elements" with the Atomic Theory now in vogue, and the difference between a superficial synthesis and a synthesis that follows delicate and accurate analysis is manifest. Richard Wagner's lofty ideal, already partially realized, of uniting all the arts into one grand "Art-work of the future" (Kuntswerk der Zukunft) is another admirable illustration of development, according to the theory of Evolution. Music and poetry were inseparably linked on the stage at Athens centuries before the theatre at Bayreuth was built. But music, among the Greeks, had no separate existence of its own, while dramatic action and scenic effect were almost entirely lacking. The result is that the modern synthesis is as much greater and richer than the ancient as the arts included in that synthesis are more individualized and perfected. Returning to the question in hand, and using a test proposed, not by Christianity, be it remembered, but by Spencer, we find the answer to be as follows: of the three systems, Positivism, Cosmism, and Christianity, that system which furnishes the most perfect unity, that is, the unity that clearly recognizes the diversity of the factors included under it, is best adapted to the highest needs of the time; on the contrary, that system which presents a homogeneity without heterogeneity-a factitious unity that fails to individualize the differences of which it is composed-or a heterogeneity that is not in turn integrated, or unified, lies "nearest to the beginning of human progress considered as a development." Such is the system which is to be thrown aside as archaic.

As we have seen, each one of the three systems, in its character as a religion, deals with the object of religious cognition, Christianity denominating it God; Comte, Humanity; and Spencer, paradoxically enough, The Unknowable. But, plainly, if the basis of religion is in an apprehension of the object of religious cognition, there must be an apprehending subject, or religion cannot exist. Is there any question as to whether man as well as God, the creature as well as the creator, is to be regarded as a factor in the religious problem? Prof. Whitney of New Haven thinks not. "No one," he says, "will deny that the object of religious inquiry, in all ages and stages, is to learn something about the Maker and Governor of the world

and our relations to him ;"* and again, the most eminent English authority on comparative religion, Max Müller, maintains the same view, asserting that "the broad foundations on which all religions are built up" are "the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life."+ Primarily, then, the factors which are to be distinctly differentiated and again united by the three systems under discussion, as religious systems, are the individual on the one hand, and the object of religious cognition on the other, be it called God, or Humanity, or the unknowable Something. Without attempting to defend the Spencerian Law of Evolution as a universal law, we claim that, as applied and interpreted above, it furnishes a just principle for testing the validity and value of Positivism and Christianity as well as of Cosmism. The independent existence of God and man, and, at the same time, a perfect union between the two, has been the aim of religious striving, practical and speculative, throughout history. If it can be shown, therefore, as we shall hope to show, that Positivism is defective because it offers a unity without difference; that Cosmism fails to meet its own test because it gives, at most, a heterogeneity that cannot be integrated, or unified; and that Christiauity alone makes possible a distinction that is not a separation, and a union that is not a confusion, we shall have, not a mere argumentum ad hominem, but a bona fide proof of the adequacy of Christianity to meet the needs of the world and of all times.

Positivism, while it boasts itself to be a religion without a God, furnishes the best of proofs that such a religion is impossible. Let it be repeated that Comte has a Deity-the "Grand Etre," which he regards as including within itself the collec tive existence of Humanity, past, present, and future. John Stuart Mill, after noting the fact that no one, before Comte, realized, so fully as he, all the majesty of which this idea is susceptible, says: "It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, embraces the manifold present, and descends into the in

* On the So-called Science of Religion. Princeton Review, May, 1881, p. 434, cf. p. 437.

+ Introduction to the Science of Religion, p. 287.

definite and unforeseeable future. Forming a collective Existence without assignable beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is deeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the imposingness of all our highest conceptions."* At the same time, as Mill himself notices, and as Comte frequently asserts, the Grand Etre is not to be conceived of as composed of "all individuals or groups of men, past, present, and future taken indiscriminately,”† but as made up solely of noble natures who have "played their part worthily in life"-a proviso that plainly impairs considerably the infinitude of the idea. Not Humanity as it is, but Humanity idealized, is to be substituted, like the Greek Jove, for the God of Christianity. Moreover, on the ground that only those who have proved themselves worthy of honor, should be incorporated into the Grand Etre, we are to regard it as composed essentially of the dead, the living being admitted provisionally merely.‡ Bearing in mind that the only exist ence accorded to the dead by Positivism, is subjective existence in the minds of the living, we need no further evidence of the indefiniteness and unreality of the Deity of the Positivist. Notwithstanding his hatred of metaphysics, Comte, in presenting this abstract idea as the basis of his religious system, affords a curious illustration of Aristotle's famous dictum: "If we must philosophize, we must philosophize; if we must not philosophize, we must philosophize;-in any case, therefore, we must philosophize."

