, to exist and to feel it; this is for them a good, and one can understand that nature has taken precaution to assure it to them. It is not the same with inorganic beings." (pp. 190, 191.)

M. Janet thus briefly states his conclusion as to the relations of physical science and teleology:

"To sum up. There is no contradiction between our principles and the most recent scientific conceptions. No fact, no law of nature warrants us to eliminate the final cause from the human mind. Science, so far as it is science, is mute on the problem." (p. 145.)

We have thus endeavored to give an exposition of the chief fundamental ideas in the first book of the Final Causes together with some reflections on the subject which have been stimulated by the study of M. Janet's work. We have said nothing with reference to the chapters on the Facts and Contrary Facts, as there is nothing of very great newness or interest to be noted in connection with them. They are as remarkable for clearness, candor, and thoroughness as is the rest of the discussion. The weakest portion of the book, as it seems to us, is the discussion of evolution in the last three chapters. While there is much here that is suggestive and valuable, yet it did not satisfy us as some other parts of the book did, as revealing perfect mastery. Any worthy consideration of these chapters would itself call for an Article, and cannot be compressed into a few words at the close of this review. The writer has, moreover, an Article on this subject in the New Englander for September, 1883, in which M. Janet's position is to some extent considered.

We must say in conclusion that we think that every one, of whatever opinions, who really loves candid and thorough thinking, cannot but be interested in this work; and we believe that It will do more to put Teleology on a truly scientific basis than any other work of this century has done.

ARTICLE V.-OEHLER'S OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

Oehler's Old Testament Theology. With the translation revised, an Introduction and Notes, by GEORGE E. DAY, Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature, and Biblical Theology, in Yale College. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.

SCHOLARLY candor, generous and accurate learning, carefulness of statement, and a pious, fervid but not bitter spirit, characterize the treatise of Oehler on Old Testament theology. These qualities of the original work, in connection with the faithful revision and valuable notes of its American editor, Professor Day, fully justify the claim of this book to be the best one as yet obtainable for the instruction of theological students in its subject. For mature students, however, it is in some important respects inferior to the "Old Testament Theology" of Hermann Schultz. The latter often shows more of intellectual pith and of ethical grasp than does Oehler; moreover, the positions of Schultz with respect to those questions of Old Testament Introduction and Criticism which underlie the systematic treatment of the theology of the Hebrew writers, are, if not always so "safe", yet more clearly defined and more intelligible. In reading Oehler, one who reads between the lines is frequently led to wonder what the final answer of its author would be to some of these fundamental questions. One is sometimes led to inquire how Oehler himself would reconcile his own position as a critic with his treatment of certain points in Biblical theology. None the less true is the persuasion that Oehler's book for the purpose of opening the subject before beginners is a better book than that of Schultz. For in certain very important respects the theological position of Oehler was such as to give a just additional value, in the minds of his American readers and admirers, to his opinion on critical and historical inquiries. That position, in its relation to these inquiries, it is the purpose of this Article very briefly to set forth.