But the Deity of Positivism is real and definite, or it is nothing. This vague and empty abstraction must, accordingly, be personified, in order to be appreciated. Suitable individuals are to be chosen and worship is to be offered to them as the representatives of humanity.§ Now, it makes no difference, so far as the principle of the thing is concerned, whether a human being is adored under the name of the Lama, as in Thibet, or under the name of Madame Clotilde de Vaux, as in the case of Comte. When we learn, in addition, that the animal races are to be included in the Great Being, we do not need the assur

* Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 135. + Comte's Positive Polity, vol. i, p. 333. Positive Polity, vol. iv., p. 96, et seq.

+ Ibid.

| Ibid, p. 33.

ance which Comte gives us again and again, that Positivism is more directly connected with Fetichism than with any of the forms of Theology, being able to see clearly "how entirely the primeval adoration of the external world was in instinctive conformity with the ultimate tendencies of Humanity."* Without doubt Comte's system exhibits the same defect as is manifest in earlier and ruder forms of religion, inasmuch as he has failed to perceive the Creator and creature as distinct from each other, and has effected a union between the two by hopelessly confusing them.

If we turn to the secondary aspect of the religious problem, and ask what sort of union is established by the Religion of Humanity not only between man and the Deity whom he wor ships, but man and his fellow man, the result is no less disappointing. Notwithstanding the many noble sentiments inculcated by Positivism in regard to the relation of mankind to each other, we find that individuality is regarded by Comte as "anarchy," the "élément perturbateur" of society; that the idea of natural rights is abhorrent to him, and that he proposes to introduce uniformity of opinion by a legislation as arbitrary as the rule of an eastern despot. In whatever way we look at it, we cannot but conclude that the unity proposed by the Religion of Humanity, whether between God and man, or man and society, is a "homogeneity" without difference rather than a "coherent heterogeneity," to be compared to the undeveloped germ rather than to the full grown tree or animal, and to be regarded as better adapted to "the beginning of human progress considered as a development" than to the advanced thought of the nineteenth century.

It has been the confidence of the Spencerians, as it has been of the Positivists, that they represent the vanguard in the philosophy of religion. Does Cosmic Theism respond to the test of highest development-the test it has itself proposed? It is claimed that it does so respond. Let us remind ourselves that, if such be the case, this theory must account for progress from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the indefinite to the definite, from the incoherent to the coherent. Comte regards Deity as absorbed in humanity; Spencer, implicitly,

*Positive Polity, vol. iv., p. 131.

*

in his conceptions of the absolute and the infinite, which exclude the possibility of the independent existence of man, and, explicitly, in his denial of free will and even of a mental substance, seems to regard humanity as swallowed up in Deity. Is not, then, the same objection applicable to Cosmism as to Positivism, that it presents a mere homogeneity without heterogeneity? Strictly speaking, yes. At the same time, the benefit of a doubt is to be conceded. For, however contradictory it may be, and however lacking in a logical basis, it is nevertheless true that Spencer declares the consciousness of personality to be "a fact beyond all others the most certain," and that Fiske expressly denies the charge of Pantheism as false, while the worth and power of personality are emphasized and reëmphasized both by Spencer and Fiske. So far, for the sake of the argument, at least, we do not deny Spencer's statement that "the theory of the Cosmos, beginning with fitful ghost-agency, and ending with the orderly action of a universal Unknown Power, exemplifies once more the law (of Evolution) fulfilled by all ascending transformations." These words close a summary of some eighteen chapters of the Sociology in which the development of primitive beliefs has been traced. Having stated that this development conforms to the Law of Evolution by exhibiting an increase in heterogeneity, etc., he adds, "Change from the indefinite to the definite is no less clearly displayed." . . . "The different kinds of supernat ural beings grow more defined in their forms, dispositions, powers, habits; until, in developed mythologies, they are spe cifically and even individually distinguished by attributes precisely stated." In his Essays, Spencer carries the explanation still farther and shows exactly how the law continues to be ful filled. "Supposed concrete and individual causal agencies," he says, "coalesce in the mind as fast as groups of phenomena are assimilated, or seen to be similarly caused. Along with their coalescence, comes a greater extension of their individualities. Gradually by the continuance of such coalescences, Spencer's Psychology, vol. i., pp. 500-503. First Principles, p. 65.

*

Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii., pp. 423, 424. § Sociology, vol. i., p. 451.

| Ibid, p. 452.